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Chapter 1
Introduction
The banking industry has experienced an upsurge of new business models and tech-
nological developments that have enhanced the use of alternative sources of informa-
tion to determine borrowers’ creditworthiness and reduced the cost of provisioning
financial services in remote geographic locations. At the same time, policymakers
have introduced regulatory changes intended to incentivize financial institutions to
increase credit access in under-served areas while protecting consumers from preda-
tory practices. Facilitating access to affordable credit has become a worldwide policy
in recent decades, motivated by the premise that access to flexible and affordable
funding allows individuals to develop productive projects and support the accumula-
tion of productive assets and human capital, providing protection against unexpected
shocks, and leading to an improvement in their socio-economic conditions.1
These developments have made it possible for large segments of the previously
under-served population to gain access to formal credit alternatives. Yet the effects
of public and private initiatives intended to promote financial inclusion differ substan-
tially across locations and groups of consumers. This dissertation examines how the
differences in the competitive response of incumbent lenders can contribute to explain
these disparities, and proposes counterfactual exercises to illustrate how taking them
into account can improve the efficiency of some widely used policy interventions.
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation focus on the microfinance industry. Mi-
1Cull et al. (2013), Beck et al. (2007) and Donou-Adonsou and Sylwester (2017) present extensive
reviews on the evolution of financial inclusion in recent years and its impact on development outcomes
and economic growth.
1
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crofinance institutions have differentiated from traditional banks by implementing
alternative screening and monitoring methods that allow them to determine the cred-
itworthiness of potential borrowers, typically small entrepreneurs with no collateral
or permanent source of income who do not have access to financial services offered by
traditional banks. These innovations have allowed them to scale up their operations,
transforming from small non-profit organizations into large supervised financial insti-
tutions that compete with mainstream banks to attract both clients and investors. In
the second chapter of this dissertation I examine how these changes in the compet-
itive interaction between these types of loan providers have important implications
for the design of policies intended to facilitate financial access in isolated rural areas
in Colombia.
In the last decades, the portfolio of financial services available for lower-income
borrowers has broadened substantially as a result of technological innovation and
strategic policy support. The design of a regulatory framework that promotes credit
access while protecting individuals from the excessive market power of financial insti-
tutions requires a detailed understanding of the firms’ competitive environment. It
is a challenging task, given the simultaneous interactions of different types of loan
providers across multiple market segments, the varied sources of product differentia-
tion that they can exploit, and the information asymmetries that are typical of the
banking industry. In this context, regulatory measures that are perceived as similar
at a glance can lead to very different results. For example, Cuesta and Sepulveda
(2019) find that tightening the limits on the interest rates charged for consumer loans
in Chile reduces lending significantly, as loan providers cannot transfer to the borrow-
ers the operational costs associated with the provision of this services, while Agarwal
et al. (2014) and Galenianos and Gavazza (2019) find that the introduction of regula-
tory limits on credit card fees in the United States can generate important savings for
borrowers without substantial reduction in the volume of credit. I find in Chapter 3
that the resulting balance between higher economic costs and improved credit access
that followed a relaxation of interest rate limits applied to microloans in Colombia
differed significantly across geographic markets.
A crucial element of the analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3 is the existence
of barriers that make it difficult for consumers in different locations to access the
complete set of credit alternatives offered by all the financial institutions that operate
in the country. In the context studied in these chapters, consumers can only choose
among the financial institutions that administer a branch in their vicinity. Most of
the potential clients are located in remote or underdeveloped areas with limited access
3
to the internet and have informal occupations, which makes it difficult for financial
institutions to obtain information about their payment behavior from conventional
sources. Loan providers need to rely on the direct interaction with loan officers to
collect information about the payment behavior of potential borrowers and monitor
the performance of productive projects that have received funding. In consequence,
the decisions of loan providers regarding their offices’ location have a significant im-
pact on the local availability of credit and the optimal pricing strategies implemented
by financial institutions. Furthermore, the analysis proposed in these chapters recog-
nize that even in urban or higher-income areas some segments of consumers may be
prevented from accessing credit provided by local lenders due of regulatory barriers,
inattention, lack of financial literacy or high search costs.
More recently, technological innovation has disrupted the banking industry even
further with the development of cloud computing, internet application programming
interfaces (APIs) and blockchain technology, increasing both the set of information
available and the capacity of processing tools relevant in the provision of financial
services, from loans to payment and transaction services (Vives, 2019). The broader
availability of reliable internet, smartphones and mobile networks has led to the devel-
opment of technological platforms that reduced the need for ’face to face’ interaction
between loan officers and customers. While this technology is still not widely used in
the loan market in many developing countries, financial institutions in higher-income
countries have reduced the role of traditional branches in the provision of other finan-
cial services, such as mortgages and consumer loans, with substantial effects on their
pricing and geographical diversification strategies. With the introduction of mobile
payment systems and online platforms, financial institutions have streamlined their
branching networks, closing their offices in the least profitable locations and rethought
the type of services that required physical interaction with clients. The fourth chap-
ter of this dissertation explores some of these changes by studying the response of
different kinds of incumbent lenders to the arrival of platform-based online lenders in
the mortgage industry in the United States.
Across the different chapters of this dissertation, I use structural demand and sup-
ply models, as well as reduced-form estimation techniques to study the interaction
of the firms and consumers in the banking industry, particularly in the sectors of
microfinance and mortgage lending. In each chapter, I combine recent developments
from the literature of empirical industrial organization in order to account for partic-
ular features of the microfinance industry, such as credit rationing, inattention, and
unobserved price heterogeneity. Chapters 2 and 3 develop empirical strategies that
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use market-level data to analyze entry and pricing decisions of microfinance institu-
tions, allowing for the quantification of consumer welfare gains associated with policy
intervention. These models are also used to conduct counterfactual exercises to study
the implications of alternative policies. Chapter 4 examines the effects of the advent
of technological innovation in the U.S. mortgage industry.
1.1 Contributions
Chapter 4 explores the relation between MFIs and other types of loan providers that
compete in the market of microloans. I examine the role of institutions specialized
in microfinance at creating market expansion and how their presence in the market
can influence the entry decisions of mainstream loan providers. To measure these
spillovers, I use market-level information of small isolated markets in Colombia to
estimate a structural model that identifies the effects of the presence of an additional
competitor on the overall profit and the stock of loans provided by incumbents of
different types.
The empirical strategy consists of an entry model similar to that in Berry (1994)
that incorporates a revenue equation. This extension, first proposed by Schaumans
and Verboven (2015) allows us to understand how entry affects both the market struc-
ture and the revenue of other competitors. I find positive and significant spillovers
between banks and MFIs. Interestingly, these competitive effects are not symmetric
among different types of loan providers. The presence of MFIs has a positive im-
pact on the profit of mainstream institutions, which is partially explained by market
expansion in the loans market. By contrast, MFIs seem to benefit less from the pres-
ence of mainstream institutions. This new insight about the competitive interaction
among MFIs and other formal loan providers could help in the design of policies to
promote investment in branching networks, particularly in small rural markets.
Chapter 3 explores the welfare implications of the relaxation of a regulatory ceiling
applied to the interest rate of micro-loans in Colombia. The presence of usury ceilings
can limit the availability of funding for some borrowers, with negative consequences
for the availability of formal funding alternatives across regions, as it reduces the
incentives to invest in branching networks, particularly in rural areas. On the other
side, interest rate caps can be welfare improving, reducing the possibility of banks to
price discrimination. Economic theory indicates that removing a price ceiling in the
presence of third-degree price discrimination is not always welfare improving. The
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implications are largely determined by the degree of output expansion that takes place
in the absence of the ceiling.
To measure these effects, I develop a structural model of the microcredit market
in Colombia and estimate it using a unique data set that contains information on
market shares and characteristics of financial institutions across geographic markets.
My approach takes elements from the literature concerned with demand estimation
in the presence of consumers’ inattention (e.g. Ho et al., 2017; Abaluck and Adams,
2017), integrating them into the framework proposed by D’Haultfœuille et al. (2018)
to account for potential market expansion and unobserved price heterogeneity. I use
the variation of market outcomes across geographic locations before and after the
policy change to identify the portion of consumers that gain access to formal loans
as a consequence of the removal of the interest rate ceilings. I use the model to
understand the implications of the regulation change in terms of the volume of loans
and the optimal interest rate set by financial institutions in different market segments.
With these elements, I can evaluate the policy’s effects in terms of consumer and
producer welfare across locations. I find that there is a loss in consumer surplus
associated with an increase in the interest rates charged to all borrowers after the
ceiling was relaxed. However, the welfare gains associated with the entry of financial
institutions in new locations and the provision of financial services to borrowers who
did not have access to formal loans before the policy change exceed these losses in
most places. In a counterfactual scenario where I examine the effects of relaxing the
usury ceiling in the absence of additional investment in branching networks, I find that
the policy is still welfare improving at the national level, although in this case there
is a significant number of locations, especially small markets, that would experience
a loss in consumer surplus in the absence of additional branches.
Finally, Chapter 4 explores recent changes in the U.S. mortgage lending associ-
ated with the increased use of technological innovation in the provision of financial
services. This industry has experienced a rapid transformation, with an increasing
number of lenders adopting technological innovations that allow potential borrowers
to complete their mortgage application process online, reducing the need for face-to-
face interaction with loan officers. This chapter examines the response of incumbent
mortgage lenders to the advent of this technology. I find that the increased availability
of lenders providing online mortgages has had a differentiated impact on the volume
of applications and loan originations for incumbent providers depending on their size.
The results suggest that local lenders are better able to differentiate from FinTech
institutions by offering services that are appealing to some segments of borrowers.
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By contrast, mortgages provided by FinTech seem to be a closer substitute for the
services offered by large financial institutions. As a result, these competitors have
seen a reduction in their market share after FinTech entry.
1.2 Policy Implications
The results of Chapter 2 indicate that microfinance institutions can generate market
expansion that benefits all competitors in the market, including traditional banks that
focus on other types of financial services. Since their presence can lead to the entry
of mainstream lending establishments in isolated markets, MFIs have the potential to
contribute to consumer welfare by facilitating access to financial products beyond their
loan portfolios. This new insight about the competitive interaction among MFIs and
other formal loan providers can be used to improve the efficiency of subsidies designed
to promote the opening of branches in rural locations.
Chapter 3 addresses the effects of interest rate caps on consumer welfare. The
results indicate that the policy increased consumer surplus even in the absence of
additional investments on branching networks. This is explained by the gains in con-
sumer welfare of borrowers in existing locations who gained access to formal loans
after the ceiling was relaxed. Nevertheless, additional investment in branching net-
works helped to compensate for the welfare losses associated with the increase in
interest rates, particularly for safer borrowers who already had access to formal loans
before the usury ceiling was removed.
The third chapter highlights the competitive advantages of small and large financial
institutions in the U.S. market industry in the advent of a new type of competitor.
The results suggest that online mortgage platforms are a closer substitute for ser-
vices provided by large financial institutions, and contrast previous studies that have
indicated that small and local lenders are more vulnerable to the arrival of platform-
based competitors. Although the analysis presented here does not consider important
differences in incumbent lenders’ regulatory requirements, this insight could help us
understand the effects of the development of online mortgage lending on credit access
across geographic markets.
Recently, policymakers and industry experts have highlighted the benefits of part-
nerships between FinTech institutions and local lenders to expand the portfolio of
services available for consumers, exploiting the competitive advantages of two differ-
ent business models. While the effects of these alliances were still incipient during the
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period of analysis that I consider here, their role in shaping the competitive environ-
ment in the mortgage market industry should be considered in more detail in future
research.




Traditional Banks in Rural
Markets. Evidence from Colombia
Abstract
In recent years, microfinance institutions (MFIs) in several developing countries have undergone a
transition from non-profit organizations into regulated (for profit) financial establishments, trans-
forming their competitive interaction with traditional loan providers. While the new scenario could
be characterized by increased business stealing between the two types of competitors, the presence of
rivals of the opposite type could also generate market expansion that benefits all incumbent lenders.
I use a structural model to identify the effects of the presence of an additional competitor of either
type on the overall profit and the stock of loans provided by incumbents in small isolated markets
in Colombia. I evaluate different assumptions on the interaction across types of loan providers, find-
ing positive and significant spillovers between banks and MFIs. I find that presence of MFIs has a
positive impact on the profit of mainstream institutions, which is partially due to market expansion
in the loans market. By contrast, MFIs do not seem to benefit significantly from the presence of
mainstream institutions. This result is relevant for the design of policies that attempt to increase
the supply of financial services in isolated markets.
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2.1 Introduction
In recent decades, non-profit organizations, as well as regulated financial institutions,
have developed a broad set of financial services designed exclusively for potential cus-
tomers who find it difficult to access traditional financial services due to low income,
lack of suitable collateral, or absence of reliable information about their payment
behavior. Several studies have focused on the role of these specialized institutions
at improving the living conditions of their clients; Cull et al. (2014) provides an ex-
tensive review of empirical studies that suggest that access to credit facilitates the
accumulation of capital over time, as small entrepreneurs are able to start indepen-
dent, productive projects as well as to overcome unpredictable situations that might
put at risk the success of their ventures. Although evidence on long term effects of
access to micro-loans is mixed (Banerjee (2013) provides a detailed review of empir-
ical studies on the topic), governments in many countries have been enthusiastic at
creating strategies to facilitate the provision of financial services for the low-income
population segments, which has resulted in an increase of the number of non-profit
private organizations and regulated financial institutions specialized in this segment.
MFIs specialize in the supply of financial services for the poor. These institutions
operate under different regulatory settings, ranging from non-profit informal platforms
at a local level to well-established banks with operations in many countries. In recent
years, some of the biggest MFIs have transformed from non-profit organizations de-
pending on external subsidies into specialized banks, able to provide funding to small
entrepreneurs and low-income households, under profitability conditions required by
investors and clients from the deposit market. Cull et al. (2009) compile evidence
from a broad set of countries on the transition of non-profit microfinance institutions
into regulated banks, free from subsidies, and how this process has affected the supply
of microcredit. They find that MFIs that have undergone this transformation tend
to offer products that are more comparable to those provided by mainstream loan
providers.
As this transition allows MFIs to use deposits from the public as additional fund-
ing to expand their loan portfolio, increased interaction with mainstream financial
institutions is expected. There are several reasons why the entry of an MFI is likely
to have a different effect on the profit of mainstream financial institutions: first, as
discussed by Banerjee (2013), the amount of learning involved in the credit relation-
ship, both by the customer and the MFI, and the extent to which others can use
this knowledge competitors in the market configure a potential externality. Second,
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inefficiencies in the loan supply might arise if there are barriers that tie borrowers
to a particular provider for an extended period of time. Since these externalities can
ultimately determine whether a financial institution enters or exits a market, it is im-
portant to examine whether MFIs contribute to expanding the portfolio of financial
products available for consumers in local markets by facilitating the entry of other
loan providers. This question turns out to be particularly relevant in the design of
policies to increase access to financial services in isolated locations where few com-
petitors are willing to enter. Furthermore, accurately measuring these interactions
among MFIs and mainstream institutions at a local level adds to the understanding
of the nature of competition in the microfinance sector at the national level.
Financial institutions are more likely to enter markets where they perceive favor-
able demand conditions as well as a milder competitive response from incumbents
and other potential entrants. This simultaneous determination of entry and market
structure, as well as the fact that some of the market/loan-provider characteristics
that make entry profitable are likely correlated across different types of financial
institutions and are often unobservable to the econometrician, create an endogene-
ity problem that needs to be addressed in order to obtain accurate measures of the
spillovers that MFIs generate on incumbent institutions. In this paper, I estimate a
structural model where the observed local market configuration is interpreted as the
equilibrium outcome of the competitive interaction among different types of potential
entrants. Taking elements from industrial organization models that have been used
to examine competition in retail sectors, I propose a static entry model with revenue
equation, similar to the one developed by Schaumans and Verboven (2015) to iden-
tify the effects of entry on market expansion for different types of competitors in the
retail banking industry. This model uses the variation in the number of competi-
tors across locations to obtain measures of effects of the presence of MFIs on other
loan providers. Their approach extends the model proposed by Bresnahan and Reiss
(1990) with information about the local revenues, to disentangle the impact of entry
on market power and market expansion.
Using an approach similar to the one developed Mazzeo (2002), I introduce hetero-
geneity among loan providers and evaluate empirically different assumptions on the
type of strategic interactions among MFIs and mainstream banks. My approach is
closely related to the one developed by Fernandez (2016), who investigates the pres-
ence of positive (bilateral) spillovers between bars and cafeterias and the consequences
for urban planning.
Exploring the competitive interaction in the banking industry is a challenging task
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due to the complex structure of the profit of financial institutions and their dual role
in the deposits and loan markets. In this paper, I abstract from some of the elements
that have been recently discussed in the literature concerning the spatial interaction
across branches in the banking industry (Aguirregabiria et al., 2012; Ho and Ishii,
2011; Huysentruyt et al., 2013, e.g.), by modeling the local market structures as the
result of entry decisions that are independent of those taken at other locations, and
restricting my empirical analysis to small, geographically isolated markets. The cost
of this decision is the impossibility of extending the conclusions obtained here to other
types of markets, such as big urban centers. Nevertheless, analyzing the competitive
interaction of lenders in these locations turns out to be particularly relevant from a
policy point of view because the decision to open a branch in those locations has a
high impact on the portfolio of financial services that become available for vulnerable
clients.
Market structure is determined by entry and exit decisions of individual firms,
and these are affected by expectations of future profits, which, in turn, depend on
the degree of competition by potential entrants and incumbents within the market.
Given the static nature of the approach that I propose here, no inference can be made
about the competitive process that gave origin to the market structure observed in
different locations in 2014. A dynamic framework could provide further insights on the
short and long term effects of recent regulatory and technological changes on market
structure and the mechanisms behind the potential spillovers among different types of
loan providers. Introducing these dynamic considerations involves solving a dynamic
game with large state space, which results in substantial computational challenges
and requires additional information on entry and exit flows across locations. The
extension of the model in this direction is left, therefore, for future research1
Dynamic considerations are particularly important in industries where there is a
substantial difference between the incumbents’ fixed cost of operation and the sunk
costs faced by potential entrants. This distinction helps to rationalize simultaneous
flows of entering and exiting firms. In the case of the retail banking industry, few
studies have studied entry decisions using a dynamic framework. de Elejalde (2009)
argues that the sunk costs associated with the opening of a branch in a rural location
1de Elejalde (2009) uses a dynamic framework to analyze competition in a context of rapid
expansion of branching networks in the US banking industry, after the introduction of the 1994 Riegle-
Neal Act, which permitted banks and holding companies to operate in multiple states. Although
he is able to provide an estimate of the entry costs for different types of financial institutions, the
results in terms of the competitive effect associated to the presence of rivals are qualitatively similar
to those obtained by other authors using static models, such as Cohen and Mazzeo (2007).
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in the United States are associated mainly with investments in advertising, licensing
and other expenses that single market de novo banks need to face in order to start
their operations, but do not seem to be very important for multi-market banks that
are already operating in the industry. The retail banking industry in Colombia, and
in particular, the microfinance sector, experienced a period of expansion during 2011
and 2012 that was characterized by an increase in the number of branching networks
of existing financial institutions, rather than by the entry of new competitors at the
national level. The absence of ’de novo’ competitors at the national level suggests that
the presence of sunk costs might not have a significant impact on the entry decisions
of financial institutions at the local level.
After the branching network expansion observed in 2011-2012, there has been no
change in terms of the number of financial institutions available in most the locations
included in my sample, with exit of lenders occurring very rarely.2 Also, there was
no change in the number of competitors of both types at the national level between
2011 and 2014. As a result, a continuous competitive interaction between mainstream
institutions and MFIs has taken place for at least two years in most of the locations.
The stability in the market structure of the locations included in the sample and
the overall favorable and stable macroeconomic environment observed in Colombia
around the period studied here, allows us to interpret our estimates as the effects of
sustained competitive interaction among incumbent lenders.
One of the advantages of the approach used here is that it does not rely on confiden-
tial individual data. Instead, I estimate a structural model that captures the strategic
interaction among different types of loan providers using information on the number
of competitors and the composition of the loan portfolio across small geographically
isolated markets in Colombia in 2014. This country provides an interesting setting to
evaluate the effects of entry of MFIs in the local retail banking industry because the
conditions of microloans, such as the type of liability, the frequency of payments and
the total amount borrowed, are closer to the ones of the products offered by main-
stream financial institutions. The similarities across the characteristics of the loans
provided by banks and MFIs, the regulatory framework under which both types of
institutions operate, as well as the level of information sharing among the two types of
loans providers via credit score agencies, suggest that the interaction between banks
2In During the period 2012-2014, there was no exit of MFIs in any of the markets analyzed,
while exit of mainstream lenders occurred in 12 locations out of 498. After 2014, there have been
reductions in the number of branches of the most prominent financial institutions, but they have
all taken place in urban areas and have not translated into significant changes in the number of
competitors.
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and MFIs is likely to be significant.
I find that the presence of both mainstream banks and MFIs had a strong positive
impact on the volume of loans of incumbent lenders, even after controlling for a broad
set of unobservable and observable local factors that could have influenced the demand
for loans for both types of lenders. Banks exhibited a higher outstanding value of
the loan portfolio per capita in markets where there was at least one microfinance
institution. Interestingly, the volume of loans provided by MFIs also increased in
those markets where there was at least one mainstream bank, although to a lesser
extent. There is, nevertheless, intense competition among loan providers of the same
type. Banks’ profits reduce to 43% of the monopolist level if there is a new bank in the
market, while in the case of MFIs, the profit in markets with at least one competitor
of this type becomes just 25,8% of the monopolist level.
This paper continues as follows: Section 2.2 contains a brief review of the literature.
Section 2.3 outlines the essential features of the MFIs and other financial institutions
that compete in the retail banking industry in Colombia and shortly summarize re-
cent regulation changes that have had a significant impact on the development of
microfinance. Section 2.4 provides summary statistics of the data and Section 2.5
and presents the econometric strategy. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 present the results of the
structural model and counterfactual exercises. Section 2.8 contains the concluding
remarks.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to a growing literature that studies the interaction of MFIs
and other loan providers in local markets. Furthermore, it relates to a broad number
of studies that investigate the intensity of competition among loan providers in the
retail banking industry.
Several studies have focused on the competition dynamics among institutions spe-
cialized in providing services for the poor. Most of this research has made use of
data of non-profit institutions that offer group-liability loans using private donations
or government resources as a primary source of funding. These institutions typically
target the poorest segments of the population, whose only alternative source of fi-
nancing are informal lenders. Demont (2016) analyzes the impact of entry of MFIs
on informal sources of lending in rural villages in India using a model where MFIs use
joint-liability contracts while informal moneylenders offer standard individual loans.
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By contrasting the predictions of the model with a panel household survey for India,
he finds that MFIs can worsen the informational problems faced by traditional lenders,
leading them to increase the interest rate charged to low-income clients. Kaboski and
Townsend (2012) find similar evidence on interest rates increments in Thailand; they
interpret these changes as an indication of the financial constraints of the households.
These findings are consistent with a model where MFIs attract better borrowers from
the moneylender and where fixed costs are essential in informal lending, such as the
one proposed by Mookherjee and Motta (2016). Other studies have focused on the
competition among MFIs. McIntosh et al. (2005) studies the effects of rising compe-
tition among the incumbent MFIs by examining the dropout and repayment rates of
a sample of clients of one of the most prominent microfinance institutions in Uganda,
as it abandons its position as local monopolist in the supply of micro-loans. The
identification strategy relies on group-level changes in outcomes that occurred after
the entry of a new competitor in the market.
Only in the last decade have studies directly addressed the effects of entry of MFIs
on other loan providers that participate in local loan markets. In recent years, the
business model of many MFIs has undergone structural changes aiming to achieve
greater independence from donors while maintaining the rate of expansion of their
portfolio. While the majority of MFIs today are still non-profit, several have already
transformed into banks or other kinds of regulated financial institutions. Regulated
MFIs include regional leaders such as Banco Compartamos in Mexico, Banco FIE
in Brazil or Bandhan, and SKS in India, which are among the largest MFIs in the
world (D’Espallier et al., 2017). The transition process implies the adoption of a
shareholder ownership structure, and most often, it also includes becoming subject to
prudential regulation by national banking authorities. These changes may translate
into increased tensions between higher profit and outreach (Hermes and Lensink,
2007), as well as stricter competition among MFIs both in terms of attracting new
clients and obtain funding from donors (Ly and Mason, 2012).
As noticed by Cull et al. (2009), while regulated MFIs continue to provide services
to segments of the population without access to traditional banking, the character-
istics of their products have become more similar to the ones offered by traditional
financial institutions. For example, D’Espallier et al. (2017) and Cull et al. (2014)
find that regulated MFIs tend to increase the size of their loans and to serve a lower
percentage of women. Meanwhile, the majority of their loan portfolio has individual,
rather than group, liability. Few studies have explored the effect of these transitions
on the competitive interaction MFIs and mainstream financial institutions. Descrip-
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tive evidence is provided by Cull et al. (2009), who examine the impact of the presence
of banks on the profitability and outreach of commercially oriented MFIs. They find
that greater bank penetration in the overall economy is associated with more entry
of commercial banks specialized in microcredit in poorer markets.
This paper provides new insights into this question by incorporating elements from
empirical industrial organization models that have been used to study competition
in other retail sectors. I extend the model proposed by Schaumans and Verboven
(2015) and Fernandez (2016) to account for the differences between the loan providers
that interact in local markets. To include the possibility that competitors belong to
different types, I use the framework proposed by Mazzeo (2002), who analyzes entry
decisions in the context of firms heterogeneity. In later work, Cohen and Mazzeo
(2010) uses a similar approach to analyze competition for deposits in the retail banking
industry in the United States.
In addition, this paper relates to several studies that examine the competitive
interaction among different types of financial institutions using information from the
market configuration observed across different locations. My approach is similar to
the one proposed by Cohen (2004), who tests empirically different hypotheses about
competitive interaction among banks and thrifts.
Competition among different types of financial institutions have been studied us-
ing spatial models that explicitly account for the consumer disutility from a distance
traveled as in Ho and Ishii (2011) and Huysentruyt et al. (2013). This approach
has been used to study competition in the banking industry urban locations where
cannibalization across branches of the same bank is more likely, or when banks with
large networks face competition from single-market financial institutions (e.g. Dai and
Yuan, 2013; Adams et al., 2007). Other studies have tried to capture externalities
among the nodes of the same branching network related to geographical diversifica-
tion of risk and liquidity considerations (see: Aguirregabiria et al., 2012; Clark et al.,
2017). In contrast with these studies, I model the decision of entry in each market
as independent from the decisions taken in other locations. I argue that local profits,
rather than the aggregate profit across markets, are the main determinant of these
entry decisions. This assumption seems suitable to model entry in remote geograph-
ically isolated markets, where spillovers towards neighboring markets might not be
very significant and where financial institutions tend to open only a reduced number
of branches per market.3
3de Juan (2003) finds evidence in support of the independence of sub-markets, using information
from small towns in Spain. He concludes that banks decide to enter the markets mostly based on
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My work complements previous studies that have studied competition in the retail
banking industry in Colombia, such as those by Salamanca (2005) and Rozo et al.
(2008), by taking into account the heterogeneity among loan providers, and measuring
the potential spillovers that MFIs can generate on other financial institutions in terms
of market expansion. By exploring the competitive interaction among these loan
providers, this paper offers new insights about the role of MFIs at facilitating access
to banking services in isolated locations, that can be used in the design of future
policy interventions.
2.3 Background: The Colombian Banking Industry
In this section, I provide a summary of the characteristics of MFIs and other loan
providers that interacted in the retail banking industry in Colombia as of 2014, fo-
cusing first on the general economic and regulatory environment, and later on the
particular characteristics of MFIs and other lending institutions.
Colombia experienced favorable macroeconomic conditions that were accompanied
by a significant expansion of the demand for loans in the period between 2006 and
2014, particularly in the households’ sector. After a deep financial crisis at the end of
the 1990s that motivated stricter regulation concerning risks management and capi-
tal requirements for financial institutions, the banking industry underwent a process
of consolidation that resulted in a relatively concentrated market, where commercial
banks with extended branching networks throughout the national territory repre-
sented a significant share of the market portfolio. The segments that experienced
higher growth were the ones related to the provision of financial services towards
households and micro-entrepreneurs. The potential for growth in Colombia in the
niche of microcredit is thought to be still high, given the levels of poverty, inequality,
and financial restrictions faced by a significant portion of the population. According
to Estrada and Rozo (2006), these restrictions are even more acute in rural areas,
where a public bank had exclusively provided financial services and often tied to the
existence of a productive project in the agricultural sector.
local conditions of demand.
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2.3.1 Microfinance institutions in Colombia
Microfinance institutions in Colombia started operations at the end of the 1980s.
Before their entry, loans for low-income entrepreneurs were provided exclusively by
the government through development agencies. According to Barona (2004), during
the 1990s, most of these institutions were non-profit organizations that funded their
loan operations with donations from private individual donors or international de-
velopment agencies. Only after the effects of a deep financial crisis that the country
experienced at the end of the 1990s attenuated, the number of non-profit organiza-
tions that offered loans to poor clients started to increase. Between 2000 and 2010, the
number of institutions increased, while the biggest MFIs transitioned from non-profit
organizations into specialized banks.
According to Banca de las Oportunidades, the government agency in charge of
implementing the national strategy to promote financial access, there were 18 no profit
MFIs and nine regulated financial institutions specialized in microfinance (Banca de
las Oportunidades, 2014) as of December of 2014. Besides, there was one public bank
that intermediated government resources to provide funding for productive projects
in the agricultural sector. The share of this bank in the total outstanding portfolio
of microloans reached 42% in 2014. The public bank was present in all banks where
private banks were active in 2014. This bank opened its branches long before the
entry of any private bank in all the locations included in the sample. Historically,
the network of this bank was used by the government to distribute currency in rural
locations, and many public subsidies in rural areas are distributed using its branching
network. There has been little change in the number of locations where this bank is
active; it has not exited any market, and it has only experienced a few closures in big
cities where it had several branches. The stability of its networks indicates that the
development of private banks has had little impact on its operations.
Among the private institutions that provided this type of loan, the most important
institutions were banks specialized in microfinance (27%) and non-profit MFIs (31%).
These institutions registered sustained growth in previous years, both in terms of their
number of clients and the size of their portfolio. Between 2007 and 2014, the number of
clients nearly tripled, rising from almost 600.000 clients to 1,8 million, while the share
of the total portfolio of loans (including commercial loans and mortgages) increased
from 0.7% to 3%.
MFIs in Colombia offer different types of loans depending on the characteristics
of the client, such as their credit record collateral availability. The vast majority of
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them are individual loans, rather than group liability loans, and they comply with the
legal definition of microcredit, introduced by the government in 2007. This definition
specifies i) a maximum amount that can be borrowed by a single client (around 7500
USD), ii) a cap on the total debt that the client can have with the financial system
(nearly 36000 USD) and ii) all costs (different from the interest rate) and commissions
that financial institutions can charge for the product. According to Fernandez (2014)
the average amount of a microloan in 2014 was around 2170 USD . Most of these
loans have a monthly frequency of payments.
While some of these characteristics are similar to those observed for loans given
to higher-income households by mainstream financial institutions, the interest rate
of this type of loan was significantly higher in 2014 (34% effective annual for micro-
credits vs. 19% effective annual for other unsecured consumer loans, on average). 4
Furthermore, there are essential differences in the ways that MFIs value the avail-
able collateral and their methods of monitoring clients. To maintain low levels of
default and reduce associated losses, MFIs rely on higher provisions and close mon-
itoring of the productive projects of the clients, often including additional services
for entrepreneurs, such as guidance on management skills and accounting. Branching
networks are often complemented with mobile agents to reach clients in isolated loca-
tions, where there is a limited supply of financial services by mainstream lenders. In
consequence, microloans are the type of loan with greater geographical diversification.
In 2014, 62% of these loans were given to clients in locations different from the 13
biggest cities in the country, while only 5% of the loans in other categories were given
to clients outside these locations.
MFIs in Colombia operated in the beginning as non-profit organizations that did
not have legal authorization to capture deposits from the public. Once they tran-
sitioned into regulated financial institutions, they became legally able to capture
deposits from the public and gained access to deposit insurance. However, they did
not start capturing deposits from the public to a large scale after they became reg-
ulated financial institutions. Nowadays, many of them have relatively low levels of
deposits compared with their volume of loans. As of 2014, they all maintained low
levels of deposits even when they could legally capture deposits from the public. Their
scarce participation in the deposits market could be explained by the lack of demand
for these services in their market niche (small entrepreneurs in rural areas make all
transactions using cash due to the lack of financial infrastructure, and low levels of
4These numbers correspond to nominal interest rates. The inflation rate in Colombia has remained
in single digits since 2000. In 2014 the annual inflation rate was 2.91%.
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financial literacy), the presence of sunk costs and entry barriers, both at the national
and the local level (expansion of ATM and payment terminals, commercial agree-
ments, etc), and the existence of sufficient and cheap funding obtained through other
sources.
2.3.2 Other financial institutions
Commercial banks are the most relevant agents in the retail loan market in Colom-
bia, both in terms of market share and size, representing more than 90% of the total
provided to the private sector. These institutions have a diverse portfolio that in-
cludes services for business clients, households, and micro-entrepreneurs. The highest
share of their portfolio corresponds to commercial loans (58% on average), followed
by non-collateral consumer loans and mortgages. Microcredits account for less than
5% of their total stock of loans. However, there is significant heterogeneity in the
composition of the loan portfolio of these institutions, with some smaller banks fo-
cusing on non-collateral loans to households or commercial loans, exclusively. Banks
rely heavily on their activity in the retail credit market. Loans represented 65,7% of
their assets in 2014, while net interest obtained from loan operations accounted for
62% of their total revenue.
Other institutions that compete in the retail loan market include loan providers reg-
ulated by the financial supervisory authority (Superintendencia Financiera de Colom-
bia), and several organizations that offer loans to particular groups of the population
such as credit unions and employees associations. These institutions exhibit a higher
degree of specialization, both in terms of their geographic location and the range of
products they offer, concentrating their operations in urban markets. The financial
supervisory authority does not regulate employee associations and other credit unions,
as these organizations are not allowed to capture deposits from the public. Since for-
mal employment is often a requirement for membership, they are not considered as a
source of funding for independent entrepreneurs with low income.
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
I use a cross-sectional data set that contains information from 953 cities and towns
in Colombia (from a total of 1102) in December 2014. The number of branches
and the loan portfolio of all financial institutions are published by Superintendencia
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Financiera, while the demographic variables per market are taken from the Munici-
palities Panel Data Set from Universidad de Los Andes, which contains information
from several official sources.
I define a market as a group of administrative municipalities that fulfills two char-
acteristics: its population is below 150.000 inhabitants, and the distance to the closest
urban center is bigger than 40 kilometers5. If two or more municipalities are less than
25 kilometers apart from each other, they are considered as a single market, whenever
the total population is below 150000. I obtained 498 markets. These markets account
for 4, 8% of the total outstanding value of loan portfolio in the country and 52,2%
of the value of the microloans portfolio of regulated financial institutions. Further-
more, this sample of markets concentrates a significant proportion of the Colombian
population (30.3%).
This definition of geographic market attempts to include the possibility that poten-
tial borrowers demand financial services from financial institutions located in neigh-
boring municipalities. The distance that a borrower is willing to travel in order
to access financial services differs greatly depending on the context and the type of
products required. Brevoort and Wolken (2008) show that the distance between small
businesses in the United States and their most frequently used depository institution
was 6.4km in the median and 122.2km on average in 2003, while Degryse and On-
gena (2005) find smaller estimates for the Belgian banking industry (between 4.8 to 8
km). By type of product, Brevoort and Wolken (2008) find that the median distance
between a firm headquarters in the United States and the financial institutions that
provides them with equipment or motor vehicle loans was 30.4km and 38.4km in 2003,
respectively. By contrast, the distance to access asset services like checking accounts
was just 3.2km. All these studies include urban areas densely occupied by banks,
which explains the skewness of the distance distribution.
An estimate in a context more comparable to the Colombian one is provided by the
National Committee for Financial Inclusion of Mexico, who found that the average
distance between borrowers and brick-and-mortar branches in rural areas was 28.2km
in 2017 (Comité Nacional de Inclusión Financiera de México, 2018). This measure is
based on the geometric distance between coordinates; therefore, it does not necessarily
correspond to the actual distance that borrowers need to travel in order to approach
to a branch in person. The threshold used to define geographic markets here (40km)
attempts to reflect the state of the road infrastructure in rural areas in Colombia,
5This distance corresponds to the shortest path between towns using the current road network,
provided by Open Source Routing Machine Project.
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and is, therefore, based on the shortest path between towns using the current road
networks.
Table 2.1: Number of loan providers per type - December 2014
Market structure Count Loan portfolio per capita
Mainstream institutions MFIs
{Nb = 0, Nm = 0} 316 0.00 0.00
{Nb = 0, Nm = 1} 10 0.00 81.40
{Nb = 0, Nm > 1} 0 0.00 0.00
{Nb = 1, Nm = 0} 66 354.94 0.00
{Nb > 1, Nm = 0} 51 344.77 0.00
{Nb = 1, Nm = 1} 6 301.60 46.56
{Nb > 1, Nm = 1} 34 305.31 69.33
{Nb = 1, Nm > 1} 0 0.00 0.00
{Nb > 1, Nm > 1} 17 218.26 52.19
Notes: Based on information published by Superintendencia Fi-
nanciera de Colombia. Values expressed in US dollars (PPP-2014).
Table 2.1 presents the market configurations observed in the sample and the av-
erage value of the loan portfolio divided by the market population. There is at least
one competitor in 36.5% of the markets. Within those markets, market structures
with one or more mainstream institutions and no MFIs are the most frequent. The
value of the loan portfolio per capita diminishes in markets with more competitors;
in the case of banks, it is lower in markets where there is at least one MFI compared
to markets where only banks operate. As it will be explained in further detail in
Section 2.7, the econometric strategy used to measure the competitive interaction of
loan providers compares market structures and loan volumes across geographic mar-
kets. The presence of many competitors of both types in a particular location can
be indicative of complementarity among loan providers, but it can also indicate that
the market is particularly profitable for the two types. In order to distinguish the
effects related to presence of different types of loan providers it is necessary to control
for all observable and unobservable characteristics that make a location attractive
for both types of competitors. This is done by making specific assumptions on the
distribution of the unobservables and incorporating information of all markets, in-
cluding those where there is only one competitor or even those where there are no
competitors at all. These markets are relevant in the estimation because the absence
of lenders in those locations indicates that the potential profit obtained there in case
of entry would be smaller than that of the outside option. In Section 2.7, I use these
estimates I can to assess whether it is more likely to see the a mainstream institutions
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or an MFI opening a new branch locations where there are no incumbent lenders, and
to provide a measure of the subsidies needed to achieve entry in locations that are











































































Table 2.2: Summary statistics of markets - December 2014
Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Mainstream financial institutions 0.86 1.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 13.00
MFIs 0.17 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
Public bank (dummy variable) 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total population 26736.76 26231.39 984.00 9333.00 17575.50 33937.00 143193.00
Population in rural areas (%) 0.61 0.19 0.07 0.50 0.63 0.76 0.96
Distance to closest urban center 122.37 225.80 40.50 68.50 99.88 138.68 4920.70
Population in poverty conditions (%) 0.49 0.19 0.09 0.34 0.46 0.61 1.00
Number of firms 207.59 359.07 1.00 34.00 92.50 219.00 3526.00
Oil extraction fields 2.73 6.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.82
Coca plantations (dummy variable) 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Attacks of armed illegal groups∗ 0.33 1.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.82
Robbery of commercial establishments∗ 1.13 2.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.58 29.28
Notes: 498 markets in the sample. ∗Number of incidents per 100000 inhabitants. Based on information published by Superin-
tendencia Financiera de Colombia.
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I include in the model some variables that may help to predict the size of the
market and individual demand for credit, such as population, distance to the closest
urban center, share of population under in poverty condition, number of firms, and
presence of oil extraction fields. In addition, I considered some measures of the level of
violence experienced in each location, such as the number of attacks by illegal armed
groups, the presence of coca plantations, and the number of robberies to commercial
establishments. Table 2.2 presents summary statistics of the main variables in 2014.
2.4.1 Competitors
Based on the composition of the loans portfolio and the regulation that applies for
each financial institution I classify loan providers into two categories: i) mainstream
banks and other regulated financial institutions and ii) MFIs.6 The last category
includes all private regulated institutions whose share of microcredit loans exceeds
40% of their loans portfolio7. While, public institutions are important providers of
funding in small isolated markets, their entry decisions and the amount of loans that
they are able to provide depends to a greater extent on national policies and fiscal
considerations, rather than on current local market conditions. Furthermore, they
focus on a segment of the market (rural productive projects) that is less targeted by
private financial institutions. Hence, I consider their presence as exogenous of the
market structure represented by the number of private banks or MFIs in the market.
Financial institutions have only one branch per market in 89.8% of locations.
Transaction terminals such as post offices and retail stores that offer banking ser-
vices in agreement with banks (known as banking correspondents) are not taken into
account to define entry because it is not possible for new clients to ask for loans or
opening standard savings accounts. Furthermore, since financial institutions use ex-
isting branching networks from other firms, the decision on opening a new BC in a
particular location is not strictly based on the local profit for the financial institution.
The presence of transaction terminals helps reducing travel costs for the customers of
financial institutions; however, potential clients are required to complete the applica-
6Financial institutions that do not participate in the retail loan market are excluded, as well as
government development agencies, credit unions, and other associations that provide loans.
7I include these two institutions because the size of their portfolio is similar to that of the banks
specialized in microcredit. Furthermore, these institutions share information with credit score agen-
cies and offer similar products to those offered by regulated institutions specialized in this niche.
Other institutions that are not included due to lack of comparable information provide less than 8%
of microcredits.
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tion process for the acquisition of different financial services by approaching in person
to a traditional branch. As of 2014, the number of requests of saving accounts re-
ceived via banking correspondents (BCs) was extremely low, with most of the clients
using those terminals to make payments to third parties and transfers. In addition,
it is often the case that retail chain stores have agreements at the national level with
multiple financial institutions at the same time, which partially dilutes the individ-
ual competitive advantage that a single financial institution could derive from the
presence of a transaction terminal. In those agreements, financial institutions do not
have to make any investment at the local level; instead, commercial establishments
arrange the terminal and obtain a commission for each transaction. Finally, since the
commercial establishment is obliged to deposit in a nearby branch all the resources
captured from the public in a regular basis, it happens only very rarely that BCs are
located in markets where there is no branch of the financial institution nearby.
There were 44 mainstream financial institutions and 5 regulated MFIs in Colom-
bia in 2014. Table 2.3 presents some descriptive statistics of those institutions that
entered at least one of the small isolated markets considered in this paper. There are
important differences between the types in terms of their branching network and loan
composition. MFIs operate in a greater number of markets and have more branches
on average than mainstream institutions. In contrast, most mainstream institutions
are available only in a reduced number of markets. The loan portfolio differs signifi-
cantly among mainstream institutions and MFIs, with the first group focused mainly
on consumer loans and the second almost exclusively in microloans. Finally, the dif-
ferences in the average interest rate and the default rate across types reveals that
MFIs are able to charge a higher interest rate for this type of loan without incurring



























Table 2.3: Summary statistics of competitors - December 2014
Type Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Total markets Mainstream 49.04 49.20 4.00 15.00 30.00 58.00 179.00
MFI 80.00 40.34 43.00 58.50 74.00 98.50 123.00
Markets (in sample) Mainstream 20.91 30.27 1.00 3.50 8.00 18.50 107.00
MFI 36.00 28.16 12.00 20.50 29.00 48.00 67.00
Branches (in sample) Mainstream 26.91 40.83 1.00 4.00 8.00 22.50 135.00
MFI 38.00 28.16 14.00 22.50 31.00 50.00 69.00
Share of consumer loans (own portfolio) Mainstream 0.68 0.31 0.00 0.54 0.77 0.93 1.00
MFI 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06
Share of microloans (own portfolio) Mainstream 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.32
MFI 0.89 0.17 0.69 0.84 0.98 0.99 1.00
Interest rate of microloans Mainstream 0.29 0.07 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.34 0.41
MFI 0.37 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38
Default risk of microloans Mainstream 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.45
MFI 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.11
Notes: 498 markets in the sample. Statistics based on institutions with at least one branch in the sample. Interest rates
are national averages reported to the financial supervisory authority. ∗Number of incidents per 100000 inhabitants. Based on
information published by Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia.
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2.5 Methodology
The model used here to estimate the competitive interaction between banks and MFI
follows closely the approach proposed by Schaumans and Verboven (2015) and later
extended to the case of two types of competitors by Fernandez (2016). Similar to the
framework developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), this model uses the variation in
market structure across locations to obtain measures of the toughness of competition.
Furthermore, the model incorporates information about the value of the loans in each
location to identify the effects of the presence of rivals on market expansion in the
loans market.
2.5.1 Assumptions on banks and markets
A key assumption of the model is that the observed market structure in each par-
ticular location is an equilibrium outcome that results from the interaction between
incumbents and potential entrants in the industry. The existence and uniqueness of
such equilibrium requires the fulfillment of a set of assumptions on firms and mar-
kets: i) banks and FMIs are able to operate in multiple markets. ii) Their type,
either mainstream bank (b) or MFI (m), cannot be chosen after entry in each par-
ticular market, therefore it is the same across geographic locations.8 iii) There is a
fixed number of geographic markets M where banks can decide to enter, and banks
can operate simultaneously in all of them if it is profitable (there are no capacity con-
straints). iv) Decisions about type and entry are irrevocable. Furthermore, I assume
entry decisions are based mainly on the particular conditions of each location. MFIs
and mainstream banks included in the sample have been operating in Colombia for
more than 10 years as of 2014. These institutions define the characteristics of their
portfolio, their business model, risk management and advertising strategies at the
national level, and there are clear differences among these types that are perceived
by potential borrowers. In this context, it is reasonable to assume that it would not
be possible for them choose a different type in each location, or to change at their
convenience after entry.
The last assumption, which states that entry decisions are based mainly on local
conditions might be problematic in a context of multi-market competition. Financial
institutions obtain funding for their loan operations either by capturing deposits in
8Microloans represent more than 80% of the total loan portfolio in all the markets considered in
the sample, whereas this share is lower than 30% for mainstream banks.
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other markets, or via the interbank market. In both cases, this might create some
dependence among the nodes of the branching networks, as entry decisions could be
affected by liquidity shocks that affect the overall capability of the loan providers to
make this type of investment. Furthermore, loan providers could choose the locations
of their branches in order to optimally diversify geographic risks, as shown by Clark
et al. (2017). The presence of branches in nearby markets can serve for advertising
purposes even if only few clients are willing to travel among geographic locations to
demand their services, and their performance can help loan providers to learn about
regional conditions that might be relevant for their potential operation in neighboring
markets. Other externalities related to the costs of recruitment and training of human
capital, and the development of technology that can be used in multiple nodes of
the networks could make local entry and exit decisions dependent across geographic
markets. These externalities play an important role in big urban locations, where
entering the market requires a significant investment in equipment, human capital
and advertising, and the mobility of potential customers creates competitive pressure
among the nodes of the same branching network. Nevertheless, I expect operation
costs in the banking industry to be affected to a lesser extent by the size and location
of other nodes of the branching network, compared to other industries such as retail
chain stores, where those features can translate into substantial changes in distribution
and storage costs (see for example Holmes (2011)).
All financial institutions included in the sample have large branching networks
across multiple regions. MFIs had 188 branches while mainstream banks had 583 in
the median, as of 2014. The overall size of the branching networks and the decision of
focusing only in small isolated locations makes the financial effort related to the entry
in a single location less significant in relation to the overall resources of the institu-
tion. This reduces the dependence of local entry/exit decisions to liquidity shortages
at the national level and makes it less likely that local shocks on the demand for loans
or on the deposits supply have significant effects on the volume of loans provided in
other markets. Furthermore, given that the loan providers maintain operations across
different regions, it is reasonable to assume that they are relatively well known by
potential customers all across the territory. In addition, I expect that the dependence
across nodes to become less important in rural areas, where potential consumers tend
to restrict their selection to the loan providers that have branches in their vicinity due
to higher transportation costs. In the context studied here, clients need to approach
personally to a branch in order to ask for a loan, since many of them still do not have
the possibility of performing this type of operation using virtual or mobile platforms.
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Although internet access was available in most of the cities and towns in Colombia
as of 2014, a significant share of the population in those places did not have internet
access at home at the time. As a result, many borrowers were not familiar with the
use of virtual platforms to make transactions and preferred to approach a traditional
branch since they perceived this transaction channel as safer and more reliable. Fur-
thermore, clients might not demand loans from nearby towns, due to higher travel
expenses and lower probability of obtaining funding (monitoring costs for banks also
increase with distance, particularly for financial institutions offering microcredits).
2.5.2 Entry conditions
The market structure in location j is described by the number of mainstream institu-
tions (Nbj) and MFIs (Nmj) and denoted by Nj = {Nbj , Nmj}. Let N̂ij = {N bij , Nmij }
be a tuple that contains the number of competitors of type b (mainstream institu-
tions) and m (MFIs) in market j, from the perspective of a lender of type i ∈ {b,m}.
The number of competitors for a firm of type b is N̂bj ≡ {N̂ bbj , N̂mbj } = {Nbj−1, Nmj},
whereas N̂mj ≡ {N̂ bmj , N̂mmj} = {Nbj , Nmj − 1}. The profit function of a bank of type
i in a market j, can be written as follows:





(roi − rdij(N̂ij)) max{Dij(N̂ij)− Lij(N̂ij), 0} − Fij(N̂ij),
where rlij(N̂ij) is the expected return obtained from the current stock of loans,
Lij(N̂ij), r
d
ij(N̂ij) is the return of the deposits stock, and Dij(N̂ij) that banks need
to pay to their clients.
I assume that banks can make use of deposits obtained from an outside source to
secure funding for their loan operations in case the local deposits are not enough to
fund the local loan originations. In that case, those resources would be remunerated
at the same rate as local deposits, rdij(N̂ij). When there is a local surplus of deposits,
banks can invest it in an outside option that has a return denoted by roi . The expected
local return rate, rlij(N̂ij), may vary across markets depending on the ex-ante interest
rates, the portfolio composition, and the materialization of credit risk, which in turn,
may be affected by the market structure. Finally, the variable Fij(N̂ij) captures
the operative costs of the branch, which do not depend on the scale of the operation.
Again, this variable might be affected by market structure if the presence of additional
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competitors generate spillovers on the development of necessary infrastructure for
money transactions, such as ATM networks and debit/credit card payment terminals.
I consider a competitor as active in the market if there exists at least one ”brick
and mortar” branch in the market that reports non-zero stocks of deposits or loans.
Therefore, N̂ij is a vector that contains the number of competitors per type rather
than the number of branches that each financial institution operates in each market.
Hence, I am not able to capture the effect of competition among branches of the same
competitor, or the relative advantage of competitors with more than one branch in
the local market; this is likely not be a significant limitation since banks and other
financial institutions operate just one office per market in most of the cases.
The profit function can be rewritten as follows:
Πij(N̂ij) = µij(N̂ij)lij(N̂ij)Sj − Fi(N̂ij), (2.1)
where lij(N̂ij) is the value of the stock of loans per capita, dij(N̂ij) is the value
of the local deposits per capita and Sj is the population of market j. The term
µij(N̂ij) =
(






other components of the profit, such as the markup obtained in the loans market
and the profit obtained from operations in the deposits market. In the case of mi-
crofinance institutions, µij(N̂ij) could be interpreted directly as the expected return
of the operations in the loan market, because of their scarce participation in the de-
posits/insurance markets. By contrast, mainstream institutions offer a wider portfolio
of financial services, which allow them to capture deposits from the public. In these
cases, the profit function captures the additional revenue obtained by the provision
of those services.
If a financial institution decides to enter a location where it will face N̂ij com-
petitors, it must be because the profit of entering the market is greater than the
outside option payment, which I normalize to zero. This condition can be written in






+ ln lij(N̂ij + Ii) + lnSj > 0, (2.2)
where the indicator vector Ii takes the value 1 if there is an additional competitor of
type i in the market, and 0 otherwise. Both the overall profit and the volume of loans
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depend on the observed market structure, as well as of economic and demographic
characteristics of the market such as income, distance to metropolitan areas, etc. I






= λiXj + δi(N̂ij) + ηij (2.3)
ln lij(N̂ij) = βiXj + αi(N̂ij) + εij , (2.4)
where Xj is a vector that captures all the relevant demographic characteristics of
market j, and εij and ηij are characteristics that vary across locations and types of
competitors, unobservable to the econometrician. The effects of the presence of rivals
on the volume of loans and other components of the profit of bank of type i in market





ij ≥ 1) + αb2i max{N̂ bij − 1, 0}+ αm1i I(N̂mij ≥ 1)+






ij ≥ 1) + δb2i max{N̂ bij − 1, 0}+ δm1i I(N̂mij ≥ 1)+
δm2i max{N̂mij − 1, 0}
where I(N̂ bij ≥ 1) and I(N̂mij ≥ 1) are dummy variables that indicate the presence
of at least one competitor of type b or m, from the perspective of a firm of type i. The
parameters {αb1i , αb2i , αm1i , αm2i } and {δb1i , δb2i , δm1i , δm2i } capture the effects related to
the presence of rivals of each type on the overall profit and on the volume of loans
provided by lenders of type i. This specification allows us to evaluate whether the
competitive effect associated to the first competitor of each type is different from that
related to the presence of additional firms.9
9Alternatively, the model was estimated using a linear specification on the number of competitors
of each type and obtained qualitatively similar results (available upon request). Nevertheless, using
a more flexible specification seems more reasonable, given that the the presence of the first rival is
likely have a distinct impact on profits, compared to the presence of additional competitors. Using a
specification that allows greater flexibility (such as using a dummy variable for each kind of market
structure present in the sample) would result in very imprecise estimators due to sample size.
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When analyzing the differences in market structure and the value of the loans across
geographic markets an endogeneity problem arises because firms are more likely to
operate in markets where they expect higher demand. Firms anticipate the impact of
the presence of other incumbents and potential entrants on their profit when making
their entry and credit supply decisions. Therefore, market structure variables and
different observed outcomes are simultaneously determined. Furthermore, there is a
potential omitted variables problem, since banks and MFIs might find some locations
attractive due to variables unobserved by the econometrician. To correct for the
potential bias caused by this correlation, an econometric model of equilibrium market
structure is employed as a selection equation. If an incumbent firm of type i faces a
number of competitors N̂ij , individual rationality indicates that its profits, given the
market structure, should be greater than the outside option payment. Substituting
equations (2.2) and (2.4) in (2.3), I obtain,
Xjγi + lnSj + θi(N̂ij)− ωij > 0.
Furthermore, any additional firm should obtain negative profits if it decides enter-
ing the market, otherwise, it should have entered the market already. Therefore,
Xjγi + lnSj + θi(N̂ij + Iij)− ωij < 0.
If these conditions are met for all types of competitors, we can interpret the ob-
served market structure as an equilibrium outcome. Therefore, the following condi-
tions should be met at the equilibrium market structure described by N̂ij for each
type:
Xjγi + lnSj + θi(N̂ij + Iij) < ωij < Xjγi + lnSj + θi(N̂ij)
where,
γi = λi + βi
θi = αi + δi
ωij = ηij − εij .
Chapter 2. Interaction between Microfinance Institutions and Traditional
Banks in Rural Markets 34
This is a simultaneous ordered probit and demand model, under the assumption
that the entry of a new competitor always reduces profit of incumbents (θi < 0). In
markets where there are no competitors of type i, the volume of loans is not observed;
hence, only one inequality must hold for that type:
Xjλi + lnSj + δi(N̂ij + Iij) < ωij .
Instead, if there is at least one competitor of type i, the realization of the unob-
served term εij can be inferred for the particular values of the parameters βi and αi
and the observed variables lij(N̂ij , Xj) and Xj , Therefore, the two following condi-
tions must be satisfied:
ln lij(N̂ij , Xj) = Xjβi + αi(N̂ij) + εij (2.5)
Xjγi + lnSj + θi(N̂ij + Ii) < ωij < Xjγi + lnSj + θi(N̂ij). (2.6)
Since the set market characteristics Xj enters both the profit and the revenue
equation, an exclusion restriction is required in order to achieve identification. I use
the population variable (Sj) as an exclusion restriction because it affects the overall
profit, but it less likely to affect per-capita demand for loans.10 This model can be
estimated by maximum likelihood, under the assumption that the distributions of the
unobservable terms ηij and εij are known.
2.5.3 Entry game for two types of competitors
As noted by Mazzeo (2002), when there are different types of competitors in the
market, it is necessary to introduce additional assumptions that allow to interpret
the distribution of firms across types as the result of a rational individual decision
of potential entrants. Therefore, I impose some structure on the kind of interaction
between financial institutions (mainstream banks (b) and MFIs (m)), such that the
observed market structure can be interpreted as the outcome of an entry game under
complete information.
10An OLS regression of the stock of loans per capita on demographic characteristics of the market
reveals that after controlling for income and distance to closest market, population doesn’t contribute
to explain the variation of this variable across markets.
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Similar to the investment game proposed by Mazzeo (2002), I assume there is a
pool of potential entrants of the two types that make irrevocable decisions about
entry. Potential entrants of the same kind are identical and play sequentially. Firms
anticipate that subsequent firms will make decisions about entry and product type
once they have committed to their choice. The last firm of each product type finds
entry profitable, taking the number of competitors of each type that are active in the
market as given. Additional entry, in either product type, is not profitable.
Different equilibrium market structures can be achieved depending on the type of
interaction between mainstream institutions and MFIs. Cleeren et al. (2010) analyzes
a case where competitors are substitutes, while Fernandez (2016) studies a situation
where firms provide complementary goods, opening the possibility of bilateral pos-
itive spillovers. I also consider a third case, in which the relationship between the
two types of competitors is not symmetric, resulting in one-sided positive spillovers.
To see why this can be the case in the context of MFIs and mainstream banks, no-
tice that limited business stealing between mainstream banks and MFIs is expected,
particularly from the second group towards the first, since mainstream institutions
offer relatively cheaper alternatives of credit for clients with lower default risk, and
their share of microcredit in the loan portfolio is small. On the deposits side, many
MFIs do not capture resources from the public, funding most of their operations with
external loans. Positive spillovers for mainstream institutions, derived from the entry
of a MFIs may occur instead since MFIs’ clients might become eligible for accessing
cheaper loans offered by mainstream institutions once they have build some credit
history, amassed some collateral or become more aware of the benefits of formal fi-
nancial services. To simplify notation, I will drop the sub-index j, to focus on the
features of the interaction of competitors of types b and m in a given market.
Types are substitutes
If Πb(Nb, Nm + 1) < Πb(Nb, Nm) and Πm(Nb + 1, Nm) < Πm(Nb, Nm), then the
types are substitutes. Furthermore, if the presence of a competitor of the same type
reduces the profit of an incumbent more than a competitor of other type would, then
a Nash equilibrium exists and can be represented by the pair {Nb, Nm} for which the
following inequalities hold:
πb(Nb + 1, Nm) < ωb < πb(Nb, Nm) (2.7)
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πm(Nb, Nm + 1) < ωm < πm(Nb, Nm), (2.8)




i ) for i = {b,m}. This equilibrium is
not unique, however, as there is a sub-region of the area defined by inequalities above
that is consistent with the outcome {Nb + 1, Nm − 1}. This sub-region is defined by
the following inequalities:
πb(Nb + 1, Nm) < ωb < πb(Nb + 1, Nm − 1)
πm(Nb + 1, Nm) < ωm < πm(Nb, Nm).
In order to obtain a unique equilibrium in terms of the number of firms of each
type, Mazzeo (2002) introduces additional inequalities related to the optimal selection
of types in each market. Given that types are given in the context of this paper, I
assume instead that potential entrants of the type b (mainstream institutions) have
a competitive advantage with respect to MFIs. This means that in markets that are
attractive for both types, but where at most one additional competitor can operate
profitably, the outcome {Nb + 1, Nm − 1}, rather than {Nb, Nm} is obtained. This
assumption is in line with the fact that traditional financial institutions have been ac-
tive in the retail banking industry for a longer period and have more liquidity, which
allow them to make investments in branching networks faster than MFIs. Given
these assumptions, the resulting equilibrium is unique in terms of the number of com-
petitor in each category, and the likelihood contribution of a market with {Nb, Nm}












where f(ωbj , ωmj) is the distribution function of the duplet (ωb, ωm).
Figure 2.1 presents an example with two players of each type. The delimited areas
in the plane represent the set of values of {ωb, ωm} that are consistent with each
possible market outcome.
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Figure 2.1: Substitutes case: equilibrium outcomes with two firms of each type 
Notes: This Figure illustrates the values of the duplet (ωb, ωm) that are consistent each one of the
possible market outcomes in an hypothetical scenario with two potential incumbents of each type,
where the types are substitutes.
One-sided complementarity
Alternatively, if the effect of the presence of MFIs on market expansion is big enough
such that Πb(Nb, Nm + 1) > Πb(Nb, Nm), then the latter type of loan provider acts
as complement of mainstream institutions. I consider a case where positive spillovers
are one-sided, therefore, MFIs do not benefit from the presence of a mainstream loan
provider (Πm(Nb + 1, Nm) ≤ Πm(Nb, Nm)). A Nash equilibrium of the game exists
in this scenario under the assumption that such spillovers on mainstream institutions
are smaller than the effect related to another competitor of the same type: Πb(Nb +
1, Nm + 1) < Πb(Nb, Nm) for all Nm. Figure 2.2 presents the predicted outcomes
of the game for different values of (ωb, ωm) when there are only two competitors of
each type. The outcome {Nb, Nm} = {1, 1} is obtained in the area defined by the
equations (2.7) and (2.8), but also in the area where the following inequalities hold:
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πb(2, 0) < ωb < πb(2, 1)
πm(2, 1) < ωm < πm(1, 1).
In this area, an additional competitor of type b can only operate profitably in this
market if there is at least one MFI, but the MFI would operate there if the type b
does not. Since the presence of type b reduces the profit of the MFI to the point
that it makes its operation not profitable, an additional competitor of its type cannot
enter, and the result {1, 1} is obtained.
Figure 2.2: One-sided complementarity case: equilibrium outcomes with two firms of
each type 
Notes: This Figure illustrates the values of the duplet (ωb, ωm) that are consistent each one of the
possible market outcomes in an hypothetical scenario with two banks and two MFIs, where there is
complementarity among the two types.














This case is described in detail by Fernandez (2016). She shows that in this case, an
equilibrium exists, and it is unique, provided that the positive spillovers derived from
the presence of a competitor of the opposite type do not exceed the losses derived
from the competitive interaction with an additional loan provider of the same type.
As Fernandez (2016) explains, while there can be multiple equilibria for particular
values of the unobservable terms, only one of such outcomes is a sub-game perfect
equilibrium, the one with the largest number of firms. Figure 2.3 presents the pre-
dicted outcomes of the game for different values of (ωb, ωm) when there are only two
competitors of each type. The outcome {Nb, Nm} = {1, 1} is obtained in the area
defined by the equations (2.7) and (2.8), except for the sub-area where the following
inequalities hold:
πb(2, 0) < ωb < πb(2, 1)
πm(2, 1) < ωm < πm(1, 1).












As shown above, the assumptions on the strategic interaction among competitors
of different types have consequences on the likelihood contribution attributed to each
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Notes: This Figure illustrates the values of the duplet (ωb, ωm) that are consistent each one of
the possible market outcomes in an hypothetical scenario with two mainstream institutions and two
MFIs, where there is one-sided complementarity among the two types, i.e. mainstream institutions
benefit from the presence of MFIs, but the opposite does not occur.
market outcome. Therefore, following the approach developed by Mazzeo (2002), I
can compare the log-likelihood across models to decide which one captures better the
observed strategic interaction in local markets.
2.5.4 Econometric Specification
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood, by imposing assumptions on the
distribution of the unobservable variables ωij and εij . I assume that these variables
follow a joint normal distribution and can be correlated. Correlation is also possible
across different types of banks that operate in the same market.








The individual likelihood contribution a market j where there are no competitors







where the duplet {ωb, ωm} is distributed normal with zero mean and variance equal
to Σωω.
If there is a competitor of type i ∈ {b,m} in the market, then it is possible to
observe the value of the stock of loans; therefore, it is necessary to calculate the
likelihood individual contribution of the market using the joint normal distribution
of the duplet {ωb, ωm}, conditional on the realization of εij . There are four different
cases for the conditional variance matrix of the joint distribution function. As an
illustration, I will consider here the case where types are substitutes, and the number
of competitors is positive for all types.
When Nb > 0 and Nm > 0, the conditional distribution of the duplet ε ≡ {εbj , εmj}
can be inferred from equation (2.5), given the observed value of (lbj , lmj) and some
parameter values β and α. Hence probability of a market structure described by
(Nb, Nm) is given by the following expression if types are substitutes:










f(ωb, ωm|εb, εm)d(ωb, ωm)),
The conditional probability density f(ωb, ωm|εb, εm) is a multivariate normal den-
sity with mean equal to:
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µ(ωb, ωm|εb, εm) = µω − ΣωεΣ−1εε (ε− µε) ,
where µω = µε = 0, and variance Σω|ε:
Σω|ε = Σωω − ΣωεΣ−1εε Σωε.
Identification of the elements of the variance-covariance matrix is possible, given
the restriction on the population coefficient, which is set to be equal to one. I assume
that the effect of the presence of an additional competitor of the same type on those
components of the profit different from the volume of loans is always negative and
larger than the effect of an additional competitor of the opposite type (which can be
positive or negative).
2.5.5 Measures of competition intensity
Next, I calculate the changes in profit and loans supply generated by the presence of
an additional rival of each type in the market, using equations (2.3) and (2.4). The
competitive effects on the local supply of loans per capita can be estimated as:
lbj(1, 1)
lbj(1, 0)
= exp(αb(1, 1)− αb(1, 0)).
Similarly, the effects of the presence of an additional competitor on other compo-
nents of the profit can be calculated as:
µbj(1, 1)/fij
µbj(1, 0))/fmj
= exp(δb(1, 1)− δb(1, 0)).
Where δb(1, 0) = θb(1, 0)− αb(1, 0).
2.6 Results
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the detailed results of the estimation under the three sets
of assumptions described in Section 2.5. While the estimated coefficients of control
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variables are similar across specifications, the value of the likelihood function is lower
in the case of strategic substitutability and one-sided complementarity. Furthermore,
the estimates of the parameters capturing the competitive interaction across types in
these specifications seem to hit the constraints, which is suggestive of the incompati-
bility of these sets of assumptions with the type of competitive interaction observed in
the data.11 In consequence, I focus here on the results of the model that assume two-
sided strategic complementarity. As expected, the share of the population in poverty
conditions and the distance to the closest urban center and the number of attacks
by illegal armed groups have a negative impact on the overall profit. Therefore, it is
less likely that mainstream or microfinance institutions operate in poor, remote areas,
with greater levels of illicit activity. Similarly, the estimates obtained for the equation
for the volume of loans indicate that there is a positive impact of the variables that
capture economic conditions, and a negative impact of crime and violence by illegal
armed groups. The presence of the public bank is related to lower loan supply from
mainstream institutions, while the effect has the opposite sign for MFIs.
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients that capture the com-
petitive interaction across and within types, I present the estimated changes in the
loan supply and the overall profit, relative to a monopoly scenario for different market
structures (Table 2.6), after controlling for observed and unobserved market charac-
teristics. By estimating the volume of loans’ equation and the probit model jointly I
am able to account for the selection bias generated by the fact that we are only able
to observe the volume of loans of those competitors who are active in the market,
and to provide an estimate of the correlation between the unobservable terms present
in both equations, based the set of assumptions used to model the interaction of the
competitors and the distribution of the unobservables. Failing to account for the
correlation of unobservables across types would most likely result in overestimation
of market expansion, since some markets may result attractive for both types due to
the effect of variables unobserved by the econometrician.
The first section of Table 2.6 contains the changes in the value of the loan portfolio
per capita related to the presence of an additional competitor of each type in the
market. In the case of mainstream institutions, the presence of a competitor of the
same type is associated to an increase in the volume of loans provided by incumbents
11In the case of strategic substitutes the parameters that capture the effect of MFIs on the profit of
mainstream institutions are close to zero, while in the case of one-sided substitutability the estimated
effect of a competitor of the opposite type is close to the effect of the entry of a competitor of the
same type.
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of 12.7% relative to the monopolist level if another mainstream bank is present in
the market and of 21.1% if an MFI operates in the area. These results indicate that
there is substantial market expansion associated with the presence of other financial
institutions in the market. In the case of MFIs, these effects seem to be smaller
in magnitude. The volume of loans is not significantly smaller than the monopolist
level in markets with one competitor of the same type, and it reduces to 74,6% of
the monopolist level in places with more than two competitors of this type. This is
consistent with the fact that MFIs offer a narrower and more homogeneous portfolio
of services than mainstream institutions. Finally, the volume of loans per capita of
MFIs in markets with one mainstream loan provider is not significantly different from
the one observed in places where they act as monopolists. This is an expected result,
given that MFIs focus on potential clients that are often considered as not eligible by
traditional banks.
Market expansion seems particularly strong in places where loan providers face
only one additional competitor, either a mainstream institution or an MFI. There are
several factors that might contribute to the low levels of business stealing among com-
petitors in the loans market compared to other retail industries. First, competition
among loan providers increases the pressure on banks to relax their credit standards
by offering services towards clients with greater default risk. Second, the arrival of
an additional competitor expands the financial infrastructure available in the market
(number of ATMs, banking correspondents and commercial establishments accepting
credit/debit cards), which increases the perceived benefits of the services offered by
different loan providers, as well as the level of consumers awareness and financial lit-
eracy. Finally, as MFIs are able to create information about the payment behavior
of clients, their presence contributes to expand the pool of clients that are eligible by
mainstream institutions.
The second part of Table 2.6 presents the competitive effects on the overall profit
(as explained in Section 3, these parameters also capture the effect of the presence of
additional competitors in the deposits market). The results reveal important asym-
metries in the competitive effects across types, with mainstream institutions obtaining
substantially higher profits in markets where MFIs operate, while the opposite does
not seem to occur. One explanation for this result is the presence of market expansion
in the deposit markets. Micro-entrepreneurs who become clients of MFIs might begin
to demand services offered by the mainstream institutions, such as saving accounts.
On the other side, the results are suggestive of strong competition among competitors
of the same type, especially in the case of MFIs. The drop in the overall profit of loan
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providers in places where there is at least one competitor of the same type indicates
that they might need to incur higher costs in order to maintain a profitable level of
operation, and is indicative of substantial competition in the deposits market.
Finally, Table 2.7 presents the estimated correlation between unobservables enter-
ing the profit and the volume of loans equation (η and ε). As expected, the correlation
between the unobservables affecting the overall profit and the volume of loans of loan
providers of the same type is positive for both types, indicating that those markets
that are attractive for mainstream institutions are also profitable for MFIs. The
variable ε captures local unobserved characteristics that have a direct impact on the
volume of loans, while η captures the unobservable factors that have an impact on
other components of the profit. I find that the correlation of these unobservable terms
across types is positive and significant, which confirms the importance of modeling
the entry and loan equations for both types. As seen in the Table, the covariance η
and ε is larger for MFIs than for mainstream institutions. In addition, the covari-
ance between εb and εm is positive and larger than the covariance between ηb and
ηm. These results could be explained by the scarce participation that MFIs maintain
the deposits market. While mainstream banks operate in some locations where the
volume of loans is low, due to the possibility of capturing deposits from the public,
the presence of MFIs is closely linked to the local demand for loans.
In summary, the results of the structural model confirm the presence of spillovers
among mainstream and microfinance institutions and reveal important asymmetries
in the competitive interaction of these types of loan providers. While mainstream
banks benefit in general from the presence of MFIs, spillovers in the other direction
are not significant. Furthermore, the estimates reveal that the positive spillovers
generated by the presence of MFIs on the overall profit of mainstream institutions
are not necessarily due to market expansion in the loans market, although the effects
on the volume of loans are positive and significant. This could be related to the
role of MFIs in creating demand for services provided by mainstream institutions
in the deposit and insurance markets. In order to get a better understanding of
the mechanisms behind the profit increase for mainstream institutions, more detailed
information about local interest rates for both loans and deposits, default rates, and
other costs is required.
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2.7 Policy implications
It is the interest of many governments in developing countries to facilitate access to
financial services to all segments of the population, particularly in remote zones where
the lack of funding is cited as one of the main difficulties for the success of small scale
production projects. One relevant question in the design of policies that facilitate
entry in small distant markets is where should the government provide additional
incentives for entry. Recognizing the existence of positive spillovers across mainstream
and microfinance institutions might change the optimal strategy of the government
since it could be more efficient to give priority to MFIs in some markets, as their
presence could make the location more attractive for mainstream institutions. The
optimal policy in terms of which type of loan provider should receive an incentive, as
well as the magnitude of the subsidy or tax relief will depend on the characteristics
of each market.
In this section, I use the structural model to predict the expected profit and volume
of loans of MFIs and mainstream institutions in markets where there are no competi-
tors and the size of the subsidy that the government would have to provide in order
to achieve entry in those locations. In order to obtain these predictions, I calculate
the expected values of the unobservables entering the profit and the volume of loan
equations using their conditional joint distribution. Using these values, I predict the
expected profit that a potential loan provider would obtain if it decides to enter a
particular market. Figure 2.4 presents the distribution of the subsidies across markets
with no competitors (the values are presented as a percentage of the fixed cost). As
seen in Figure 2.4, the value of the minimum subsidy required to achieve entry of one
loan provider is distributed similarly for mainstream and microfinance institutions.
In both cases, the government would need to provide a subsidy of around 10.1% of the
fixed cost of operation in order to create enough incentives for entry. As expected, the
size of the subsidy needed to achieve entry of a mainstream institutions reduces if the
government provides also provides incentives for at least one MFI to enter the same
market. In contrast, the size of the subsidy required to achieve MFIs’ entry remains
almost unchanged if the government subsidizes the entry of a mainstream institution
in the same location.
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Figure 2.4: Minimum subsidy to satisfy entry condition in markets with no competi-
tors






















Mainstream institutions (one MFI in the market)







Microfinance institutions (one bank in the market)
Notes: The subsidies are calculated as a percentage of the expected fixed cost of operation. The
top row presents the distribution of the subsidy that should be provided in order to achieve entry of
one financial institution in markets with no competitors. The bottom row presents the distribution
of the subsidy required to achieve entry of mainstream institutions (MFIs) if the government also
provides entry incentives to lenders of the opposite type.
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2.8 Final Remarks
The model presented here allows us to measure the impact of entry of MFIs on the
profit of incumbent formal financial institutions in geographically isolated markets.
The results indicate that the first type of institutions generate market expansion that
benefits all competitors in the market. If these expected gains materialize in the
entry of mainstream lending establishments in isolated markets, then MFIs would
contribute to consumer welfare by facilitating access to financial products that are
beyond the scope of their own portfolio. This new insight about the competitive
interaction among MFIs and other formal loan providers could help in the design of
policies oriented towards financial inclusion.
The results of the structural model indicate that the positive spillovers generated
by the presence of MFIs on the overall profit of mainstream institutions are only
partially due to market expansion in the loans market. Other components of the
local profit, such as those obtained from the investment of resources captured in the
form of the deposits from the public, or the revenue obtained through the supply of
other financial services play an important role. In order to obtain more insights on the
mechanisms behind this profit increase, more detailed information about local interest
rates for both loans and deposits, default rates, and other costs is required. Although
the results could be associated with the creation of information about payment behav-
ior that becomes available for other institutions, there are alternative explanations,
such as the additional demand for services offered by mainstream institutions in the
deposits market. In the long run, the interaction with MFIs could help clients to
increase their levels of financial literacy and awareness or trust in formal institutions,
which may lead them to demand more products offered by mainstream financial insti-
tutions. Finally, the timely access to funding is likely to have a substantial impact on
the rate of success of productive projects, translating into sustained improvements in
the economic conditions of clients, which would allow them to demand other types of
financial services in the future. Exploring these alternative mechanisms requires more
detailed information about the portfolio choices of the consumers in those markets
over time, and therefore it is left for future research.
One crucial factor that affects the competitive interaction in the retail banking
industry and the supply of microcredit is technological change, in the form of virtual
and mobile channels that facilitate the access to financial products without tradi-
tional ’brick and mortar’ branches. These innovations are likely to have a meaningful
impact on the way competitors interact in these markets and represent a challenge for
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econometricians and policy makers since accurate measures of competition need to
take into account the potential interaction of lenders across geographic markets and
platforms. In Colombia, most of these innovations were not available in small remote
towns during the period analyzed here, and even today, the presence of traditional
branches or loan officers continues being necessary for the provision of loans, partic-
ularly in the case of microcredit, since most of the specialized loan providers perform
close monitoring of the clients’ ventures.
The use of virtual and mobile transaction channels for capturing deposits and per-
form transactions have important consequences on the relations between the deposits
and the loan market that I have not taken into account in this paper. So far, the
banking industry has been faster at developing interaction platforms that facilitate
the use of deposits, than at implementing tools that enable remote monitoring of
credit risk, particularly in the case of microfinance. As highlighted by Aguirregabiria
et al. (2012), these differences have a significant impact in the way that loan providers
obtain funding for their operations, exposing financial institutions to different degrees
of geographical risk, and may ultimately reduce the possibility of consumers in far
locations to get loans, as financial institutions might find it profitable to concentrate
their loan operations in the biggest markets.
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Table 2.6: Effects of entry relative to a monopoly situation
Change in market structure vs. monopoly scenario Mainstream Banks MFI
Value of the loan portfolio per capita
One additional mainstream bank 1.1277∗∗ 1.0598
(0.0492) (0.0471)
Two additional mainstream banks 1.1047∗∗ 1.0620
(0.0604) (0.0610)
One additional MFI 1.2110∗∗ 1.0366
(0.0806) (0.0546)
Two additional MFIs 1.2354∗ 0.7458∗∗
(0.1602) (0.1138)
Overall profit
One additional mainstream bank 0.2804∗∗ 1.0584
(0.0180) (0.0475)
Two additional mainstream banks 0.1335∗∗ 1.0592
(0.0131) (0.0662)
One additional MFI 2.0113∗∗ 0.1855∗∗
(0.1188) (0.0219)
Two additional MFIs 4.2139∗∗ 0.0400∗∗
Notes: ∗∗Significantly different from 1 at 1%. Standard errors are calculated using the delta
method.




















Notes: ∗∗Significantly different from 1 at 1%.
Standard errors are calculated using the delta
method.
Chapter 3
The Effects of Usury Ceilings on
Consumers Welfare: Evidence from
the Microcredit Market in
Colombia
Abstract
Interest rate caps, also called usury ceilings, are a widely used policy tool to protect consumers from
excessive charges by loan providers. However, they are often cited as a barrier for the advancement
of financial inclusion, since they may reduce the incentives to provide loans to borrowers with lower
income or located in remote areas. In this paper, I exploit a change in the usury ceiling applied
to micro-loans in Colombia to understand the effects of this policy across geographic markets. To
quantify the welfare implications of this policy, I structurally estimate a demand and supply model
that incorporates the changes in size and composition of the potential market caused by this policy
change, in a context where the distribution of branching networks has a crucial role in the optimal
pricing strategies of loan providers. I find that the policy generated an increase in consumer surplus
at the national level that is explained by greater credit availability for riskier borrowers and the
expansion of branching networks in areas that were previously under-served. A counterfactual exer-
cise reveals that the welfare gains associated to this policy depend greatly on additional investment
in branching networks, as the opening of new branches in some locations helps to compensate the
consumer welfare loss associated with the increase in interest rates after the relaxation of the ceiling.
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3.1 Introduction
Access to affordable credit for the low-income population has become a worldwide
spread policy in recent decades. Efforts in this direction are motivated by the premise
that access to flexible and affordable funding allows individuals to develop productive
projects and support the accumulation of productive assets and human capital, pro-
viding protection against unexpected shocks, and leading to an improvement in their
socio-economic conditions (Cull et al., 2013).1 From a macroeconomic perspective,
financial inclusion has been associated with higher economic growth. Evidence of this
link has been provided by Beck et al. (2007), who use cross-country data in the period
from 1960 to 2005 to show that financial development reduces income inequality and
contributes to aggregate economic growth, and Donou-Adonsou and Sylwester (2017),
who find a significant effect of access to microloans on economic growth using a panel
of 85 developing countries in the period 2002 to 2013.
Public and private initiatives have resulted in a broader portfolio of financial ser-
vices for low-income clients. However, important barriers persist to date for the
expansion of this market. Armendariz and Morduch (2007) and Cull et al. (2013)
present a detailed overview of the challenges in the provision of financial services for
the poor. They identify barriers on the demand side, such as scarce information that
low-income clients have about the advantages of formal credit alternatives and low
levels of financial literacy. On the supply side, they highlight, among other factors,
the presence of higher operational costs that cannot be fully transferred to the bor-
rower via higher interest rates due to regulatory barriers. Microfinance institutions
(MFIs) operating in different countries often cite the presence of interest rate caps as
a barrier that prevents them from reaching a broader segment of clients (Ledgerwood
et al., 2013).
The appropriateness of this type of price regulation has been debated for decades,
as it remains a widely used policy tool across countries of all income levels.2 On
the one hand, the imposition of a ceiling may lead to a shortage of formal alterna-
1There are numerous empirical studies that have examined the link between economic welfare
and credit access, with different conclusions. Banerjee et al. (2015) find that microcredit allows poor
households to invest in their small businesses, although they do not find a significant impact on
household consumption and other welfare measures. By contrast, Khandker (2005) and Augsburg
et al. (2015) find that access to microfinance increased the standard of living of communities that
receive microloans in Bangladesh and Ethiopia.
2See Maimbo and Gallegos (2014) and Ferrari et al. (2018) for a comparison of interest rate
regulations across countries.
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tives of funding for poor clients, reducing price transparency, and even facilitating
tacit collusion (Knittel and Stango, 2003; Temin and Voth, 2008; Melzer, 2011; Zin-
man, 2010). On the other hand, usury ceilings can be seen as a mechanism to limit
undesirable distortions associated with third-degree price discrimination, protecting
vulnerable clients against predatory practices of lenders with excessive market power
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Stango and Zinman, 2015).
Several empirical studies have found that lenders in the consumer loans market
may have enough market power and information about potential customers to exert
this type of price discrimination.3 The consumers’ inability to evaluate all the alterna-
tives available in the market, as well as the presence of switching costs and imperfect
information about credit contracts, contributes to the market power of lenders, par-
ticularly in the case of products targeted for low-income borrowers (Agarwal et al.,
2014; Stango and Zinman, 2015).
Economic theory suggests that the welfare implications of interest rate caps will
depend on how much market expansion can be achieved if they are removed.4 Theo-
retical contributions on the topic show that, while the presence of this type of regula-
tion may lead to excess supply in some segments and shortages in those with higher
marginal costs, the overall effect in terms of consumer and producer welfare is not
necessarily harmful, and the outcome will depend on the curvature of the demand
function, the distance between the ceiling and the marginal cost, and the differences
in marginal costs across segments.
The type of credit rationing that is associated with the presence of interest rate
ceilings is the result of an external distortion and is different from the one described
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), where rationing arises as a result of adverse selection
in a context where the only screening instrument available for lenders is the interest
rate. In the situation described by the authors, allowing banks to charge interest rates
higher than a certain threshold does not increase the volume of loans because lenders
would interpret the willingness to pay such high fees as a signal of a high risk of
3Galenianos and Gavazza (2019) and Stango and Zinman (2015) document high levels of dispersion
in the interest rates charged for narrowly defined loan products, even after controlling for a rich set
of individual characteristics potentially informative of the risk profile of the borrowers.
4Schmalensee (1981) uses a formal approach to prove some degree of price discrimination can be
welfare improving in cases where there is a significant increase in the volume of sales in segments that
could not be served under uniform pricing. His framework has been extended later by Armstrong
et al. (1991), Aguirre et al. (2010), among others, to analyze the implications of price ceilings in
cases where a monopolist can offer multiple products and marginal costs are allowed to differ across
segments. For a detailed exposition of the topic see Stole (2007).
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default. These results rely on strong assumptions, such as the role of the interest rate
as the only screening tool available, and that all productive projects have identical
expected returns and differ on their risk level only. When these assumptions are
relaxed, rationing is not optimal anymore in equilibrium (Meza and Webb, 1987)). In
the microfinance industry, financial institutions have developed strategies that allow
them to gather information about the probability of success of productive projects and
the borrowers’ payment behavior. These screening and monitoring technologies are
relatively expensive, but they allow them to overcome some of the adverse selection
problems that could give origin to the equilibrium credit rationing result obtained by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Abundant empirical evidence indicates that banks tend to
increase their volume of loans after the interest rate restrictions are relaxed, even in
the context of microfinance, where the interest rates are typically very high already
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2007). In line with these findings, the volume of loans and
the overall profit of loan providers in Colombia (particularly microfinance institutions)
increased after the interest rates were relaxed.
Whether or not lifting usury ceilings is welfare-improving is, therefore, an empirical
question. While there are plenty of studies that describe the evolution of credit mar-
kets after the modification of an interest rate cap for different countries and periods
(see: Temin and Voth, 2008; Benmelech and Moskowitz, 2010; Maimbo and Gallegos,
2014), only few studies provide a quantification of the welfare effects of this type of
policy. Recent developments in this direction, by Cuesta and Sepulveda (2019) and
Galenianos and Gavazza (2019), make use of comprehensive data sets that include
detailed information on individual loan operations. Unfortunately, this information is
often unavailable in low-income regions, where the development of microfinance has
been significant and perhaps most relevant. This problem is sometimes exacerbated
by the differences in the regulatory framework that applies to loan providers in the
microfinance sector, which often translates into different information requirements
and confidentiality rules.
In order to measure the welfare implications of this policy in contexts where com-
prehensive data on individual transactions are not available, I propose a structural
model of demand and supply that can be estimated using market-level information.
In the model, loan providers operate across multiple market segments and geographic
locations. The model incorporates changes in the size and composition of the poten-
tial market in each location that may occur as a result of the regulatory change. It
allows us to measure to what extent these changes in credit availability are due to
an increase in the supply of loans of existing competitors or due to the entry of new
57 3.1. Introduction
competitors in local markets. Consistent with the practice of financial institutions in
the microloans market, and motivated by data limitations that are common in this
industry, I consider a scenario where price discrimination occurs based on the risk
profile of the clients, but it is not perfectly observed by the econometrician.
The link between the evolution of branching networks and changes in the pricing
strategies of financial institutions is a critical element of my approach that has not
been considered in the literature. The microfinance industry has become increasingly
dominated by large specialized institutions that operate across multiple locations by
making use of extensive networks of brick-and-mortar branches. These networks are
particularly important in the microcredit market, as they facilitate the collection of
reliable information about payment behavior of potential borrowers, as well as the
monitoring on the performance of productive projects that have received funding.
The decisions of loan providers regarding the location of their branches will have,
therefore, different welfare implications for consumers across locations, depending on
the impact on the local availability of credit.5 The relaxation of the interest rate cap
modifies the incentives of financial institutions to expand their branching networks
towards new locations, by making it profitable to offer loans to a wider segment of
clients. These effects may be significant even in contexts where financial institutions
set a unique interest rate for each type of loan (client) at the national level, because
the distribution of branches across geographic markets will determine their exposure
to local competitive environments. In this paper, I incorporate the effects of these
changes in the size and distribution of branching networks on the optimal pricing
strategy of financial institutions.
My identification strategy exploits the variation of market shares and product char-
acteristics across geographic markets, before and after the policy change, to identify
the consumers’ sensibility to changes in loan characteristics. My approach combines
elements from several studies that estimate demand in the context of limited attention
(e.g. Abaluck and Adams, 2017; Ho et al., 2017; Hortaçsu et al., 2017; Abrams, 2019),
and in the presence of unobserved price heterogeneity (D’Haultfœuille et al., 2018).
I combine moment conditions derived from the consumers’ utility maximization and
the lenders’ optimal decision on interest rates, before and after the policy change,
to identify changes in the price elasticity and the share of consumers with access to
5Bruhn and Love (2014) exploit the opening of a large multi-market bank in Mexico to analyze
the effects of financial access on poverty. They find a significant effect of access to finance on labor
market activity and income levels, particularly among individuals with low income, located in areas
that were under-served before the entry of this agent.
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formal loans.
On the supply side, I focus on the optimal pricing strategies of financial institu-
tions for a given market structure. Since I do not model the entry decision of financial
institutions across geographic markets, I cannot make conclusions on the effects of
changes in usury ceilings on the size and distribution of branching networks. The
model, however, allows us to measure how potential borrowers value an extra com-
petitor or branch at a local market, and how their surplus is affected by the increase
in the interest rates. This information is used to evaluate to what extent the expected
increase in the volume of loans generated by the relaxation of the usury ceiling de-
pends on additional investments on branching networks in new markets, facilitating
the comparative analysis of different policy interventions.
I use the model to understand the welfare implications of a modification of the
usury ceiling for microloans that took place in Colombia around 2011. This category
includes loans that are designed for small entrepreneurs who do not have collateral or
cannot provide reliable information about their payment behavior. The Colombian
scenario is relevant in the context of microfinance because the institutional framework
is comparable to that of other countries in the region, such as Bolivia, Mexico, and
Chile, where the main providers of this type of loans are for-profit institutions regu-
lated by the financial supervisory authority.6 In Colombia, the change in the usury
ceiling in 2011 occurred during a period of macroeconomic stability and was followed
by a significant increase in the interest rates charged by financial institutions (7 per-
centage points on average), as well as by an important expansion of the branching
networks.
On the supply side, I observe that the expansion in the volume of microloans
that occurred after the relaxation in the usury rate was not followed by a signifi-
cant increase in default risk (see Figure 3.6 in the Appendix). Instead, the regulatory
changes were followed by substantial increases in operational costs, salaries and provi-
sions, that suggest a greater effort of financial institutions related with monitoring and
screening activities. Overall, the profit of financial institutions increased (the average
return over assets (ROA) increased from 2% in 2010 to 2.2% in 2012), particularly
for those specialized in microcredit.
I perform a before-and-after comparison of consumer welfare to examine the effects
6In many developing countries, institutions specialized in the provision of financial services for the
poor have transitioned from non-profit organizations into regulated financial institutions (Ledger-
wood et al., 2013).
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of the relaxation of the usury rate. I find significant gains associated both with
the greater availability of branches in new locations, and the increased funding for
borrowers who did not have access to formal loans before the policy change. These
gains exceeded the reduction in consumer surplus caused by the increase in the interest
rates. When comparing the welfare gains of consumers across markets, the results
indicate that those who benefited the most from the policy change were the ones
located in markets where the expansion of loan operations towards riskier borrowers
was accompanied by entry of new competitors.
In a counterfactual scenario where I examine the effects of relaxing the usury
ceiling in the absence of additional investment in branching networks, I find that the
policy is still welfare improving. Although there are markets that would experience
a reduction in consumer welfare in the absence of additional branches, the overall
effect is dominated by the increase in consumer surplus of riskier borrowers who gain
access to formal loans after the ceiling is relaxed. Nevertheless, the results suggest
that there are other barriers prevent micro-entrepreneurs from considering regulated
financial institutions as a source of funding, as there is a significant number of potential
borrowers who seem to rely solely on informal lenders even after the policy change.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief review of the
related literature. Section 3.3 provides an overview of the characteristics of MFIs
and other loan providers that interacted in the retail banking industry in Colombia
in the period of analysis. Section 3.4 presents descriptive statistics of the data used
in the estimation. Section 3.5 describes the consumer choice model, the supply side
optimality conditions on the interest rate, and the estimation strategy. Section 3.6
presents the results of the structural model, introduces measures of the impact of the
regulatory change on consumer welfare and discusses a counterfactual exercise where I
examine the effects of the policy in the absence of additional investments in branching
networks. Finally, I present some concluding remarks and potential extensions of the
model.
3.2 Related literature
This paper contributes to different strands of the literature. First, it contributes to a
growing number of studies on the effects of interest rates caps on consumer welfare.
Most of the studies in this literature focus on consumer loans and payday loans
(e.g. Benmelech and Moskowitz, 2010; Temin and Voth, 2008; Melzer and Schroeder,
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2017; Rigbi, 2013). For example, Melzer and Schroeder (2017) and Zinman (2010)
explore the effects of usury laws applied to automobile loans and payday loans in
the U.S., concluding that tightening ceilings is harmful for consumers, as it reduces
price transparency in the market and limits access to timely funding for vulnerable
borrowers.
Most of this work adopts reduced form approaches and focuses on credit access
as the main outcome. Recent papers, however, by Galenianos and Gavazza (2019)
and Agarwal et al. (2014) find that usury ceilings can be beneficial for consumers as
they limit the ability of banks to exert price discrimination in contexts with product
differentiation and consumer inattention, without causing a significant reduction in
the volume of credit. Cuesta and Sepulveda (2019) find a contrasting result in the
context of the Chilean consumer credit market. They propose a structural model of
demand and supply of consumer loans to provide evidence of the effects of interest
rate caps on market outcomes and welfare, finding that the adverse implications of
tightening the usury ceiling on credit access dominate the consumer protection effects.
This paper is also related to a broader set of studies that explores the competitive-
ness in the credit market and the sources of market power, particularly in segments
of low-income borrowers. Recent work by Meier and Sprenger (2010), Zinman (2010),
and Nelson (2019) finds that consumers’ present bias and limited search, lender con-
centration, and adverse selection might be behind the excessive market power exhib-
ited by lenders in some markets. Many of these studies explore these topics in the
context of the US credit card market, where recent regulation changes such as the
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, have
attracted renewed attention. The CARD act limited the ability of financial institu-
tions to raise interest rates and other fees in response respond to new information
about the borrowers. The seminal work by Agarwal et al. (2014), who finds signif-
icant welfare gains for consumers in this market has been followed by other studies
that reveal partial market unraveling among subprime accounts (e.g. Han et al., 2018;
Nelson, 2019).
Next, this paper joins a growing literature that uses structural models to examine
the role of branching networks as a source of differentiation in the context of retail
banking. My paper is related to the work of Dai and Yuan (2013), Berger and
Dick (2007), and Dick (2008), who use discrete choice models to estimate consumer
demand, price, and entry decisions of bank across geographic markets. Their work
focuses on the effects of entry triggered by the Riegle-Neal Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994 in the United States and the interaction of different types of
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financial institutions in local markets, such as single and multi-market banks. In a
recent study, Clark et al. (2017) highlight the contribution of branching networks
to the market power of multi-market agents and their role in the geographic flow of
credit.
From a methodological perspective, my paper is related to a body of literature
concerned with demand estimation in contexts where not all consumers are aware
of all the services at their disposal (e.g. Abaluck and Adams, 2017; Hortaçsu et al.,
2017; Ho et al., 2017). In these studies, the share of consumers that opt for the
outside alternative exhibits some degree of inertia that is often associated with inat-
tention, advertising expenditures or higher switching costs. Recently, Abrams (2019)
examined local competition in the banking industry across geographic markets the
United States by applying a demand model with consideration sets similar to the one
proposed by Goeree (2008), where the probability that a consumer is aware of the
services offered by a particular bank is a function of the advertising expenditure of
the latter. Their model relies on very detailed information of the distance between
borrowers and lending, and advertising expenditure of financial institutions across
multiple geographic markets. Here, I use similar methods to identify the share of con-
sumers that gain access to credit from formal loan providers after the usury ceiling is
relaxed. In addition, my empirical strategy takes elements from recent literature that
estimates demand in the presence of unobserved price heterogeneity (D’Haultfœuille
et al., 2018; Huang, 2020, e. g.). I follow the approach by D’Haultfœuille et al. (2018),
who propose a method for the structural estimation of a demand and supply model
with price discrimination, where information on prices is limited and takes the form
of, e.g., observing list prices from catalogs or average prices.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature that has examined the effects of
usury ceilings on credit market outcomes in Colombia. Empirical work on this topic
has been developed by Steiner and Agudelo (2012) and Cubillos Rocha et al. (2018).
These studies use reduced-form approaches and differences in differences estimation to
analyze the effects of the measure on the aggregate value of microloans and the number
of clients. This paper complements this work by making use of a structural model that
incorporates the changes in the composition of the potential market in the demand
estimation. My approach has the advantage of allowing for the implementation of
different counterfactual exercises that can provide more insights on the effects of the
policy on consumer welfare across geographic markets.
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3.3 Usury ceilings and microcredit in Colombia
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the microfinance industry in Colombia
and the changes in the regulation related to usury ceilings.
Colombia experienced a favorable macroeconomic environment between 2006 and
2014 that was accompanied by a significant expansion of the demand for loans. After a
deep financial crisis at the end of the 90s that triggered the implementation of stricter
regulation related to credit risk management and capital requirements for financial
institutions, the banking industry experienced a process of consolidation resulting in
a relatively concentrated market, where commercial banks with extended branching
networks throughout the national territory enjoyed significant market power. The
growth in the demand for loans is largely explained by the dynamics of non-collateral
loans, including those available for small entrepreneurs. Industry reports indicate
that the potential for growth in the niche of micro-loans is high, due to the high levels
of informality in the labor market and the scarcity of adequate collateral among
entrepreneurs (SFC, 2015). According to Estrada and Rozo (2006), these financial
constraints are even more acute in rural areas, where financial services had been
almost exclusively provided by a public bank that focuses on funding for productive
projects in the agricultural sector.
3.3.1 Microloans supply in Colombia
The oldest private financial institutions specialized in microfinance (MFIs) started
operations in Colombia at the end of the 1980s. Before their entry, microloans were
provided exclusively by the government through development agencies. According to
Barona (2004), during the 1990s, most of these institutions were non-profit organiza-
tions that funded their loan operations with donations from private individual donors
or international development agencies. Only after the financial crisis at the end of
that decade, the number of non-profit organizations that offered loans to poor clients
started to increase. Between 2000 and 2011, the number of institutions increased from
4 to 26. During this period, the biggest MFIs transitioned from non-profit organiza-
tions into specialized banks, while only a few traditional banks made their incursion
in the microfinance sector.
The vast majority of the microloans offered by financial institutions in Colombia are
individual, rather than group liability loans, and they comply with the legal definition
of microcredit, introduced by the government in 2007. This definition specifies i) a
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maximum amount that can be borrowed by a single client (around USD 7500), ii) a
cap on the total debt that the client can have with the financial system (nearly USD
36000) and iii) the charges that financial institutions can apply for additional services
related to the loan (different from the interest rate).7 These loans are typically used
by small entrepreneurs to finance productive projects that involve less than ten direct
employees. The average amount of a microloan in 2014 was around USD 2160 and
the time of repayment was 1.4 years on average (Fernandez, 2014). Most of these
loans have a monthly frequency of payments.
While some of these characteristics are similar to those of non-collateral loans
offered to households, the interest rate of microloans has been consistently higher.
This gap has been attributed partially to differences in how that financial institutions
asses the value of the available collateral and gather information about the payment
behavior of their clients. To maintain low levels of default and reduce associated
loses, they often exert close monitoring of the productive projects of the clients and
include additional services for entrepreneurs, such as guidance on marketing and basic
accounting. The implementation of these measures is costly and often requires a
higher number of employees. MFIs’ branching networks have more nodes in rural
areas and intermediate cities compared to those of traditional banks, and sometimes
they are complemented with mobile agents with the task of reaching clients in isolated
locations. Microloans are the credit product with greater geographical diversification.
In 2012, 52% of these loans were given to clients in locations different from the 13
biggest cities in the country, while only 5% of the loans in other categories were given
to clients outside these locations.
Although the microloans portfolio typically represents only a small fraction of
the total volume of credit provided by financial institutions (3,16% in 2012), it has
exhibited significant growth in recent years. The value of the portfolio nearly doubled
between 2010 and 2017, while the number of clients has increased from 1.2 million
to 3.3 million over the same period (Estrada and Hernandez Rubio, 2019). As of
2017, there were a few financial institutions that concentrate the majority of loan
operations in the microcredit market. A public bank concentrated around 70% of
the loans operations destined to the rural sector, while a dozen of private regulated
financial institutions provided the majority of the loans for micro-entrepreneurs in
other sectors.8 Other entities that were not regulated by the financial supervisory
7The values presented here were converted into US dollars by applying the year 2014 Purchasing
Power Parity, calculated by the World Bank.
8Throughout this paper I refer to regulated financial institutions as those under the supervision
Superintendencia Financiera.
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authority provided 16% of the total volume of loans.9 Nevertheless, these institutions
were subject to the same regulation in terms of usury ceilings.
3.3.2 Interest rate ceilings
The Colombian government has implemented usury ceilings to protect vulnerable
consumers of excessive charges. This regulation has existed in Colombia for decades,
and it is applicable for every person or institution that offers a loan.10 With the
introduction of regulation related to the supply of microloan by supervised institutions
in 2007, the government started introducing changes to the usury ceilings in order to
adjust them to the particularities of this market niche, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Before 2007, there was a single interest rate cap that applied for all types of loans.
This ceiling was calculated as 1.5 times the average interest rate charged by regulated
financial institutions for consumer and commercial loans during the previous 12 weeks.
This ceiling was heavily influenced by the level and dynamics of the interest rates of
commercial loans, which were substantially lower than those of consumer and micro
loans. In October 2007, the government defined a new interest rate ceiling that was
applied to for the category of microloans exclusively. This cap remained fixed until
October 2010 at a level of 33.9%, effective annual.11 Later, after a transition period
that ended in January 2011, the usury rate for microcredit was defined as 1.5 times
the average interest rate charged by financial institutions for this type of loan during
the previous year.
Figure 3.2 presents the distribution of the interest rates (national weighted aver-
age) charged by regulated financial institutions. As shown in the figure, the interest
rate ceiling applied until September 2010 was binding at least for some of the reg-
ulated loan providers. The distribution of the interest rates after the policy change
exhibited a shift in the mean and greater dispersion. Banks with the lower interest
rates before the policy change maintained them at similar levels or even reduced them
after the usury ceiling was modified. These institutions kept a small participation in
9Most of these institutions concentrated their operations in a few municipalities and in some
cases consumers needed to acquire some type of membership in order to become eligible to obtain a
loan. Since these alternatives were not available for all consumers in the market during this period,
I consider them as part of the outside option in the demand estimation.
10The enforcement of the usury ceiling is more challenging among informal sources of credit, where
information about the conditions of the loan contracts is often unavailable.
11The inflation rate in Colombia has remained in one digit levels since 2000. Between 2010 and
2012 the average annual inflation rate was 2.95% (based on information of the consumer price index
published by Banco de la República (Central Bank of Colombia).
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the microcredit market, and their microloans also represented small fraction of their
total loans portfolio, even after the policy change. In contrast, entities specialized
in this market niche increased their interest rates significantly after the ceiling was
relaxed.
The increase in the interest rates was accompanied by a rise in the outstanding
value of the microloans portfolio of private regulated loan providers, as shown in
Figure 3.3. From 2011 to 2013 the annual growth rate of this portfolio exceeded the
one registered in other loan categories. Interestingly, this expansion did not translate
into a significant increase in the default risk of loan providers, as seen in Figure 3.6
in the Appendix. The portfolio quality ratio (share of the outstanding portfolio that
registers a delay in the payment of more than 30 days) of the cohorts of microloans
generated in 2012, after the relaxation of the usury rate, was only slightly higher than
the one observed in 2010 and lower than the ratio observed for the cohorts of 2007
and 2008. Financial institutions however, increased their loan provisions substantially
between 2010 and 2012, which might be indicative of their willingness to expand their
loan operations towards riskier segments of the market after the policy change.
Chapter 3. The Effects of Usury Ceilings on Consumers Welfare 66



































Notes: Distribution of interest rates of new microloans across private financial institutions
(national weighted averages per year). The red dots correspond to the mean usury ceiling for
this type of loan in each year . Source: Author’s calculations based on information published
by Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia.
In addition, the relaxation of the usury ceiling was accompanied by a significant
expansion of the branching networks. The entry of new competitors and the branch-
ing expansion of incumbents increased the availability of micro-loans in small and
intermediate markets. Table 3.1 presents the the number of cities with new competi-
tors between 2008 and 2014. As seen from Table, financial institutions expanded their
branching networks substantially in 2011 and 2012, particularly in cities of interme-
diate size (between 50.000 and 500.000 inhabitants).
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Notes: The red solid line corresponds to the average annual growth of the outstanding value of
the gross microloans portfolio of private financial institutions regulated by Superintendencia
Financiera. Calculations include only those institutions with a microcredit porfolio that
represents more than 1% of their total loan portfolio. The blue dotted line represents the
annual growth rate of the portfolio comprised by other loan categories. Source: Author’s
calculations based on information published by Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia.
3.4 Data
Information regarding the bank/loan characteristics, such as the number of branches
and the value of the loan portfolio of all financial institutions is published by the
Colombian financial supervisory authority (Superintendencia Financiera), while the
demographic variables per market were taken from the Municipalities Panel Data
Set from Universidad de los Andes, which contains information from several official
sources.
I consider information of all the private financial institutions regulated by Super-
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Table 3.1: Number of cities with new branches, by population size.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Less than 50000 0 0 1 0 2 1 1
50.000 to 100.000 0 4 6 5 3 6 3
100.000 - 500.000 0 6 15 7 19 9 8
500.000 - 1’000.000 0 2 4 3 4 0 0
More than 1’000.000 0 2 4 3 3 0 0
Notes: Total number of markets with new competitors compared to previous year,
by year and market size. Source: Source: Author’s calculations based on information
published by Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia.
intendencia Financiera with a microloans outstanding portfolio that represents more
than 0.1% of their total loan portfolio. I also include in the analysis the biggest
non-profit organizations specialized in microfinance (these institutions transitioned
into regulated banks between 2008 and 2011). I focus on private financial institutions
only, because the microloans originated by public institutions are often guaranteed by
the government and their conditions on interest rate and repayment may differ sub-
stantially from those provided by the private sector. The loans originated by public
entities are concentrated in the agricultural sector. The data set contains information
of 12 out of 26 financial institutions in the period 2019 to 2013. The outstanding
value of the microloans portfolio of the institutions included represented 95.67% of
the value of microloans provided by private loan providers in 2012.
3.4.1 Financial institutions
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of the characteristics of these financial institu-
tions at the national level. The average interest rates charged for new microloans in
September 2010 ranged from 18,4% to 33.9% (the usury ceiling at the time). While
the average deposits rate was relatively similar across financial institutions (between
2.6% to 6.5%), there is significant dispersion across loan providers in terms of their
administrative costs and salaries. The differences in the risk management strategies of
financial institutions might explain this discrepancy. For example, loan providers that
specialize in microfinance exhibit greater administrative costs and typically charge
higher interest rates.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of financial institutions at the national level.
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
September 2010
Interest rate 0.294 0.049 0.184 0.245 0.339 0.339
Salaries* 0.539 0.453 0.000 0.196 0.744 4.486
Provisions Rate* 0.018 0.024 0.000 0.001 0.050 0.093
Required reserve** 0.095 0.029 0.023 0.084 0.118 0.118
Deposits rate 0.034 0.007 0.026 0.028 0.034 0.051
Microloans portfolio* 0.264 0.394 0.005 0.007 0.528 0.986
Administrative costs* 0.371 1.075 0.046 0.075 0.325 13.364
Previous NGO (dummy var.) 0.228 0.420 0 0 0 1
Bank (dummy var.) 0.874 0.333 0 1 1 1
Number of observations 451
September 2012
Interest rate 0.346 0.070 0.184 0.290 0.385 0.452
Salaries* 0.625 0.612 0.017 0.178 0.886 4.321
Provisions Rate* 0.021 0.026 0.000 0.001 0.054 0.093
Required reserve** 0.084 0.025 0.042 0.059 0.097 0.119
Deposits rate 0.045 0.009 0.034 0.037 0.047 0.065
Microloans portfolio* 0.316 0.415 0.003 0.006 0.917 0.975
Administrative costs* 0.330 0.892 0.042 0.085 0.223 10.053
Previous NGO (dummy var.) 0.280 0.449 0 0 1 1
Bank (dummy var.) 0.866 0.341 0 1 1 1
Number of observations 515
Summary of descriptive statistics of the characteristics of financial institutions observed at a
national level in 2010 and 2012. Source: Author’s calculations based on information published
by Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia.
*: Values expressed as a percentage of the outstanding value of the loans portfolio.
**: Values expressed as a percentage of the outstanding value of the deposits.
3.4.2 Period of analysis
As shown in Figure 3.1, there is a transition period between the old regulation, that
fixated the usury ceiling at 33.93% (effective annual), and the new regulation, that
defined the usury rate as 1.5 times the average interest rate charged by regulated
financial institutions in the category of microloans in the last 12 months. This period
lasted between October 2010 and December 2011. I took September 2010 as the
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period before the policy change. Anticipation of the policy change does not seem
likely on the demand side, as potential borrowers in the segment of microloans are
typically not sophisticated in terms of their financial decisions an often exhibit low
levels of financial literacy. On the supply side, the number of new loans originated
in the months previous to the policy change did not decrease compared to previous
periods, suggesting that financial institutions did not strategically restrain the supply
of microloans before the relaxation of the usury ceiling. The information available
in every geographic location corresponds to the value of the outstanding portfolio,
rather than to new loan operations only. In order to make sure that this value fully
reflects the new conditions applied by financial institutions after the usury ceiling was
modified, I took September 2012 as the period after the policy change.
3.4.3 Geographic markets
The data set contains information of all municipalities in Colombia, where there was
at least one branch of a private regulated financial institution at some point between
2019 and 2013 (832 municipalities out of 1122). It includes big urban centers, with
a population above 3 million inhabitants, as well as small villages with less than two
thousand inhabitants.
My empirical strategy assumes that consumers only consider financial institutions
with at least one branch in their vicinity. Using municipality as a proxy for local
markets can be problematic, as it is likely that entrepreneurs travel to their closest
urban center to request a loan from financial institutions that do not have a branch in
their municipality. Since information about the precise location of consumers is not
available, I define geographic markets as clusters of municipalities with a maximum
distance between them of 40km.12 This distance is consistent with other studies on
the banking industry that measure the average distance that consumers are willing
to travel in order to ask for a loan (Berger and Mester (2003)). The resulting number
of markets is 134.
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics of demographic characteristics and mar-
ket structure. As seen in the table, there is great dispersion in terms of the total
population, the share of the population in rural areas and GDP per capita across
markets. The number of branches and banking correspondents (BCs) also differs
12The distance between municipalities corresponds to the traveling distance obtained using a
Google Maps API.
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greatly across locations.13 The microcredit market is highly concentrated, as sug-
gested by the number of competitors in each location. In more than 25% of the
markets, there were only two private regulated institutions that offered microloans,
with just one branch per entity. Other institutions that offer microloans, such as
non-profit organizations and savings associations, were mostly concentrated in urban
markets.
Between 2010 and 2012, there was a significant expansion of the branching networks
as can be seen in the change in the number of competitors, branches and banking cor-
respondents. 202 new branches were opened during this period in 84 locations, while
55 markets experienced an increase in the number of competitors. During the same
period, financial institutions expanded radically their banking correspondents net-
work. The average number of banking correspondents per 100 thousand inhabitants
almost quintupled, rising from 1.1 in 2010 to 5.12 in 2012. Table 3.9 in the Appendix
presents the summary statistics of the characteristics of financial institutions that
change across markets. The most important changes between 2010 and 2012 are the
increase in the number of markets with at least one branch and the in the density of
banking correspondents.
13Banking correspondents are authorized representative individuals of a financial institution. They
provide basic financial services to the people like cash transactions (both deposit and withdrawal)

















































Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of geographic markets.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Adults 337, 886.10 695, 332.60 8, 237 64, 757.8 285, 373 4, 237, 450
GDP per capita (USD-PPP2014) 32, 801.96 70, 624.58 267 2, 940.5 26, 489 397, 114
Entrepreneurs 12, 110.44 8, 036.77 961 5, 955 16, 198 39, 800
Rural productive units 59.45 39.68 1.00 29.10 78.17 197.90
Distance to closest urban center (km) 0.45 0.17 0.05 0.33 0.60 0.80
Market structure 2010
Public bank 0.98 0.13 0 1 1 1
Banks offering microcredit 3.70 2.47 1 2 6 12
Microfinance NGOs 3.32 4.49 0 1 4 28
Total number of branches 17.76 64.25 1 2 12 635
Banking correspondents 20.65 40.60 0.00 0.33 20.08 218.50
Market structure 2012
Public bank 0.99 0.12 0 1 1 1
Banks offering microcredit 3.84 2.65 1 2 6 12
Microfinance NGOs 3.04 4.30 0 1 3 33
Total number of branches 17.68 64.39 1 2 12 665
Banking correspondents 95.94 115.00 0.00 0.81 136.31 517.00
Notes: Descriptive statistics of demographic characteristics of local markets in 2010 and 2012. Source: Author’s calculations
based on information published by Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia.
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3.4.4 Market shares
In order to obtain a measure of the market share of each financial institution, it
is necessary to define first the size of the potential market. That is, the potential
outstanding value of the microloans portfolio in each market. For this purpose, I
use information from several surveys by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de
Estadistica (DANE) and Superintendencia Financiera.
I started by building a measure of the number of potential borrowers in the market
(Nmt). I define the set of potential borrowers as all individuals who may need loan
to start a productive project or carry on economic activities, either from formal or
informal sources. To estimate the number of potential small entrepreneurs in each
market, I used information from the GEIH Survey and the Micro-establishments Di-
rectory developed by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE).
I included in my definition of potential borrowers all small entrepreneurs that already
have a formally registered micro-establishment (up to nine employees) and all adults
who are either unemployed or have an informal occupation (this definition excludes
self-employed professionals, and patrons and employees of micro-establishments with
more than 5 employees). This measure of market size allows to account for potential
entrepreneurs who need funding in order to start their own business and it also rec-
ognizes the existence of many small business that do not have a formal registry. Also,
it takes into account that financial institutions often require proof of an employment
contract in order to become eligible of other credit alternatives, such as credit card
and consumer loans.
I used a survey performed by Superintendencia Financiera in 2014 that asked in-
dividuals and micro-entrepreneurs in different geographic locations about the use of
financial services (SFC, 2015), to estimate the share of potential entrepreneurs that
need a loan. This survey consists of two different questionnaires, one for individu-
als (households) and one for micro or small entrepreneurs, and it is representative
for three types of municipalities: big cities and urban centers, intermediate urban
municipalities, and rural towns. The survey asked whether individuals or micro-
entrepreneurs have requested a loan in the previous 12 months. Among the response
alternatives the survey includes different funding sources, from friends and family,
informal sources like loan sharks and thrift stores, to formal loan lenders like financial
institutions or traditional banks. The survey also asked to those who claimed not to
have asked for a loan in the previous year, the reason behind this decision. Among the
response alternatives, the survey includes the option ”I am not interested, I did not
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need one, I have not asked for it”. Other options include ”I have asked for a loan but
it has been denied”, ”I believe that my request will be denied”, ”I do not comply with
the requirements”, and other alternatives indicative of mistrust of available sources of
funding and financial constraints. Based on the response alternatives included in the
survey, This question permits to identify clearly the proportion of borrowers who did
not need a loan, from those who were not able to obtain funding for other reasons.
As seen in the second column of Table 3.4, there is a meaningful share of the
population that relies on sources different from the formal financial sector to ob-
tain funding. These sources include family members and friends, as well as informal
lenders. The third column presents the proportion of individuals who, according the
their responses in the survey, did not asked for a loan in the previous year because
they did not need it. I will assume later in the estimation procedure that the shares
shown in the Table are identical among markets belonging to the same category (big
cities, intermediate urban, and small markets).14
Table 3.4: Sources of funding of entrepreneurs and individuals - 2014
Type of municipality Financial inst. Other No need of a loan
Individuals
Big urban markets 0.181 0.255 0.564
Intermediate markets 0.158 0.183 0.659
Rural/remote markets 0.154 0.1500 0.699
Entrepreneurs
Big urban markets 0.187 0.241 0.572
Intermediate markets 0.356 0.155 0.489
Rural/remote markets 0.296 0.160 0.545
Notes: Share of individuals and entrepreneurs who obtained their funding
from financial institutions or other sources, by market size. Source: Au-
thor’s calculations based on the Demand for Financial Services Survey by
Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia (SFC, 2015).
I calculate the potential size of market m in year t, Smt, using the number of
potential small entrepreneurs defined above (Nmt), the proportion of them who need
a loan (sloanm ) according to the survey by Superintendencia Financiera, and the average
14This survey was taken in 2014 (after the ceiling was on the interest rates was removed). The
structural model that I propose in Section 3.5 allows to measure in retrospective the share of bor-
rowers who could have been constrained by the existence of the interest rate ceiling, that is, the
proportion of borrowers who needed a loan, but were not able to obtain it because financial institu-
tions were not willing to provide credit at the maximum interest rates allowed by the regulation.
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value of the microloans portfolio per capita observed in different types of markets (big
cities, intermediate urban locations, and small markets), l̄mt.
15 The calculation is as
follows:
Smt = Nmt l̄mt(s
loan
m ).
Let Ljmt denote the value of the microcredit portfolio of the loan provider j in





The potential market is comprised of 2.9 million small entrepreneurs and cor-
responds to a credit volume of 10.4 billion dollars. For comparison, Estrada and
Hernandez Rubio (2019), estimate a potential market of 4.7 million entrepreneurs.
The main difference with their estimates is explained by my decision to exclude agri-
cultural productive projects and consider only the fraction of entrepreneurs who do
not need a loan according to the survey mentioned above.
3.5 Model
As discussed in the previous section, the relaxation of a usury ceiling was followed by
a rise in the interest rates and the volume of loans provided by financial institutions.
The later effect might have occurred as financial institutions started providing loans
to new segments of clients in existing geographic markets, or via additional invest-
ments in their branching networks, which allowed them to expand their operations in
new geographic markets. These investments have important implications in terms of
consumer welfare because the availability of microloans often requires proximity be-
tween the client and a brick-and-mortar branch. In practice, clients typically need to
approach a traditional branch to complete the procedures related to the loan request.
Similarly, financial institutions that provide microloans often exert close monitor-
ing of the productive projects that receive funding, including on-site assessment of
15I assume the share of entrepreneurs that require a loan does not change as a result of the policy
change. Instead, I assume that this change only affects the decision of entrepreneurs to request the
loan from formal or informal sources.
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the conditions of the productive projects by bank agents. These activities become
prohibitively expensive if the client is too far from the branching network.
In estimating the demand for microloans, it is important, therefore, to account
for changes in the interest rate, but also those in other service characteristics such
as the size of branching networks and the availability of other transaction channels
in the vicinity of the borrowers. To capture these effects in the demand estimation,
I use a discrete choice model, where the decision of the consumers is simplified to
one in which they select the preferred financial institutions among those who have
at least one branch in their local market. Although this approach does not take into
account the effects of the interest rate on the size of the loans demanded by potential
borrowers, it seems reasonable in the market of microloans, given the small dispersion
in the size of the loans observed in this market.16
Furthermore, I assume that banks do not price discriminate across geographic
markets. Instead, they set a unique interest rate that applies to all their consumers
of the same type in all locations. This pricing strategy is consistent with the usual
practice of financial institutions in Colombia as well as in other countries, where banks
use a reference interest rate in multiple markets and make adjustments based on the
client risk profile rather than the local market structure (Berger and Dick (2007)).
3.5.1 Demand side
The microloans market is one in which financial institutions have the possibility to
charge different interest rates depending on the characteristics of the clients. Due to
data limitations, I am not able to fully capture the heterogeneity in interest rates
charged by loan providers. However, the approach that I propose here allows us to
capture some of the changes in the composition of the loan portfolio generated by the
relaxation of the usury ceiling. I divide the potential borrowers in the microloans mar-
ket into three segments: the first one (Segment 1) is constituted by all entrepreneurs
that are aware of all the credit alternatives available in the market and could obtain
a loan from a private regulated institution at an interest rate lower than r̄b; these en-
trepreneurs are more likely to have a safer profile and may represent lower marginal
costs for the loan supplier. The second segment (Segment 2) corresponds to those
16The legal definition of microcredit includes a maximum size of the loan (around US3500 as of
2012) and a maximum amount of debt that a client can have with the financial system at a given
period . Banks often specify a minimum loan size. Furthermore, I do not observe a significant
increase in the average size of a micro-loans after the policy change.
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attentive borrowers that can only obtain loans at rates higher than r̄b, but lower than
r̄a, the usury ceiling after the policy intervention. The third segment of borrowers
corresponds to those individuals who are either not attentive or are not able to obtain
loans even under the new usury ceiling.
Before the policy change, the aggregate demand for microloans is composed of
borrowers that belong in Segment 1, whereas after the policy change, borrowers from
Segment 1 and Segment 2 can demand loans. I assume that there is no price dis-
crimination within these two segments. This is a simplifying assumption motivated
by the limitations in the availability of data. If more detailed information about in-
dividual transactions is available, it is possible to extend this framework to account
for additional market segments.
The utility that an individual i, located in market m and belonging to segment d,




where δdjmt is the mean utility of consumers in segment d and εijmt is a term that
captures individual preferences and follows a type I extreme value distribution. The
mean utility satisfies
δdjmt = β0 +
~βd ~Xdjmt + α
drdjmt + ξjm, (3.1)
where ~Xdjmt is a vector of characteristics of the bank and ξjm is a term that captures
other aspects unchanged across segments and over time that are not observed by the
econometrician. Suppose that there are only two periods: before and after the policy
change (t = {b, a}). According to this specification, preferences of consumers can
vary across segments but are constant over time.
Abaluck and Adams (2017), Ho et al. (2017) and Hortaçsu et al. (2017) study
situations where the alternatives under study are not available for all consumers, and
instead, there is a fraction of consumers whose only alternative is the outside option.
In these studies, the probability that consumers choose a particular alternative is
calculated, therefore, as the product of the probability that consumers belong in
the segment with access to the complete choice set, and the probability that they
select that alternative, given that they participate in the choice problem. The first
probability is often determined by observed characteristics of the consumers and their
environment, while the choice conditional on participation is often modeled using a
logit model.
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Let ω1bm be the portion of entrepreneurs in market m that belong to Segment
1 before the policy change. This value is assumed to be dependent on observable
characteristics of the market, such as demographics and the availability of alternative
(informal) sources of funding. Given the assumptions on εijmt, the share of bank j in


















where K1mb is the number of banks in that offer loans in the segment of safer borrowers




















I assume that the fraction of safer borrowers ω1mb will depend on a vector of char-
acteristics of the market, ~Zmb, such as distance to closest urban center, percentage
of population in rural areas, public safety conditions, the presence of a public bank
and number of non-regulated institutions that offer loans to entrepreneurs. I modeled




1 + e~ρ1 ~Zmb
. (3.2)
This specification is similar to the one used by Hortaçsu et al. (2017), and it can be
interpreted as a reduced-form representation of the determinants of inattention. There
are plenty of reasons, both on the demand and the supply side, that explain why formal
financial institutions might not constitute a relevant source of funding for a portion
of potential borrowers, including low levels of financial literacy, distrust for financial
institutions, inexperience with formal financial services or long distances between
branches and potential clients. Therefore, I do not interpret the initial magnitude of
ω1mb, before the policy change, as the degree of financial exclusion generated solely
by the usury ceiling. Instead, I argue that the change in the portion of potential
borrowers that participate in the choice problem after usury ceiling is relaxed can be
informative of the degree of market expansion that can be associated with the policy
change.
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Abaluck and Adams (2017) shows that this model is equivalent to a standard logit
model with an additional inertia term through which the utility of each alternative
depends on the characteristics of rival products. Provided that enough determinants
of probability of participating in the choice problem are observed, it is possible to sep-
arately identify ξjm and ω
1
mb based on the asymmetry in the response of the market
shares of available banks to changes in the characteristics of the outside option, rela-
tive to the response of the share of the outside option to changes in the characteristics
of banks.
After the policy change, financial institutions can profitably provide loans to a new
segment of potential borrowers who were previously excluded due to the initial usury














, and ω1ma + ω
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ma ≤ 1.
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where Kdma is the number of banks who offer loans in segment d and market m after
the policy change.
3.5.2 Supply side
In modeling the optimal pricing of financial institutions, I abstract from the informa-
tion problems typically encountered in the context of retail banking, such as adverse
selection and moral hazard, that can have important implications in the optimal pric-
ing strategies of loan providers. This is a strong assumption, which could be relaxed
in future research if more detailed data on default rates becomes available.17 Prelim-
inary exploration of the data at the national level reveals that the relaxation of the
usury ceiling did not lead to a sustained increase in the default rates of the microloans
portfolio (See Figure 3.6). Instead, loan providers seem to have adjusted their expen-
diture in provisioning, operative costs and salaries, indicating that they might have
17Recent work in this direction has been done by Cuesta and Sepulveda (2019) and Nelson (2019).
These studies make use of administrative data sets that contain detailed information on individual
loan transactions and borrowers’ credit history.
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resorted to additional monitoring to manage the potential increase in credit risk after
the usury ceiling was relaxed. This evidence suggests that financial institutions in the
microcredit market have mechanisms in place that allow them to solve the adverse
selection problem to some extent.
I focus here on the effect of branching networks on the optimal pricing strategies
of loan providers that operate across multiple geographic locations. I consider a situ-
ation where they set interest rates based mostly on the risk profile of their borrowers,
with no spatial discrimination pricing. This assumption is not incompatible with
the presence of substantial differences in the average interest rates across geographic
markets, which have been broadly documented in different contexts (e.g. Hannan and
Prager, 2006; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Bellucci et al.,
2013), nor does it ignore the ways in which the distance between lenders and bor-
rowers can impact prices and credit availability. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) finds
that once the analysis accounts for proprietary information related to the borrowers’
payment behavior, the distance between borrowers and lenders becomes irrelevant as
a predictor of the interest rate. These findings, along with those provided by Petersen
and Rajan (2002), are in line with information-based theories but are not supportive
of discriminatory spatial pricing.
There is some agreement in the literature regarding the effect of competition on
pricing in the banking industry. However, the relevant definition of geographic mar-
kets differs depending on the context. Degryse and Ongena (2005) find that interest
rates are sensitive to the number of competitors in the vicinity of the borrowers.
In contrast, Hannan and Prager (2006) find evidence in favor of homogeneous pric-
ing in the deposit market by multi-market banks throughout states and even across
broader geographic areas in the US, with interest rates being closely correlated state-
wide competitive conditions. Similarly, Heitfield and Prager (2004) find that small
banks set their interest rates based on the local market competitive conditions, while
large multi-market banks set homogeneous prices across broader geographic areas.
The authors attribute the presence of uniform pricing to the growth in Internet ad-
vertising, which allows borrowers to get more information about rates charged across
geographic markets. By quoting uniform rates, rather than local market-specific ones,
multi-market banks avoid adverse reactions from consumers that would be offered a
relatively unattractive rate due to their location.
By surveying the internet websites of financial institutions in Colombia and inter-
viewing some industry representatives informally, I could confirm that pricing prac-
tices in the microloans segment are similar to those found in large multi-market banks
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in the US, in the sense that interest rates for this particular type of loans are usually set
at the national level (this practice is also documented by Armendariz and Morduch
(2007) in the context of microfinance in different countries). This pricing strategy
might be related to the multi-market nature of all financial institutions included in
the sample and the costs associated with allowing differentiated rates across regions.
As a result, pricing strategies seem to be more affected by competitive conditions at
the national level. Furthermore, regulation on price transparency by Superintendencia
Financiera introduced in 2008 created additional incentives for banks to provide very
detailed information on interest rates applicable to standardized products on their
websites. As a result, financial institutions advertise different types of microloans
that differ in their interest rates, repayment periods, and borrowers conditions such
as collateral availability or previous experience with formal financial institutions, but
do not depend explicitly on the location of the borrower. As mentioned in the pre-
vious subsection, heterogeneity in the borrowers’ risk profile is captured here by the
presence of two segments of potential borrowers in the period after the policy change.
According to this, a bank j that operates across M markets in year t will obtain












where Smt is the size of each geographic market. Lenders choose the interest rate
that maximizes their profit, subject to the constraint on the interest rate imposed by




















where r̄t is the usury ceiling in year t. The optimal interest rate for the second segment




















I assume that the marginal cost in the segment of safer clients, c1jmt, depends on a
set of bank characteristics ~W 1jmt which may vary across banks, markets and periods,
and it is given by:
c1jmt = e
~γ ~W 1jmt+ηjmt , (3.6)
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where ηjmt is an independent unobserved term that follows a normal distribution
with variance σ2η. I assume that the difference in marginal costs across segments is a




Since the difference in marginal cost among segments is assumed to be constant, it
is not possible to identify the intercept of the utility function for both segments.
According to D’Haultfœuille et al. (2018), it is possible to rationalize any price gap
between groups of consumers, constant across j, by differences in marginal costs or
the intercept of the utility function. In consequence, I assume that this intercept is
the same across market segments.
3.5.3 Observed interest rates and market shares
I do not observe the portion of consumers that belongs to each market segment. In-
stead, the only information available corresponds to the aggregate market share of
each loan provider in every location. Furthermore, information about specific charac-
teristics of the loan products offered to each segment, most critically, the interest rate,
is not available. Regarding this critical variable, I only observe a weighted average of
the interest rate at the national level.
I assume that there is no unobserved price heterogeneity in the period before the
policy change, consistent with the premise that only consumers from Segment 1 have
access to the loans from regulated loan providers at this time. In turn, after the
policy change, the observed price becomes a weighted average that includes the prices










where s1ja and s
2
ja are the market shares of bank j in each segment at the national
level after the regulatory change.
3.5.4 Estimation procedure
D’Haultfœuille et al. (2018) developed an algorithm for demand estimation that can
be used in situations where the researcher can not observe perfectly the price and the
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market share of competitors across different segments of consumers. In some cases,
only a known function of these quantities, such as a weighted average, is available.
This model is particularly useful for contexts where firms can exert third price dis-
crimination. They show that identification can be achieved by relying on supply-side
moment conditions, in cases where there is only one vector of prices that is consistent
with the observed market shares in each segment and the marginal cost structure.
They can recover the optimal prices charged in each segment in cases where either
the market shares in each segment are observed, or in cases where the characteristics
of the consumers used by sellers to price discriminate are known. The convergence
of the algorithm holds when there is not too much heterogeneity between groups of
customers in terms of their price sensitivity.
In the context studied here, the portion of consumers that belong to each segment
is not observed. Instead, I use the information of the periods before and after the
policy change to estimate these proportions. Then, I combine the demand and supply
moments obtained before the policy change with those obtained with information
after the usury ceiling is relaxed to estimate both the optimal interest rates and the
market shares of loan providers in each of the two segments defined previously. The
algorithm used to recover the parameters that describe the consumer preferences the
determinants of the marginal costs of financial institutions is explained below.
Algorithm to retrieve interest rates and market shares in each segment
The algorithm can be divided into two stages that correspond to the periods before
and after the policy change. According to the model, before the usury ceiling was
modified, there was only one segment of borrowers with access to loans from formal
lenders. Since it is assumed that there is no unobserved price heterogeneity in this
period, I use a method similar to the one proposed by Berry et al. (1995), to recover
an estimate of the unobservable term that affects the borrowers’ utility. In the second
stage, I use these estimates, along with the algorithm proposed by D’Haultfœuille
et al. (2018), to recover the unobserved market shares and optimal prices that financial
institutions charge in each segment after the policy change.
To simplify notation, I will denote the vectors of observed interest rates and market
shares for all m markets in year t as ~rt and ~st. Similarly, ~ξ will denote the vector of
unobserved characteristics of loan providers that impact the utility of the consumers,
which are assumed to be constant over time. Furthermore, ~Xt, ~Zt and ~Wt will denote
matrices that contain the observed information in year t of product characteristics
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per loan provider and market, demographic characteristics of the markets, and in-
struments that will be used in the estimation. Lastly, the unobserved interest rates
and market shares in each segment, before and after the policy change, are functions
of the vector of parameters Θ and the vector of unobservable characteristics that are
valued for consumers ~ξ, that will be denoted by ~rdt (Θ,
~ξ) and ~sdt (Θ,
~ξ), with d ∈ {1, 2}
and t ∈ {a, b}.
1. Initial setting
(a) In order to estimate the optimal interest rate in each period, I will use a
set of G vectors of random draws taken from a standard normal distribu-
tion. Let ~ηgt denote a specific vector of random draws used to estimate
the optimal interest rate in year t. A typical element of this vector, ηgjmt,
multiplied by ση0 (initial value of the parameter that captures the standard
deviation of the unobservables), represents a random shock that affects the
marginal cost of lender j in market m (see equations ((3.6)) and ((3.7))).
The number of random draws used in each stage is 100. These sets of
random draws are set once at the beginning of the algorithm, and they
are not renewed after each evaluation of the objective function at a new
parameter’s values.
(b) Consider a vector Θ0 with initial values for the parameters of interest,
Θ0 ≡ {α10, α20, β00 , ~β10 , ~β20 , ~ρ10, ~ρ20, ~γ0, λ0, σ
η
0}.
(c) As it will become clear below, I need to define initial values for the interest
rates applied to each market segment after the policy change, ~̂r1a(0) and
~̂r2a(0). I used the vector of observed the interest rates after the policy
change ~rt as starting values for the two segments.
2. Stage 1: Before the policy change:
(a) The first step consists of calculating the share of consumers that belong
to Segment 1 according to equation (3.2), using the initial values of the
parameters and the matrix ~Zb.
(b) Consistent with the assumption of no unobserved price heterogeneity before
the policy change, I use the observed values of the interest rate, ~rb and
other product characteristics ~Xb to estimate the vector of market shares
that correspond to Segment 1, ~̂s1b(Θ0), using the simple logit formula.
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(c) The usual logit inversion (ln~st − ln~s0) can not be used to retrieve an
estimate of the vector of unobservables, ~ξ, in this case.18 Instead, I solve
numerically for the mean utility of the borrowers of this segment, ~̄δ1b (Θ0)
by evaluating the following equation recursively:
~δ1b (Θ0, n+ 1) =
~δ1b (Θ0, n) + ln~sb − ωb(Θ0) ln ~̂s1b(Θ0, n),
where n denotes a step in the iterative process. Berry et al. (1995) shows
that for the duple ( ~̂bs,Θ), the operator defined by the equation above is
a contraction mapping with modulus less than one. Therefore, given an
initial value for ~δ1b (Θ0, 0), I can obtain
~δ1b (Θ0, 1) and substitute back until
convergence. Let ~̄δ1b (Θ0) be the level of borrowers’ utility that satisfies the
convergence criterion. Using this vector, I obtain estimates of ~ξ and of the
vector of market shares in segment 1, ~̃s1b(Θ0), by solving equation (3.1), as
follows:








(d) The next step consists of calculating the marginal cost for each vector of
random draws, ~ugb and the parameter σ
η
0 that captures the standard devia-
tion of the random shocks, according to equation (3.6). Then, the optimal
interest rate for each vector or random draws, ~̂r1b (Θ0, ~u
g
b), is calculated us-
ing the estimated market shares from the previous step (equation ((3.4))).
(e) The estimated aggregate interest rate across simulations for the period









3. Stage 2: After the policy change
(a) The first step is to calculate the marginal cost in the two segments for each








18This is because the utility that consumers obtain from the outside option in this model ultimately
depends on the characteristics of all the products available in the market. See Abaluck and Adams
(2017) for details.
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(b) The market shares in each segment, ~̂s1a(Θ0, 0) and ~̂s
2
a(Θ0, 0), are calculated
using the initial guess of the interest rates in each segment after the policy
change, ~̂r1a(0) and ~̂r
2
a(0), and the vector
~̂ξ(Θ0, 0), obtained in the previous
stage.
(c) I proceed to find the estimates for the optimal interest rates in each seg-
ment, ~̂r1a(Θ0, ~u
g
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a, n)) denote the function that returns the vector
of optimal interest rates for each segment, according to equations (3.4)
and (3.5). These vectors of interest rates are subsequently used to obtain

























D’Haultfœuille et al. (2018) show that the sequence of interest rates
~̂r1a(Θ0, ~u
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a, n)n∈N, defined by the equations above, con-






a), at least for a set of values of Θ0 close
to the vector of true parameters Θ.19
(d) I obtain estimates of the optimal interest rates, ~̂r1a(Θ0), ~̂r
2
a(Θ0), and market
shares in each market segment, ~̂s1a(Θ0), ~̂s
2
a(Θ0), by taking the average of
the values obtained in the previous step across vectors of random draws.
(e) Finally I calculate the aggregate market share ~̂sa(Θ0) and the aggregate
price of each bank ~̂ra(Θ0) using equations (3.3) and (3.8).
Demand and Supply Moments
Once I have recovered estimates of the vector of unobservable characteristics ~ξ and of
the interest rates and market shares before and after the policy change, I use moments
based on the exogeneity of a set of instruments ~Wt. In the period before the policy
19A situation of persistent non -convergence may indicate that there are very substantial differences
in consumers’ preferences across groups.
87 3.5. Model
change, the demand side moments are based on the estimates ~̂ξ(Θ), whereas in the
period after the policy change the moments are based on the differences between the
observed market shares the ones estimated with the model:
E(~̂ξ(Θ) ~Wb) = 0
E((~sa − ~̂sa(Θ)) ~Wa) = 0
Following Abaluck and Adams (2017) approach I also use the asymmetries in
the response of the market shares of financial institutions and the market share of
the outside option, before and after the policy change in order to identify the share
of borrowers that belong to each segments. Therefore, I include moments that are
based on the change in the market shares observed one period before the policy was
introduced (between 2009 and 2010), and the changes in market shares one period
after the policy change took place (between 2012 and 2013), as follows:
E((~sb − ~sb−1)− (~̂sb(Θ)− ~̂sb−1(Θ)) ~Wb−1) = 0
E((~sa+1 − ~sa)− (~̂sa+1(Θ)− ~̂sa(Θ)) ~Wa) = 0
The assumption that ~ξ is invariant over time is crucial for identifying all the es-
timates pertaining to the period after the regulatory change, including the share of
potential customers constrained due to the presence of the interest rate ceiling. This is
an strong assumption, given that financial institutions are likely to offer new services
that may result more attractive for clients after the relaxation of the usury ceiling.
Nevertheless, in the context studied here any additional service provided by lenders
in each market is likely to imply changes in the variables included in the estimation,
such as the number of employees, branches, and BC, particularly in a context where
the development of internet and mobile platforms was still incipient. I do observe an
increase in these variables before and after the policy change. On the supply side,
I control for variables that change across time and financial institutions and have
an impact on the marginal costs, such as the deposits rate and expenses on salaries,
operative costs, and provisions. These variables capture a substantial portion of
the additional spending that financial institutions may have had to incur to provide
loans to riskier borrowers immediately after the usury rate relaxation. Consequently,
the estimated optimal interest rates charged in the period after the policy change
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incorporate potential increases in the marginal costs and markup related to additional
services.
On the supply side, the sample moments are based on the differences between the
observed and the estimated interest rates:
E((~rb − ~̂rb(Θ)) ~Wb) = 0
E((~ra − ~̂ra(Θ)) ~Wa) = 0
3.5.5 Instruments
Instruments frequently used in the literature are variables that shift either the marginal
costs or the markup, with little direct impact on the observed characteristics of the
product that consumers appreciate. In the case studied here, a variable that can be
interpreted as a cost shifter is the legal reserve percentage required by the central
bank.20 I build other instruments based on characteristics of competitors that oper-
ate in markets of similar characteristics but belonging to other provinces, such as the
number of competitors, branches, employees per branch, and their degree of special-
ization in microfinance. I measure this last variable by computing the average share
of microloans within their aggregate portfolio at the national level. These instruments
are variables that have an impact on the markup that lenders obtain in local market,
but are not likely to have a direct impact on the utility that consumers get from a
particular alternative.
The model specification includes characteristics of the product, such as the number
of branches and banking correspondents per thousand inhabitants, as well as the
number of employees per branch. These characteristics are endogenous since financial
institutions have incentives to open extra branches or to hire additional employees in
markets where there is a strong demand for their loans. To solve for the potential
endogeneity, I use the number of branches, employees and BCs of the bank in similar
markets in other provinces as instruments for these product characteristics. Table 3.10
presents the summary statistics of the instrumental variables used in the estimation.
20The legal reserve requirement set by the central bank each period is a percentage of certain
types of deposits that banks must hold at the central bank without remuneration. Although this
percentage is the same across banks, the resulting amount of reserves that a bank must hold at the
central bank depends on the composition of the deposits of each financial institution.
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Supply side
Among the bank characteristics that determine the optimal interest rate, I included
administrative costs, such as salaries and other costs related with the operation of
the branching network (number of branches per market and number employees per
branch), as well as the deposits interest rate, calculated as the value that was paid for
concept of interests to the bank debtors in a year as a percentage of the loan portfolio.
Since some of the variables included in the estimation are likely to be endogenous, I
use instruments based on the characteristics of competitors.
3.6 Results
Table 3.5 presents the parameters that determine the preferences of consumers and
the share of potential borrowers in each segment. Consumers who had access to
formal loans before the policy change exhibit a similar sensitivity to the interest rate
than those in the second segment. The availability of branches in the market is
appreciated by consumers in the two segments, particularly by those who did not
have access to loans before the policy was introduced. By contrast, the number
of banking correspondents has a negative impact on the utility of consumers that
belong to the second segment and is not significant for those in the safer one. This
difference might be explained by the fact that the largest banking correspondents’
networks have been developed by banks and other financial institutions that are not
specialized in microfinance. This transaction channel is perhaps more important in
the deposit market, where MFIs are not strong competitors, as it facilitates payments
and transfers from existing saving accounts.
The lower segment of the table contains the parameters that determine the share
of consumers in each segment. The results indicate that markets with lower GDP
per capita and higher share of population in rural areas have a greater share of bor-
rowers with access to loans from private regulated institutions. One explanation for
this result is that entrepreneurs from the rural sector tend to have greater experience
with credit operations in general, as they routinely use loans and other financial ser-
vices from the government in their business activity. Agricultural productive projects
receive partial default insurance provided by the government, which make them rela-
tively more attractive for private banks. The results for the second segment indicate
that microfinance institutions have a greater potential of expansion in areas with
higher income, that are relatively close to big urban centers, where public funding
Chapter 3. The Effects of Usury Ceilings on Consumers Welfare 90
Table 3.5: Demand Side




Interest rate -7.2247∗∗ -7.0505∗∗
(0.3317) (1.0891)
Branches per capita 4.187∗∗ 11.0455∗∗
(0.9293) (2.4139)
Banking correspondents per capita -0.0268 -0.9608∗∗
(0.0181) (0.2334)
Employees per branch -0.0159 -0.4512∗∗
(0.013) (0.0722)
Share of borrowers in each segment
Intercept 3.614∗∗ -0.8109
(1.5822) (0.5217)
Adult population (log) -0.5759∗∗ 0.0131
(0.1124) (0.0279)
GDP per capita (log) 0.4261∗ -0.1813∗∗
(0.2341) (0.0524)
Distance to closest urban center -0.6823∗∗ -0.0408
(0.063) (0.0411)
Population in rural areas -0.0725 1.4643∗∗
(0.7543) (0.2316)
Brand dummies Yes Yes
Sample size 966 966
Notes: Standard-errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and com-
puted using the standard formula for GMM. Significance levels: ,
∗∗: 5%, ∗: 10%.
might be insufficient to cover the demand for loans by small entrepreneurs. This
result is consistent with the pattern of entry observed between 2009 and 2014, when
microfinance institutions located their new branches in intermediate cities.
The estimated parameters that describe the marginal cost of financial institutions
are presented in Table 3.6. As expected, the effect the deposits rate and the admin-
istrative costs are positive and significant. By contrast, the salaries variable has a
negative and significant impact on the marginal cost. Institutions that have special-
ized in microcredit, that is, those with a higher share of their loan portfolio composed
by microcredit, tend to have lower costs associated with microloans. The parame-
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Notes: Standard-errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity and computed using the standard
formula for GMM. Significance levels: ∗∗: 5%, ∗:
10%.
ter λ captures the average difference in marginal cost between segments has a large
standard error and cannot be considered significant.
Figure 3.4 presents the distribution of the estimated share of consumers that be-
longs to each segment across geographic markets. As seen in the figure at the top,
the share of low-cost consumers differs greatly across markets. In the median, 15.15%
of the potential borrowers could choose to request a loan from formal financial in-
stitutions at an interest rate lower than the initial usury ceiling. The figure in the
bottom panel presents the distribution of the share of consumers that gained access
to formal loans from these lenders after the interest rate ceiling was modified. The
median share of potential borrowers in this segment was 13.31%. The figure shows
that, while the relaxation of the usury ceiling increased access to funding provided by
private financial institutions, there is a significant portion of the potential consumers
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of the share of consumers in each segment across markets
Share of consumers in Segment 1









Share of consumers in Segment 2










Share of consumers in Segment 1 and Segment 2











Notes: The top figure presents the distribution of the share of borrowers with access to loans
before the policy change. The figure at the bottom presents the distribution of the share of
consumers who obtain access after the usury ceiling is relaxed.
that do not include formal funding alternatives in their choice set even after the policy
change.
The structural model allows us to estimate the optimal interest rate for both
segments. As seen in Figure 3.5, the optimal interest rates are higher in the segment
of low-cost borrowers, compared to the period before the policy change. However, not
all financial institutions would choose to set their interest rates in Segment 1 above
the initial usury ceiling. The increase on the interest rates in those cases could be
explained by an increases in the marginal costs (the deposit rates increased between
2010 and 2012, and increasing competition from other lenders in the market could
have required additional expending on advertising), as well as by changes in branching
networks that could have resulted in greater market power.
The fact that the average interest rate registered by some financial institutions
at the national level remained low after the usury ceiling was relaxed could signal
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Figure 3.5: Estimated interest rates before and after the policy change in each segment









Notes: Distribution of the optimal interest rates that financial institutions would charge in
each segment.
the presence of very high costs of providing loans to Segment 2, which could not
be covered even with rates as high as the new interest rate ceiling. I observe that
the institutions with the lowest interest rates did not increase their market share in
the microloans markets, nor microloans became more important in the composition
of their own loan portfolio. This suggest that they continue focusing exclusively on
clients belonging to Segment 1.
Figure 3.8 in the Appendix presents the estimated share of consumers in each
segment who would choose to borrow a loan from a financial institution instead of
choosing the outside option before and after the policy change. In the first segment,
there is a significant increase in the share of consumers choosing one financial institu-
tion rather than the outside option. This share is lower in the second segment, where
only 4,97% of the potential borrowers chose to borrow from a bank rather than from
an informal source.
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3.6.1 Consumer Surplus
To explore the effects of the relaxation of the usury ceiling on consumers’ welfare, I
carry out a calculation of the welfare changes between 2010 and 2012. Following the
approach of Small and Rosen (1981) in the context of the discrete choice problem
modeled here, welfare effects are measured as the expected equivalent variation of the
changes in product characteristics. This term is defined as the amount of money that
would make consumers in market m indifferent, in expectation, between facing the
two choice sets (before and after the policy change). Let ~EV denote the vector that
contains the expected variation of the changes for all markets.
~EV = ~Γa(~ra, ~Xa,Θ)− ~Γb(~rb, ~Xb,Θ),
where ~Γt(~rmt, ~Xmt,Θ) denotes the level of consumer surplus in year t. A typical















Table 3.7 presents the results of this calculation for markets that experienced
entry between 2010 and 2012, and those which did not, by market size. The first
panel presents the change in consumer welfare for borrowers that belong to the low-
cost segment. The borrowers that were located in markets without new competitors
experienced a small welfare loss, particularly those located in bigger markets. The
greater gains in this segment are experienced by consumers in smaller markets where
new competitors opened branches. The second panel corresponds to consumers that
gain access to formal loans after the relaxation of the usury rate. As seen in the
table, the consumers with the lowest welfare gains are those located in markets with a
population greater than 100.000 inhabitants that did not experienced entry, whereas
the greater gains are registered in small markets. The average size of a microloan
around the time of the policy was around USD 2.160 according to Fernandez (2014).
With a welfare gain of USD 0.022 per each 1 USD borrowed, such as the estimated
for Segment 2 in small markets, a borrower carrying a loan of average size would
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experience an annual benefit of USD 47.52. By contrast, a borrower with a loan of
this size, belonging to the first segment and located in a big market that did not
experience entry would experience an annual loss of USD 23.3.
Overall, the average change in consumer welfare was small but positive for all
market types/entry status combinations, a result that suggests that the market ex-
pansion generated both by the entry of financial institutions in new locations, and
the expansion in the volume of loans due to the provision of financial services in the
segment of high-risk consumers, exceeded the reduction in welfare associated to the
increase in the interest rate.
Table 3.7: Average change in consumer surplus by market size
less than 50.000 inhabs. 50.000-100.000 inhabs. More than 100.000 inhabs.
Segment 1
Entry 0.0194 0.0091 -0.0044
No Entry -0.0064 -0.0104 -0.0108
Segment 2
Entry 0.0221 0.0125 0.0228
No Entry 0.0359 0.0281 0.0130
All borrowers
Entry 0.0065 0.0033 0.0018
No Entry 0.0059 0.0012 0.0009
Number of Markets
Entry 11.0000 18.0000 17.0000
No Entry 36.0000 23.0000 20.0000
Notes: The values in the table correspond to the average consumer welfare change from 2010
to 2012 across geographic markets, expressed in monetary units per each US dollar borrowed,
based on the equivalent variation calculation by Small and Rosen (1981).
Counterfactual exercise: the importance of branching networks investment
Previous calculations on consumer welfare are based on the assumption that the
growth observed in the number of branching networks and employees is a consequence
of the changes in the usury ceilings. However, other factors that might have affected
the investment in branching networks at the local level, such as economic growth or
improvements in public infrastructure and safety.
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Since I do not model the entry decisions of financial institutions at the local level,
my estimates can only provide an upper bound on the policy effects on consumer
welfare. Nevertheless, I propose a simple counterfactual exercise that can help us to
understand how much of the consumer welfare can be attributed solely to the change
of the interest rate after the ceiling was relaxed. In the counterfactual scenario, I
assume that the branching networks remain as they were before the policy change.
The optimal interest rates are adjusted accordingly.
Table 3.8 compares the changes in consumer welfare in the observed and counter-
factual scenarios. Each entry corresponds to the average change in consumer surplus
across markets within each category. As seen from the Table, the welfare gains are
closely linked to the expansion of branching networks of financial institutions. The
overall gains from the policy in the absence of new branches is close to zero in all
types of markets. Consumers in the Segment 1 experience a greater welfare loss in
the counterfactual scenario, particularly those located in bigger markets. In these
markets, the increase in market expansion created by the relaxation of the usury rate
is smaller than the one estimated for smaller and intermediate markets. Consumers
in the second segment, that is, borrowers that gained access to credit after the policy
change, would experience a welfare gain, although smaller than the one obtained in
the original scenario. In smaller markets the gains are 45,2% of the ones they would
experienced in the scenario with new branches, whereas in the biggest markets the
welfare gains would be reduced by almost 90%. Furthermore, the number of locations
that would experience a consumer welfare loss increases from 49 to 92 in the scenario
without branching network expansion. These results indicate that new branches play
a crucial role in the expansion of loans towards new clients, even in intermediate and
big markets.
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Table 3.8: Average change in consumer surplus per type of market.
Scenario 1: Observed after policy change Scenario 2: No additional branches
Less than 50.000 inhabitants
Total 0.0060 0.0008
Segment 1 0.0002 -0.0039
Segment 2 0.0318 0.0144
50.000-100.000 inhabitants
Total 0.0025 -0.0000
Segment 1 -0.0004 -0.0082
Segment 2 0.0223 0.0076
More than 50.000-100.000 inhabitants
Total 0.0017 -0.0011
Segment 1 -0.0065 -0.0131
Segment 2 0.0197 0.0018
Notes: This table compares the changes in consumer surplus at the national level in two scenarios,
expressed in monetary units per each US dollar borrowed, based on the equivalent variation
calculation by Small and Rosen (1981). The first one uses the observed characteristics before
and after the policy change. The second one compares the consumer surplus before the policy
change with a scenario where the usury ceiling is relaxed and there is no change in the number
of branches, banking correspondents or employees.
3.7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have developed a structural model of demand and supply to explore
the implications of a modification of the usury ceiling applied to microloans in Colom-
bia. The model explores a scenario where large multi-market institutions offer loans
to borrowers with different loan profiles. By considering firms that compete across
multiple geographic markets, I focus on the role of branching networks in the optimal
pricing strategies of loan providers, in an industry where credit access is still closely
linked to the presence of a traditional branch in the vicinity of the borrower. This is a
crucial element of the analysis of interest rate regulation that has not been considered
in the literature, and it is vital to understand the consumer welfare implications of
the policy in the context of microfinance. In Colombia, the relaxation of the usury
ceiling was accompanied by a significant expansion of the branching networks of loan
providers, thereby exposing consumers to significant changes in terms of local credit
availability and a potential increase in interest rates, that could have also obeyed to
additional investments in branching networks from loan providers.
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One advantage of my approach is that it can be carried out in the absence of de-
tailed individual information on loan transactions. Data availability is often scarce
in the context of microfinance, because loan providers often operate under different
regulatory frameworks and supervisory authorities face limitations to gather detailed
information of clients from remote or poor geographic areas, where microfinance in-
stitutions concentrate their operations. Notwithstanding, estimating the effects of
this policy using market-level information comes with additional challenges, as it is
necessary to account for potential changes in the size and composition of the potential
market that might be unobserved. The relaxation of an interest rate cap opens the
possibility for financial institutions to offer their services to a segment of borrowers
that could not have access to loans due to their risk profile or their geographic loca-
tion. Ultimately, the degree of market expansion will determine whether the policy
is welfare enhancing despite the predictable increase in the interest rates.
I estimate a structural model that takes into account that there is a fraction of
borrowers that is excluded from the choice problem, due in part to the presence of a
usury ceiling in the period before the policy change. Market expansion and changes
in the pool of borrowers, generated as a result of the relaxation of the rate ceiling, is
incorporated by allowing for unobserved price heterogeneity in the period after the
policy change. This approach makes it possible to recover the changes in demand
sensitivity to product characteristics such as the interest rate and the number of
branches and banking correspondents in local markets.
I use the model to understand the changes in consumer welfare that occur as a
result of the policy change. The results indicate that welfare gains associated with
this policy depend greatly on additional investments on branching networks. The
entry of new competitors is important in small markets, where opening a branch can
represent a dramatic change in the availability of financial services. At the same time,
additional branches and banking correspondents in intermediate and big markets
provide a valuable service to consumers, helping to compensate the welfare losses
associated with the increase in interest rates, particularly for safer borrowers who
already had access to formal loan before the usury ceiling was removed. Branching
networks expansion after the usury ceiling modification accounts for nearly 90% of
the consumer welfare gains in the biggest markets.
These consumer welfare gains that followed the relaxation of the usury ceiling do
not seem to have occurred in economic detriment of financial institutions, who experi-
enced an increase in their profit, particularly in the case of microfinance institutions.
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These findings open new avenues for future research, as it becomes clear that the
welfare gains are closely linked to the distribution of branching networks across geo-
graphic markets. From the borrowers’ perspective, the presence of a branch has impor-
tant implications in terms of credit access, while for financial institutions, branching
networks have an essential role in their optimal pricing strategies by determining their
exposure to different local competitive environments. By modeling the decision to en-
ter in different locations, it would be possible to build other counterfactuals that allow
us to compare the local welfare implications of alternative policies. These analyses
can provide better guidance for the public and private initiatives that aim to diminish
inequality in the access to financial services and promote economic development in
the poorest regions.
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3.8 Appendix
Figure 3.6: Portfolio at risk ratio, by cohort. 2008-2014
 
Notes: The portfolio at risk ratio is calculating by dividing the outstanding balance of
all microloans with arrears over 30 days, by the outstanding gross loan porfolio. Source:
Superfinanciera Financiera de Colombia.
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Table 3.9: Information of bank characteristics per market
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
September 2010
Interest rate 0.29 0.05 0.18 0.24 0.34 0.34
Branches per capita 0.11 0.09 0.001 0.05 0.15 0.67
Banking correspondents per capita 0.30 2.27 0.00 0.00 0.02 45.30
Number of employees per branch 11.03 8.12 0.00 7.00 13.00 98.00
Previous NGO (dummy variable) 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 1
Bank (dummy variable) 0.87 0.33 0 1 1 1
September 2012
Interest rate 0.35 0.07 0.18 0.29 0.38 0.45
Branches per capita 0.11 0.10 0.001 0.05 0.15 0.67
Banking correspondents per capita 1.33 3.85 0.00 0.00 1.19 65.27
Number of employees per branch 11.18 8.74 1.00 6.00 13.25 118.00
Previous NGO (dummy variable) 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 1
Bank (dummy variable) 0.87 0.34 0 1 1 1
Notes: Summary of descriptive statistics of the characteristics of financial institutions that change across
local markets in 2010 and 2012. Branches and banking correspondents density is measured as the num-
ber of branches/banking correspondents per 100.000 inhabitants. Source: Author’s calculations based on













Table 3.10: Instruments used in the supply equation
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
December 2010
Branches of same bank in similar markets 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.28
Branches of competitors in similar markets 2.84 2.01 0.09 1.06 4.19 8.80
BCs of same bank in similar markets 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.97
BCs of competitors in similar markets 6.98 12.12 0.00 0.0005 9.36 76.68
Competitors microloans share (own portfolio) 0.24 0.34 0.01 0.03 0.67 0.83
Interest rate of similar banks 0.29 0.01 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.32
December 2012
Branches of same bank in similar markets 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.28
Branches of competitors in similar markets 3.08 2.35 0.12 1.02 4.71 10.46
BCs of same bank in similar markets 0.69 0.80 0.00 0.00 1.36 3.07
BCs of competitors in similar markets 38.97 44.38 0.00 0.02 68.25 190.51
Competitors microloans share (own portfolio) 0.29 0.37 0.02 0.02 0.80 0.84
Interest rate of similar banks 0.33 0.02 0.22 0.32 0.34 0.36
Notes: Summary of descriptive statistics of instruments used in the estimation. Source: Author’s calculations based
on information published by Superfinanciera Financiera de Colombia.
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of the share of consumers who choose to borrow a loan from
a financial institution across markets
Before policy change








Segment 1 after policy








Segment 2 after policy








Notes: Segment 1: consumers with access to loan before the policy change. Segment 2:
consumer that gained access to loans after the policy change (at an interest rate higher than
the usury ceiling).
Chapter 4
FinTech in the US Mortgage
Industry
Abstract
The US mortgage industry has experienced a rapid transformation, with an increasing number of
lenders adopting technological innovations that allow potential borrowers to complete their mort-
gage application process online, reducing the need for face-to-face interaction with loan officers. The
market share of financial institutions offering this type of service has increased significantly in recent
years, reaching 9.5% of the originations in 2017. This paper examines the response of incumbent
mortgage lenders to the advent of this technology. I find that the increased availability of lenders
providing online mortgages has had a differentiated impact on the volume of applications and loan
originations for incumbent providers depending on their size. The results suggest that local lenders
are better able to differentiate from FinTech institutions by offering services that are appealing to
some segments of borrowers. By contrast, mortgages provided by FinTech seem to be a closer sub-
stitute for the services provided by large financial institutions, who have seen a reduction in their
market share after FinTech entry.
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4.1 Introduction
After the Great Recession in 2008, financial intermediation in the US mortgage market
has experienced a process of transformation, with lenders incorporating new business
models and services to compete in an environment with lower interest rates, weak
credit growth, and increased regulatory requirements. In order to attract new clients
and reduce operating costs, financial institutions have increased their use of infor-
mation technology (IT) and automation technologies in financial services provision.
The increased use of these developments has transformed how financial institutions
perform core business functions, such as those related to maturity transformation and
provision of transaction services, resulting in a lower reliance on physical branches.1
This process has been driven by supply-side factors such as the development of appli-
cation programming interfaces (APIs), blockchain technologies and broader access to
high-speed internet and smartphones, as well as demand-side factors, such as changes
in consumers’ preferences and increased integration of digital services in daily life
activities.
Mortgage lenders have developed to a different extent, platforms that allow their
customers to complete transactions, initiate loan applications and receive detailed
and up to date information about their products and services.2 In recent years,
however, the speed of adoption of new digital technologies has accelerated markedly,
with IT developments moving from facilitating transactions and payments towards
supporting completely online loan origination. The arrival of this type of service is
disruptive in this industry for several reasons. In the first place, because it allows
loan providers to offer financial services in different locations without the need for a
physical branch or the presence of loan officers in the vicinity of the borrower, reducing
the costs of entry and operation across geographic markets. In the second place,
because the development of an online application platform is often accompanied by the
implementation of centralized underwriting algorithms that can modify the response
of lending supply to local conditions, and reduce the role of soft information, typically
obtained through face-to-face interaction between borrowers and loan officers.
The arrival of online mortgage lending comes at a time when both the number of
traditional lenders and the size of branching networks have decreased significantly.
The decline that occurred immediately after the financial crisis in 2008 has been at-
1Vives (2019) presents a detailed overview of the effects of digital disruption in the banking
industry.
2LaCour-Little (2000) provides a detailed discussion of the technological developments applied to
mortgage lending in the 1990s.
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tributed to the need to reduce costs through the closure of inefficient office locations,
along with a wave of mergers and acquisitions of failed financial institutions. With
the simultaneous decrease in the number of branching networks and the increased
availability of platform-based lenders with centralized underwriting procedures, po-
tential borrowers are experiencing a transformation of the credit alternatives available
at the local level. The substantial change in composition in the credit alternatives
available in local markets may have contrasting effects for different groups of borrow-
ers, as some might experience an increase in the variety and convenience of financial
services, while others might face a reduction in credit alternatives.
Recent studies have focused on the characteristics of the institutions that offer a
loan application process that can be completed online, also known as FinTech lenders,
examining their role at reducing frictions in the mortgage markets such as lengthy
processing times, capacity constraints and limited access to credit, (e.g. Fuster
et al., 2019; Jagtiani et al., 2019). Among the studies that examine the response
of traditional lenders to the arrival of these new competitors, the focus has been
placed on the regulatory and business-model differences between conventional banks
and shadow banks (e.g. Buchak et al., 2018, 2020). In this paper, I contribute to
this literature by exploring the reaction of incumbent lenders of different sizes across
geographic markets with varying levels of income, with the purpose of determining
whether the arrival of this technology contribute to alleviate some of the inefficiencies
in the allocation of credit across regions, or on the contrary, can exacerbate existing
inequalities in the availability of credit in under-served areas.
Industry reports indicate that small lenders, such as community banks, have com-
parative advantages in the provision of loans for certain groups of borrowers, since they
have greater knowledge of the local market and their customers’ preferences, which al-
lows them to maximize the advantages of relationship lending (Lux and Greene, 2015;
Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2016). Furthermore, these institutions are more likely to keep
the loans in their balance sheet rather than selling immediately in the secondary mar-
ket, which allow them to guarantee some continuity in the customer service standard
during the time it takes to the borrower to complete the payment of the mortgage. At
the same time, small lenders might find it more difficult to migrate towards a business
model similar to the one developed by FinTech lenders due to regulatory requirements,
high compliance costs and greater reliance on obsolete legacy technologies.3 McCord
3These topics have been discussed by policymakers in several public discussions. See for example
the speech by the Chicago FED Governor Elizabeth Duke at the Community Bankers Symposym
avaliable here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/duke20121109a.htm
Chapter 4. FinTech in the US Mortgage Industry 108
et al. (2015) find that the decline in branches has been accompanied by a substantial
decrease in the number of community banks, which have shown a competitive advan-
tage on lending to small business and lower-income households, particularly in rural
communities.
Large financial institutions have shown greater capacity to adopt IT technolo-
gies, which has allowed them to develop services that compete with those provided
by FinTech institutions. Nevertheless, it may be more difficult for them to build a
differentiation strategy that allows them to retain market participation in an envi-
ronment with greater competition by FinTech lenders. A growing number of studies
has concluded that the increased regulatory burden that depository institutions have
experienced in recent years has raised costs and limited the scope of financial services
that they can offer, limiting their ability to adapt to a more competitive environment
(Buchak et al., 2018, 2020; Vives, 2019).
Differences in the loan portfolio composition suggest that small lenders seem to
have an advantage in the provision of unconventional mortgages, but there are dif-
ferences in what drives this non-conformity of mortgages in lower and higher income
counties. In the first group, a higher proportion of mortgages is classified as un-
conventional because the borrowers’ particular conditions, such as inadequate credit
scores, result in ineligibility for the government-sponsored insurance programs (GSE).
In the latter case, small lenders focus on non-conventional mortgages such as jumbo
mortgages, which are not eligible for GSE insurance because their size exceeds the
maximum limit defined by the government. These differences in the loan portfolio
composition indicate that the type of clients that small lenders target in poorer and
richer counties is likely to be different, not only in terms of income but also in terms
of their familiarity with digital platforms and their knowledge of the local real market
conditions. As a result, it is possible that the sustitutability pattern observed among
services provided by FinTech and incumbent lenders differ in markets with lower and
higher income.
I find that the arrival of FinTech has led to a reduction in the volume of applica-
tions and originations of big financial institutions and multi-state banks. This result
suggests that consumers may have found a close substitute of their services in online
mortgage platforms provided by FinTech lenders, particularly in the case of refinanc-
ing loans. These result is consistent with the evidence provided by Fuster et al. (2019)
on the substantial gains that FinTech have achieved in reducing the processing time
of this type of loan applications. By contrast, local and small lenders have been more
resilient to the entry of this new type of competitors, particularly in higher-income
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counties, where the number of applications has increased significantly. While some
industry reports have highlighted the competitive advantages of small lenders in the
midst of the disruption generated by the accelerated development of the FinTech
sector, this paper provides quantitative evidence on this direction and contrast the
A second question that I address in this paper is whether the response of incumbent
lenders regarding credit availability towards minority borrowers has changed after the
entry of FinTech lenders. Online mortgage lending may have a role at increasing the
availability of loans for borrowers belonging to racial or ethnic minorities across geo-
graphic markets, as they offer services with reduced face-to-face interaction with loan
officers, which may result inconvenient or intimidating for some potential minority
borrowers. For example, Hanson et al. (2016) show that loan officers are less likely to
respond and provide more information to potential borrowers with names typically
associated with minorities, whereas Begley and Purnanandam (2020) find a higher
incidence of consumer complaints in areas with higher share of minorities.
Furthermore, FinTech lenders have developed an approval process supported by
centralized underwriting operations, which allows them to reduce processing times and
labor costs as they rely on algorithms that examine and analyze enormous amounts
of information in a more consistent and repeatable way. Algorithmic decision-making
can alleviate frictions in the mortgage market by increasing the efficiency of the bor-
rowers’ screening process and reducing processing times. The broader implementa-
tion of centralized underwriting algorithms has the potential of increasing financial
inclusion by groups of borrowers currently under-served by traditional financial in-
stitutions. There is also a concern that it may also lead to inadvertent systematic
discrimination, as these sophisticated methods are often trained on past historical
datasets. Fuster et al. (2020) find that machine learning methods can incorporate the
association between race and default more efficiently using the remaining borrower
characteristics, even though datasets cannot explicitly include information on race or
ethnicity law.
As the biggest traditional banks move towards the incorporation of these elements
in their loan origination process, small lenders may keep relying on traditional meth-
ods if this allows them to differentiate and target minority borrowers effectively. I
find that the incumbents’ response to the increased availability of FinTech services
in terms of the volume of applications and loan originations of minorities follows a
similar pattern to the one observed for all borrowers. Medium size and large lenders
register the greatest reductions in applications and originations after entry, whereas
in the case of local and small lenders this variables exhibit an increase, particularly
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in high-income counties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the contribution
to existing literature on FinTech in the mortgage industry. Sections 4.3 and 4.4,
describe the data sources, present a precise definition of FinTech and examines the
characteristics of FinTech lenders in contrast with traditional lenders across markets.
Section 4.5 describes the estimation strategy, Section 4.6 discusses the results of the
estimations for each group of lenders and section 4.7 presents some final remarks.
4.2 Literature Review
This paper connects to the growing literature on financial technology that has explored
the ways in which IT development has transformed the provision of financial services
(see Philippon, 2016; Claessens et al., 2018; Vives, 2019, for surveys). In particular,
it relates to two strands of the literature that explore the role of financial technology
in the mortgage industry:
The effects of FinTech on incumbent lenders
A growing number of studies describe the impact of technological innovation and the
development of a secondary market for mortgages on the local market structure and
the overall availability of credit supply (e.g. Basten and Ongena, 2019; Foote et al.,
2019; Philippon, 2016; Korgaonkar, 2019). Foote et al. (2019) argue that increasing
automatization of mortgage underwriting exhibited by FinTech institutions is not a
new phenomenon. Advances in information technology during the nineties contributed
significantly to credit growth during this period. Philippon (2016) finds, however, that
the benefits of the improvements in information technologies have not been completely
passed through to the end users of financial services. The authors highlight the role
of FinTech startups in solving some of these inefficiencies and discuss the challenges
of financial regulation.
Recently, increasing attention has been paid to the role of online lending platforms.
Basten and Ongena (2019) analyze the effects of the development of an online platform
in Switzerland, where consumers can apply and different banks can respond to their
applications. Their findings suggest potential improvements for borrowers as well
as for financial stability derived from the presence of online platforms, since they
create incentives for banks to provide more attractive loan conditions to customers,
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regardless of the local level of concentration. In line with these findings Jagtiani
et al. (2019) conclude that the arrival of online platform-based lenders in the US
mortgage industry have contributed to the expansion of credit in areas under-served
by traditional loan providers.
Recent work by Buchak et al. (2018) and Fuster et al. (2019) on the US mortgage
industry provide a clear contrast of the characteristics of FinTech lenders’ business
model with that of traditional banks; (Fuster et al., 2019) show that FinTech lenders
can process mortgage applications faster and display greater flexibility in response
to mortgage demand shocks, compared to conventional depository institutions and
non-FinTech shadow banks, whereas Buchak et al. (2018) finds that differences in
regulatory requirements have contributed to the development of shadow banking and
the dramatic growth of online FinTech lenders.
The analysis presented in this paper is based on the definition of FinTech proposed
by Fuster et al. (2019) and Buchak et al. (2018). While Buchak et al. (2018) focuses
on the differences between depository institutions and shadow banks, I analyze the
impact of FinTech entry on the volume of applications and loan origination of lenders
of different sizes across markets with varying levels of income. By exploring the
response of small lenders, a group largely composed by depository institutions, this
paper contributes to an extensive literature that has studied the advantages and
challenges of the community banking sector in the US (e.g Deyoung et al., 2004;
Rosen, 2011; Critchfield et al., 2018; McCord et al., 2015).
Discrimination in the mortgage market
By exploring the response of minority borrowers to the increasing availability of Fin-
Tech mortgage lenders, my work also connects with a broad literature that has studied
discrimination in the US mortgage market (e.g. Munnell et al., 1996; Ross and Yinger,
2002; Bartlett et al., 2019). Many recent studies on discrimination in the mortgage
market in the US focus on the pre-crisis period (e.g. Ladd, 1998; Ghent et al., 2014;
Bayer et al., 2017), finding that African-American and Hispanic borrowers face higher
rejection rates and tend to be charged higher interest rates after controlling on credit
characteristics. Among the studies that consider the role of IT developments in the
access of minorities to mortgages after the crisis, particular attention has been given
to the role of centralized underwriting algorithms in alleviating discrimination in the
loan approval decisions (Fuster et al., 2020). Recent work by Bartlett et al. (2019)
concludes that online mortgage platforms tend to alleviate discrimination arising from
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personal interaction with loan officers, making mortgage lending more accessible to
minority borrowers. This paper complements these results by examining the recent
evolution of non-FinTech lenders with respect to this group of borrowers.
4.3 FinTech Institutions
Fuster et al. (2019) identify two defining features of the FinTech business model, that
differentiate them from other lenders: an end-to-end online mortgage application
platform and a centralized mortgage underwriting. While these features are not fully
observable, the authors base their classification on whether the lenders offer the pos-
sibility of obtaining a preapproval online4. This classification distinguishes FinTech
lenders from other mortgage originators that use online platforms, but still require
personal interaction to complete the loan approval.5
According to Fuster et al. (2019), FinTech institutions have reached a much larger
degree of automation relative to other lenders. Their approval process is done in a
centralized manner, rather than through brick-and-mortar branches or local brokers.
They are mostly non-depository institutions (shadow banks) that originate loans and
later sell them trough channels supported by government guarantee schemes such as
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It is worth noting that the differences between FinTech
institutions and other shadow banks will become more tenuous over time, as more
traditional lenders can incorporate new technologies in their origination process.
The presence of an online platform reduces the need for face-to-face interaction
with the borrowers, allowing them to upload all supporting documents electronically,
instead of having sent them by mail or fax. These platforms are supported by algo-
rithms that analyze and compare the borrower information with reference databases,
4A similar classification is developed by Buchak et al. (2018). In both studies, the authors
emphasize that while many lenders in recent years allow their clients to start their application
process online, only those institutions that completely automate the mortgage origination process
are classified by FinTech lenders.
5According to Fuster et al. (2019), obtaining a purchase mortgage involves three main steps: (1)
Completing an initial application and obtaining a preapproval letter. This document is indicative
of a borrower’s credit capacity and is often required to make an offer on a home, although it is
not binding. (2) once a property has been identified and sale price agreed upon, the underwriting
process takes place. This step involves verification of all supporting documentation, often requiring
many interactions between the processor, loan officer, and borrower and can take from 1 to 2 days
to several weeks or more. (3) The final step is known as ’Closing’, and it implies the transfer of the
funds and property deed. FinTech lenders partially automate the first two steps and allow them to
be completed online.
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making the mortgage underwriting process more standardized and consistent (Fuster
et al., 2019). Compared to the traditional mortgage underwriting method, the Fin-
Tech automated approach can reduce processing times, labor costs associated with the
underwriting process, and allow lenders to react faster to demand shocks. However,
there are potential disadvantages, such as the possibility of consistent errors created
by poorly designed algorithms and the loss of soft information that could be gathered
through personal interaction.
Table 4.1 presents the largest institutions that are considered as FinTech by Fuster
et al. (2019) and Buchak et al. (2018).6 Among them, the biggest FinTech lenders
are Quicken Loans, LoanDepot and Guaranteed Rate. Some of these institutions have
operated in the market for more than thirty years, but only recently they have intro-
duced online mortgage platforms. The third column in the Table registers the date,
after which they are considered as FinTech institutions according to the definition
by Fuster et al. (2019). Table 4.1 presents the date when a completely online mort-
gage application process was launched, according to the FinTech websites and online
industry reports. Most of these changes took place in 2016. As seen in Figure 4.5
in the Appendix, all FinTech institutions experienced an important growth in the
number of originations between 2010 and 2017, particularly in 2011 and 2016, which
coincides with the development of online applications platforms.7 The percentage
of applications and loans originated by FinTech institutions has increased steadily
over time, reaching 8.1% and 9.6% of the total in 2017. Nevertheless, many of these
lenders still rely on broad branches networks and sponsored mortgage loan operators
(MLO), which allow them to reach clients who still prefer the conventional mortgage
application process.
FinTech lenders have become an increasingly important source of mortgage credit
to U.S. households. Their lending has grown from $34bn of total originations in 2010
to $161bn in 2016. Figure 4.1 presents the average number of applications and loan
originations of FinTech lenders between 2008 and 2017. While there is an upward
trend for FinTech lenders, the number of applications and originations of traditional
lenders does not exhibit a clear trend over the period. Instead, there have been
significant fluctuations in the number of applications and loan originations, decreasing
in 2014, but increasing again in 2016 (Figure 4.2).
6A similar classification is used by Jagtiani et al. (2019).
7For example, Quicken Loans experienced a spike in the number of applications after introducing
the platform Rocket Mortgage in late 2015, which allows customers to obtain a pre-approval minutes
after the documentation has been uploaded (Fuster et al., 2019)
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Table 4.1: FinTech institutions in the U.S. loan market
Name Founded Online lender Branches Sponsored MLO States (2017)
Quicken Loans 1985 2010 615 6425 52
LoanDepot.com 2009 2016 463 2702 52
Guaranteed Rate Inc. 1999 2010 388 1773 52
Movement Mortgage 2007 2014 520 1820 48
Everett Financial Inc. 1997 2016 271 961 51
Better.com 2003 2016 7 221 15
Amerisave 2002 − 22 555 50
SoFi 2012 2016 6 35 47
CashCall∗ 2000 − 1 0 0
Notes: Based on the classifications proposed by Fuster et al. (2019) and Buchak et al. (2018). The
second column, refers to the date that (Fuster et al., 2019) uses to classify these lenders as FinTech
institutions. The column named ”Fully online” refers to the date when these financial institutions
launched completely online application platforms that do not require interaction with loan officers
(verified on the websites of these lenders and industry reports). The last column presents the number
of states with at least one application registry in the HMDA data set as of 2017. Finally, CashCall
has suspended its operations in many states after a series of adverse court decisions.
4.4 Descriptive Statistics: Markets and Borrowers
In order to explore the characteristics of borrowers across geographic markets, I use
the mortgage application records collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) Act. This legislation required mortgage lending institutions with offices in
metropolitan areas to disclose to the public information about the geographic location
and other characteristics of the home loans they originate or purchase during a cal-
endar year. This data set contains the vast majority of home mortgage applications
and approved loans in the United States, and it has been widely used by policymakers
and academics that study the characteristics and evolution of the mortgage industry
in the US. It provides the originator’s identity, the application outcome, the loan type
and purpose, the borrower’s race, ethnicity, income, loan amount, year, census tract.
It is estimated that the lenders covered by the law account for approximately 86% of
all home lending nationwide, providing a representative picture of the US mortgage
industry (Avery et al., 2007). I complement this information with county demo-
graphics from the Census, Census tract consumer credit characteristics, house price
indexes, and bank CRA assessment area data from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC).
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Notes: This Figure shows the evolution of the average number of applications and loan originations
per county of those institutions classified as FinTech according to the definition presented in Section
4.3. Calculations are based on HMDA data.
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics of mortgage originations and applications
provided by FinTech institutions and traditional lenders based on the HDMA data
set for 2010, 2016, and 2017.8 Panel A shows that both the number of traditional
lenders and their market share has decreased between 2010 and 2017, whereas FinTech
lenders have increased their market participation both in terms of applications and
loan originations. Nevertheless, while the number of applications that FinTech lenders
received increased in 2016. the number of originations did not change in the same
proportion. During that year, the approval rate decreased significantly for this type
of lender, reaching 43% of the applications. In 2017, the approval rate exhibited levels
similar to those observed in 2010, around 62%. This fluctuation was not experienced
by traditional lenders, whose approval rate varied less during those years, situating
in 50,8% in 2017.
Panels B, C, and D of Table 4.2 present information about the composition of
8Tables 4.13 in the Appendix present additional statistics of the information included in the
HDMA data set.
Chapter 4. FinTech in the US Mortgage Industry 116


















Notes: This Figure shows the evolution of the average number of applications and loan origina-
tions per county of lenders that do not satisfy the definition of FinTech presented in Section4.3.
Calculations are based on HMDA data.
applications in terms of the type of guarantees of the loans, the purpose of the loan,
and the socio-demographic characteristics of the borrowers included in the HDMA
data set. In 2010, most of the borrowers that choose a FinTech lender had the
purpose of refinancing, rather than buying a new home. Between 2010 and 2017, the
percentage of refinancing applications has reduced, while the share of borrowers who
are choosing FinTech institutions with the purpose of home purchasing has increased
from 10,1% to 41.8% (Panel B).
A large proportion of FinTech applications are conventional, that is, eligible to
be sold to a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) like Freddie Mac of Fannie Mae
(68% in 2017). In contrast, loan applications that can be insured by the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) amounted to 20.2% of the total in 2017 (Panel C).
Between 2010 and 2017, the number of loan applications eligible for guarantees from
the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has increased from 3% to 11.2%. By
contrast, traditional lenders have seen a reduction in the percentage of conventional
and FHA-insured loan applications.
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Panel D presents information on the socio-demographic characteristics of borrow-
ers. I do not observe significant differences in the composition of borrowers of FinTech
lenders and traditional loan providers in terms of gender, race, and ethnicity except
for the higher proportion of borrowers who do not disclose this information in the
case of FinTech lenders. For the latter group of loan providers, I find an increase in
the proportion of African American and Hispanic borrowers. Regarding the income
of the borrowers, I observe a decrease in the average income for FinTech institutions
in 2016, while in the case of traditional lenders, this variable increased compared to
the value found in 2010. This change suggests that the introduction of online lending
motivated borrowers with lower income to apply for mortgages.
4.4.1 Non FinTech Lenders
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present descriptive statistics of non FinTech lenders by size, for the
years 2015 and 2017, before and after the substantial increase in the number of online
mortgage platforms available across states observed in 2016. I classify non-FinTech
loan providers in four categories depending on the average number of counties with
at least one branch between 2008 and 2010.9 Local lenders are those available in less
than ten counties in a single state. Small lenders have loan operations in 10 to 30
counties, and medium-sized lenders provide loans in up to 100 counties. Large lenders
are those active in more than 90 counties.
As seen in Panel A of Table 4.3, the total number of non-FinTech lenders included
in the HDMA database decreased between 2015 and 2017, particularly in the category
of local lenders. The total number of loan providers in this group dropped from 4069
in 2015 to 3077 in 2017. Nevertheless, the number of local lenders in each county
has increased, likely as a result of a surge in the number of branches and sponsored
loan officers. At the same time, large financial institutions have increased the number
of counties where they carry on loan operations; thus, the average number of large
mortgage providers has increased from 193 to 204 during this period.
Despite the increase in the number of large lenders per county, the number of
applications and loan originations provided by institutions in this group has decreased,
9This information was obtained from the Call Reports published by the FDIC in the case of
depository institutions. In the case of non-depository institutions, I classified institutions according
to the number of counties with applications recorded in the HDMA data set between 2008 and
2010.10 In the case of new lenders I used the number of counties where they were active during their
first two years of operation in the market.
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Table 4.2: Borrowers Descriptive Statistics of loan providers per type.
FinTech institutions Traditional lenders
Year 2010 2016 2017 2010 2016 2017
Panel A. Number of lenders and market shares
Number of lenders 5 7 8 7699 6650 5763
Market share (applications) 0.018 0.106 0.080 0.982 0.894 0.920
Market share (loan value) 0.026 0.079 0.083 0.974 0.921 0.917
Approval rate 0.620 0.435 0.619 0.479 0.524 0.508
Panel B. Purpose of the Loan
Home purchase loans 0.101 0.336 0.418 0.328 0.498 0.595
Refinancing operations 0.899 0.658 0.576 0.627 0.431 0.322
Home improvements loans 0.00002 0.005 0.006 0.045 0.071 0.083
Panel C. Type of Guarantee
Conventional loans 0.763 0.669 0.680 0.766 0.737 0.743
FHA-insured loans 0.207 0.208 0.202 0.182 0.153 0.152
VA guaranteed loans 0.030 0.118 0.112 0.040 0.094 0.087
FSA-guaranteed loans 0.0002 0.005 0.006 0.012 0.015 0.018
Panel D. Borrowers’ characteristics
Female 0.236 0.269 0.260 0.246 0.250 0.262
Male 0.601 0.583 0.514 0.616 0.583 0.568
Gender not available 0.163 0.148 0.226 0.062 0.054 0.054
Gender not applicable 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.113 0.116
White 0.666 0.636 0.571 0.711 0.665 0.655
Black 0.034 0.080 0.070 0.051 0.064 0.070
Race not available 0.218 0.266 0.298 0.092 0.088 0.088
Not Hispanic 0.755 0.726 0.649 0.753 0.706 0.697
Hispanic 0.034 0.080 0.075 0.065 0.091 0.095
Other 0.211 0.194 0.276 0.106 0.090 0.092
Income of applicant (median) 84 75 78 76 81 79
Median HUD family income 68.2 66.9 67.9 66.7 67.2 68.3
Notes: Income categories based on median Census Tract income (2010) for each county. Size
of lenders based on the number of counties with at least one client between 2010 and 2014:
Local: less than 10 counties (same state), Small: less than 30 counties, Medium: less than
90 counties, Large: More than 90 counties.
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on average. By contrast, small loan providers have seen an increase in these variables
between 2015 and 2017. Panel B of Table 4.3presents the market shares of each lender
category, based on the number of applications and the number of loan originations.
Despite the substantial decrease in the number of local lenders, the market share of
this group remained unaltered between 2015 and 2017. By contrast, the market share
of large non-FinTech institutions decreased from 68.4% of the applications in 2015 to
65.6% in 2017.11
Panels A and B of Table 4.4 present the composition of the loan originations ac-
cording to the type of guarantee and the purpose of the loan. The composition in
terms of the type of loan guarantees has not changed significantly in recent years.
Local lenders have a larger share of conventional loans than large non-FinTech insti-
tutions, whereas the latter group has a higher percentage of FHA loans.12. In terms
of the purpose of the loan, the share of loans obtained for a home purchase has in-
creased for all types of loan providers, whereas refinancing operations have decreased,
particularly in the case of large lenders. These results indicate that the loan portfolio
of large non-FinTech institutions is the one that has greater similarity with the loan
portfolio of FinTech institutions.
Finally, Panel C of Table 4.4 presents the share of applications and loan originations
where the applicant was African-American or Hispanic. Between 2015 and 2017, the
percentage of minority borrowers increased for local lenders and remained mostly
unchanged for the other categories of loan providers.
11This trend is also observed when comparing these values with those from 2010, when these
institutions received 75.3% of the applications and originated 64% of the loans.
12Conventional mortgages that satisfy some requirements can be guaranteed by GSEs such as





































Table 4.3: Summary statistics of loan providers by size. 2015-2017
Local Small Medium-sized Large
Year 2015 2017 2015 2017 2015 2017 2015 2017
Total No. of lenders 4, 069 3, 077 1, 347 1, 321 822 822 562 555
Average No. of counties 12 14 31 32 80 80 1, 029 1, 133
Panel A. Number of lenders, applications and loan originations per county
Lenders 37 42 24 25 21 21 193 204
Applications 494.5 527.9 252.1 260.0 175.0 175.0 3, 496.9 3, 303.1
Loan originations 325.1 328.6 179.0 179.5 126.6 126.56 1, 648.6 1, 557.5
Denial Rate 0.357 0.379 0.299 0.306 0.251 0.251 0.577 0.569
Panel B. Market shares
Total applications 0.127 0.129 0.086 0.083 0.054 0.054 0.684 0.656
Total loan originations 0.161 0.162 0.116 0.113 0.077 0.077 0.581 0.563
Notes: The values correspond to the average per county, except for the number of lenders, which corre-
spond to the total number at the national level. Income categories based on median Census Tract income
(2010) for each county. Conventional loans are all loans that are not FHA/VA/FSA/RHS loans. Size
of lenders are classified as: local (active in less than 10 counties in the same state), small (less than 30








































Table 4.4: Summary statistics of loan applications according to providers’ size. 2015-2017
Local Small Medium-sized Large
Year 2015 2017 2015 2017 2015 2017 2015 2017
Panel A. Type of guarantee
Conventional 0.934 0.930 0.862 0.869 0.785 0.785 0.700 0.702
FHA 0.041 0.038 0.092 0.085 0.150 0.150 0.183 0.172
FSA 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.015 0.022 0.022 0.017 0.018
VA 0.017 0.024 0.030 0.031 0.043 0.043 0.101 0.108
Panel B. Purpose of the loan
Home purchase 0.495 0.536 0.535 0.596 0.560 0.560 0.467 0.542
Refinancing 0.393 0.347 0.375 0.302 0.371 0.371 0.486 0.398
Home improvement 0.112 0.118 0.090 0.102 0.068 0.068 0.047 0.059
Panel C. Minority Borrowers (share of own portfolio)
Applications 0.133 0.180 0.116 0.115 0.126 0.126 0.142 0.146
Originations 0.087 0.096 0.106 0.115 0.125 0.125 0.080 0.086
Notes: The values correspond to the average per county, except for the number of lenders,
which correspond to the total number at the national level. Income categories based on
median Census Tract income (2010) for each county. Conventional loans are all loans that are
not FHA/VA/FSA/RHS loans. Size of lenders are classified as: local (active in less than 10
counties in the same state), small (less than 30 counties), medium-sized (less than 90 counties)
and large (more than 90 counties).
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4.4.2 Local markets
FinTech lenders can offer mortgages in a particular market without the presence of a
branch or a loan officer. Nevertheless, in order to provide their services in a particular
region, they need to obtain a license issued by the relevant state regulatory agency.
Differences in license costs and requirements contribute to explain the heterogeneity
in the number of FinTech lenders that are available across states. I use information
from the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System & Registry (NMLS) to identify the
date of entry of FinTech lenders in each state. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 present the number
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Notes: The number of Fintech per state is calculated using the date of introduction of mortgage lending platforms and license information published
by NMLS.
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Table 4.5 presents information on the mortgage market structure for counties with
varying levels of income for the years 2015 and 2017. I classify counties in three
categories of income based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of the income distribution
per county calculated using 2010 Census information.
Panel A indicates that the number of Fintech has increased in counties of all levels
of income, although those with higher income have a greater number of FinTech
lenders (5.3 on average in 2017). The number of local and small lenders has remained
stable across counties between 2015 and 2017, except for local lenders in middle-
income countries, where there was a slight reduction between those years. In contrast,
the number of medium-size lenders and large lenders has increased during this period
in all categories of counties. This increase is more substantial for the biggest loan
providers in lower-income counties, where the average number of lenders of this type
increased from 61.9 to almost 70.
Panel B describes the evolution of the market shares, based on loan originations, for
these groups of lenders between 2015 and 2017. The market share of FinTech lenders
has increased similarly in counties of all income levels. In lower-income counties,
this market expansion seems to have occurred at the expense of local lenders, whose
market share has reduced from 10% to 7%, whereas in higher-income counties, larger
non-FinTech lenders are the group with the more significant reduction in market share
during this period.
Finally, Panel C presents the Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on applications
and loan originations. The HHI based on applications has decreased for all categories
of counties, indicating that the market has become more competitive between 2015
and 2017. However, the HHI based on originations shows that market concentration
has increased in lower-income locations.
4.5 Incumbents’ response to the arrival of FinTech
lenders
In this section I examine the response of different lenders to the increase in avail-
ability of online mortgage platforms across geographic markets. Using county-lender
category observations from 2010 to 2017 included in the HDMA database, I estimate
the following regression:
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Table 4.5: Market structure for counties of different levels of income
Lower income Middle Income Higher Income
Year 2015 2017 2015 2017 2015 2017
Panel A. Number of lenders
FinTech 1.93 3.59 2.41 4.51 2.85 5.29
No FinTech 83.30 85.32 132.57 144.76 209.12 211.65
No FinTech local 5.77 5.20 10.65 9.59 18.90 16.21
No FinTech small 7.07 7.20 12.15 13.32 20.92 20.48
No FinTech medium 10.15 12.66 17.65 21.11 31.43 34.88
No FinTech large 61.90 69.81 93.39 101.10 139.87 141.75
Panel B. Market shares (originations)
FinTech 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.09
No FinTech local 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06
No FinTech small 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10
No FinTech medium 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18
No FinTech large 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.60 0.57
Panel C. HHI index
Applications 829.37 732.82 626.60 559.09 538.95 498.50
Originations 1, 156.96 1, 232.93 892.00 824.01 722.71 662.70
Notes: Income categories based on median Census Tract income (2010) for each
county. Size of lenders are classified as: local (active in less than 10 counties in the
same state), small (less than 30 counties), medium-sized (less than 90 counties)
and large (more than 90 counties).
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yb,c,t = αc + αt + αst+ β1FinTechs,t + β2FinTechs,t−1 + γXc,t−1 + εb,c,t, (4.1)
where yb,c,t is the logarithm of the average number of applications (originations)
provided by lenders of size b in county c in year t.13 These values are modeled as a
function of the number of FinTech institutions available in each state (s) in years t
and t− 1. I included the lagged number of FinTech available at the state level, since
it is possible that there is some delay in the response of potential borrowers, as not of
all them might be immediately aware of the new alternatives available in the market
in every period.
The matrix of control variables, Xc,t−1, include the logarithm of the median income
observed in the county, based on the estimated tract median family income reported
in the Census 2017, the percentage of minority population per county, the logarithm of
the county population, the number of tracts designated as under stress due to poverty,
unemployment or natural disaster in each period.14 I also included variables intended
to capture the dynamics of the real state market in the area, such as the percentage
of sub-prime mortgages provided in the market in period t− 1 and the average house
pricing index (HPI) published by the Federal Housing Finance Agency at the state
level.15 εb,c,t is an unobservable term that is assumed to be not correlated with the
variables included in Xc,t−1 or the variables of interest (FinTechs,t and FinTechs,t−1).
In order to control for unobserved local characteristics, macroeconomic factors and
state specific factors that can have an impact in the demand for loans, I include county
and time fixed effects and a state-level year trend.16
13By examining the behavior of groups of institutions per county, rather than using bank-level
data, intra-group heterogeneity is not taken into account. The correlation among unobservables of
institutions belonging to the same group can create differences in the magnitude of the coefficients
obtained with type-of-lender-county data vs. bank-county data. Preliminary results with bank-
county data show qualitatively similar to the ones presented here.
14These tracts are designated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as dis-
tressed, based on rates of poverty, unemployment, and population loss, or underseved, according
to population size, density, and dispersion. Areas that have been exposed to natural disaster are
reported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
15This variable is only available at the county level for metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). The
result of the specifications based on the sample of markets with information of the housing pricing
index at the county level are not qualitatively different from the ones reported here.
16The error term in this context is likely to exhibit autocorrelation. Therefore I consider a dynamic
panel specification by including a lag of the dependent variable. The results of the Arellano-Bond
estimation regarding the variables that capture the effects of the presence of FinTech lenders do not
differ significantly in magnitude or direction from the ones presented here. This indicates that the
effect of an additional FinTech competitor in the market largely dissipates after two periods. To
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I examine the changes in the number applications and loan originations of in-
cumbent lenders. The changes in the number of applications of incumbent lenders
are informative of the attractiveness of the financial services offered by traditional
lenders relative to online lending. They constitute a direct measure of the preferences
of consumers regarding online lending vs traditional application protocols. In con-
trast, changes in the number of loan originations reveal the effects of increased online
mortgage lending on credit availability and are also the result of a selection process
determined by risk considerations on the side of loan providers. By examining both
variables, we can gain some insights on the incumbents’ strategies after the arrival
of mortgage lending, For example, an increase in the number of loan originations of
similar magnitude of that observed in the number of applications could indicate mar-
ket expansion generated via increased advertising, whereas an increase in the number
of loans originations alone could signal a relaxation of the credit risk standards that
could be the result of greater competition in local markets.
Finally, after the arrival of FinTech, it is possible that some incumbent loan
providers implement changes in order to make their services more appealing for bor-
rowers belonging to minority groups. I explore this possibility by estimating Equation
[4.1], using the number of applications and loan originations where the borrower is
African-American or Hispanic as the dependent variable.
The development of technologies applied to the provision of financial services is
the result of investments that are guided by expectations on future market returns.
The specification above assume that the number of FinTech loan providers is not
correlated with unobserved shocks that can occur at the county level. I consider that
this assumption is reasonable given that the variables FinTechs,t and FinTechs,t−1
are defined at the state level. The number of available FinTech lenders is likely
determined by technological developments that allow lenders to enter multiple markets
simultaneously. These investments are more likely to be determined by aggregate
return considerations rather than shocks at the county level.
4.6 Results
Table 4.6 presents the results of the regression with the logarithm of the number of
applications as the dependent variable. In all specifications, I included only those
counties that registered more than 50 applications at the beginning of the sample.
facilitate the exposition of the results I included only those of the fixed effects regression.
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The columns in Table 4.6 present the results for different groups of counties according
to the income categories defined in Section 4.4. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level.
Panel A presents the effects of an increase in the number of FinTech lenders at the
state level on the average number of applications provided by local and small lenders.
The results indicate that the contemporaneous effect of an additional FinTech lender
is positive and significant in middle-income counties. In contrast, the coefficient of
the lagged number of FinTech is not significant in any of the specifications. The
presence of an additional FinTech lender increases the volume of applications of small
lenders by 3.8% in those markets. Although the coefficient of the lagged value of
the dependent variable is positive and significant, the magnitude is not very high,
indicating that the effect is mostly contemporaneous. In the case of small lenders
(Panel B), additional FinTech lenders’ presence has a positive effect on applications
in lower-income counties, where the average contemporaneous increase is 2.8%. The
response of incumbent small lenders in higher-income counties is only significant one
period after entry, but the magnitude is relatively more substantial, as the number of
applications increases by 4,5% after the entry of FinTech lenders.
The increase in the number of applications associated to the greater availability of
FinTech at the state level could be the result of more aggressive competition among
local lenders or to a renewed interest on real-state investment generated by the in-
crease of expending in advertising by both entrants and incumbent lenders. While the
increase in the volume of applications or loan originations does not necessarily imply
a higher market share or markup for incumbent lenders, reduction in these volumes
is indicative a loss in market participation.
By contrast, medium-size and large lenders experience a decrease in the number of
applications after the entry of FinTech. For the first group (Panel C), the reduction is
more considerable in low-income counties, where the number of applications reduces
by around 4.4% one period after the entry of FinTech loan providers. In high-income
counties, the effect is smaller but significant (2.2%). As for large lenders, the impact
seems to be larger in middle-income counties, although it is also negative and sig-
nificant for the other groups of counties. Overall, the results support the idea that
the products offered by FinTech lenders are a closer substitute for those provided by
large financial institutions rather than by small and local providers.
Table 4.7 presents the estimates for specifications where the dependent variable is
the logarithm of the number of loan originations. Here, I do not find a significant effect
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of entry on the volume of applications provided by local or small lenders, except for
the latter group in high-income countries, where the entry of FinTech is associated
with an increase of around 3.2% in the volume of originations. By contrast, loan
originations by medium-size and large lenders decrease significantly; in the case of
middle-sized lenders, the effect is larger in lower-income countries, where the number
of originations is reduced by around 4.3% one period after the entry of FinTech
lenders. In the case of large loan providers, the greater drop occurs in middle-income
counties, where the entry of FinTech is followed by a reduction of 3.7% in the number
of originations.
The drop in loan originations experienced by traditional lenders is consistent with
the evidence provided by Buchak et al. (2018) of a substantial migration of the finan-
cial activity from traditional banks to the shadow banking sector (to which FinTech
lenders belong). They attribute these changes to the excessive regulatory burden
experienced by the first group of lenders, including non-capital requirement-related
regulatory constraints, such as the risk of enforcement actions and lawsuits.
For low-income counties and high-income counties the results are consistent with
market expansion, since the expected reductions in the number of loan originations by
incumbent traditional lenders (-2.7 and -62.5, respectively) are smaller in magnitude
than the average number of loan originations provided by an additional FinTech lender
(10 and 86, respectively). By contrast, in middle income counties, the reduction in the
number of loans provided by incumbent traditional lenders is not fully compensated
by the additional supply provided by the new FinTech lender. Nevertheless, these
changes are not very substantial. In low-income counties, the arrival of a new FinTech
loan provider would be associated to an increase of 1.92% in the number of loan
originations, whereas in high-income markets such an increase would represent 0.5%
of the loans. In middle income markets, the presence of an additional FinTech lender
would be followed by a decrease of 1.5% in the total number of originations.
4.6.1 Home-purchase vs. refinancing
I conducted the analysis separating refinancing operations and home-purchase origi-
nations, because the application process is simpler for borrowers and they typically
have more experience in selecting financial services. When refinancing, lenders do
not have to perform many on-the-ground activities that are required for purchasing
a home, such as a title check, in situ examination of a property, and negotiations
between buyer and seller. This gives and advantage to FinTech institutions, who are
131 4.6. Results
able to offer cheaper products via an online platform that can be perceived as efficient
and convenient. Fuster et al. (2019) finds that Fintech are able to achieve higher re-
ductions in the processing times of refinance loans, compared to home-purchase loans.
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present the estimates of specifications where the dependent
variables are the logarithm of the number of home-purchase loan originations and the
logarithm of the number of refinancing loans, respectively. When disaggregating the
volume of loan originations by purpose it becomes clear that the increased availability
of FinTech has a stronger impact on refinancing loans compared to home-purchase
originations. In the latter case, the estimated effect of the number of FinTech per
state is very close to zero and it is not significant for any of the subsamples (Table
4.8). By contrast, the the increased availability of FinTech has a greater impact on
medium-sized and large lenders in the case of refinancing operations (Table 4.9)
The relative resilience of traditional incumbent lenders in higher-income areas is
consistent with their comparative advantage at extending jumbo mortgages, more fre-
quently demanded by wealthier borrowers. This advantage arises from the traditional
banks’ ability to finance loans with their balance sheets. Conforming loans are much
easier to sell than jumbo loans, because they are eligible for securitization with the
participation of GSEs, while jumbo loans are not, and must, therefore, be kept in the
balance sheet. This argument is explored in depth by Buchak et al. (2020), who argue
that the balance sheet capacity of traditional banks is higher than that of FinTech,
who almost exclusively originate to distribute, due to higher capitalization.
Minority borrowers
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 presents the results of the regressions with the volume of ap-
plications and loan originations for minorities as dependent variables. In line with
Bartlett et al. (2019) I define ”minority borrowers” as a single group of borrowers
who are either African Americans or Hispanic, according to the HDMA records.17
I find that small and local lenders experience an increase in the volume of appli-
cations of minority borrowers after entry of FinTech lenders, particularly in higher-
17Previous studies that have analyzed credit access for minority borrowers using HDMA data
indicate that the increasing number of applications that do not report information on race and
ethnicity could diminish the validity or alter the interpretation of the results (e.g Avery et al., 2007;
Bartlett et al., 2019). I find that in the case of non-FinTech lenders the percentage of applications
where information on race or ethnicity is not available has not experienced significant changes in
recent years
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income counties (Panels A and B of Table 4.10). The effect is more substantial for
small lenders, who would see an increase in the number of applications in the period
where entry occurs and even one period after. Small lenders would also register an
increase in the number of applications lower and middle-income counties of around
2.8% and 4.3%, respectively.
In the case of medium-sized and large lenders, the results are similar to those found
in the specifications that include all applicants: after the entry of FinTech lenders,
there is a significant decrease in the number of applications. However, different pat-
terns emerge when analyzing the effects of entry across counties with varying levels of
income. The reduction in the number of applications of middle size lenders is greater
in the case of middle and higher-income counties. In contrast, for large lenders, the
largest drops would be seen in lower-income counties.
Table 4.11 presents the estimated effects of entry of FinTech on the number of
originations. I do not find significant effects associated to FinTech entry on the
volume of originations in low income counties. In middle income counties, I find that
an additional FinTech competitor would reduce the number originations of small,
medium-sized and large lenders, whereas in higher income counties the effects are
mixed, as small lenders would see an increase in the number of loan originations,
whereas large lenders would experience a reduction.
Denial Rates
Table 4.12 presents the results for the specifications where the dependent variable is
the denial rate. Panel A presents the results, including all applications, and Panel
B contains the results for minority borrowers. The magnitude of the effect of entry
on the total denial rate is small and not significant, except for medium and large
lenders. In the case of minority borrowers, the denial rate increased for small and
local lenders and reduced slightly for large lenders. These results are consistent with
those presented in Tables 4.10 and 4.11, since these types of loan providers experienced
a significant increase in their number of applications and no significant changes in the
volume of loan originations.
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Table 4.6: Effects of FinTech on the incumbents’ number of applications, by size and
type of lender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Low Income Middle Income Higher Income
Panel A. Local Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.0199** 0.0131 0.0382** -0.0136
(0.00931) (0.0176) (0.0157) (0.0167)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.00623 -0.0137 -0.0183 -0.00923
(0.0110) (0.0242) (0.0170) (0.0211)
Panel B. Small Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.00913 0.0285* 0.0125 0.00454
(0.00826) (0.0165) (0.0131) (0.0154)
Number FinTech (t− 1) 0.0177* 0.0200 -0.00822 0.0456***
(0.00931) (0.0201) (0.0154) (0.0174)
Panel C. Medium-sized Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.00229 -0.00913 0.0142 0.0104
(0.00687) (0.0149) (0.0108) (0.0114)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.0235*** -0.0444*** -0.0179 -0.0211*
(0.00710) (0.0146) (0.0121) (0.0120)
Panel D. Large Lenders
Number FinTech (t) -0.00374 -0.0146*** 0.0104 0.00463
(0.00245) (0.00504) (0.0107) (0.00389)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.0109*** -0.00958 -0.0202* -0.0109**
(0.00257) (0.00585) (0.0121) (0.00435)
Observations 15,125 4,255 6,265 4,605
Number of counties 3,025 1,072 1,689 1,131
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of applications received
by non-FinTech incumbent lenders, per type of lender and county. Lenders are classified as
local (active in less than 10 counties in the same state), small (present in less than 30 counties),
medium-sized (active in less than 90 counties) and large (active in more than 90 counties).
Columns present the results of the linear regression for different groups of counties based on
median Census Tract income (2010). Every specification includes a set of control variables
defined in Section 4.5.
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Table 4.7: Effects of FinTech on the incumbents’ number of loan originations, by size
and type of lender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Low Income Middle Income Higher Income
Panel A. Local Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.0145 0.0258 0.0212 -0.0190
(0.0100) (0.0193) (0.0165) (0.0172)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.0102 -0.00602 -0.0211 -0.0254
(0.0116) (0.0249) (0.0185) (0.0214)
Panel B. Small Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.00282 0.0141 0.0137 0.000211
(0.00927) (0.0183) (0.0147) (0.0176)
Number FinTech (t− 1) 0.00356 0.0149 -0.0216 0.0321*
(0.0101) (0.0215) (0.0173) (0.0186)
Panel C. Medium Lenders
Number FinTech (t) -0.00431 -0.0104 0.00706 -0.00195
(0.00756) (0.0160) (0.0119) (0.0133)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.0317*** -0.0435*** -0.0349** -0.0175
(0.00811) (0.0158) (0.0138) (0.0150)
Panel D. Large Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.00389 0.00379 0.00356 0.00923*
(0.00332) (0.00694) (0.0118) (0.00549)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.00706** -0.00125 -0.0369*** -0.0158***
(0.00338) (0.00778) (0.0138) (0.00593)
Observations 15,125 4,255 6,265 4,605
Number of counties 3,025 1,072 1,689 1,131
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of loan originations by
non-FinTech incumbent lenders, per type of lender and county. Lenders are classified as local
(active in less than 10 counties in the same state), small (present in less than 30 counties),
medium-sized (active in less than 90 counties) and large (active in more than 90 counties).
Columns present the results of the linear regression for different groups of counties based on
median Census Tract income (2010). Every specification includes a set of control variables
defined in Section 4.5.
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Table 4.8: Effects of FinTech on the incumbents’ number of loan home-purchase
originations, by size and type of lender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Low Income Middle Income Higher Income
Panel A. Local Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.000379 0.0218 0.00309 -0.0394*
(0.0117) (0.0230) (0.0199) (0.0207)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.00242 0.0312 -0.00158 -0.0410
(0.0139) (0.0281) (0.0234) (0.0261)
Panel B. Small Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.00219 0.0104 -8.75e-05 0.00185
(0.0136) (0.0257) (0.0215) (0.0186)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.00170 0.0152 -0.0410 0.0453**
(0.0152) (0.0310) (0.0258) (0.0203)
Panel C. Medium-sized Lenders
Number FinTech (t) -0.0274** -0.0217 -0.0336* -0.0125
(0.0119) (0.0259) (0.0178) (0.0215)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.0193 -0.0536** -0.0119 0.00869
(0.0123) (0.0269) (0.0206) (0.0215)
Panel D. Large Lenders
Number FinTech (t) -0.00152 0.00150 0.00160 -0.00497
(0.00513) (0.0112) (0.00754) (0.00714)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.00297 -0.00590 0.00208 -0.00141
(0.00543) (0.0128) (0.00691) (0.00774)
Observations 13,468 3,747 5,582 4,139
Number of counties 3,002 1,040 1,607 1,128
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of loan originations
by non-FinTech incumbent lenders, per type of lender and county. Lenders are classified
as local (active in less than 10 counties in the same state), small (present in less than 30
counties), medium-sized (active in less than 90 counties) and large (active in more than 90
counties). Columns present the results of the linear regression for different groups of counties
based on median Census Tract income (2010). Every specification includes a set of control
variables defined in Section 4.5.
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Table 4.9: Effects of FinTech on the incumbents’ number of loan refinancing opera-
tions, by size and type of lender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Low Income Middle Income Higher Income
Panel A. Local Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.00894 -0.00524 0.0265 0.00912
(0.0131) (0.0264) (0.0200) (0.0235)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.00993 0.0252 -0.00338 -0.0430
(0.0140) (0.0261) (0.0233) (0.0278)
Panel B. Small Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.0173 0.0288 0.0223 0.00185
(0.0121) (0.0260) (0.0198) (0.0186)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.000483 0.0145 -0.0118 -0.0453**
(0.0132) (0.0303) (0.0227) (0.0203)
Panel C. Medium-sized Lenders
Number FinTech (t) -0.0232** 0.000317 -0.0480*** 0.0162
(0.00912) (0.0179) (0.0153) (0.0161)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.0367*** -0.0141 -0.0412** -0.0555***
(0.0115) (0.0252) (0.0201) (0.0188)
Panel D. Large Lenders
Number FinTech (t) -0.0124*** 0.00709 0.00524 -0.0151**
(0.00458) (0.00923) (0.00708) (0.00745)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.00617 0.0194 -0.0196** -0.0165*
(0.00569) (0.0118) (0.00899) (0.00999)
Observations 13,974 3,932 5,803 4,239
Number of counties 3,025 1,058 1,634 1,140
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of loan originations by
non-FinTech incumbent lenders, per type of lender and county. Lenders are classified as local
(active in less than 10 counties in the same state), small (present in less than 30 counties),
medium-sized (active in less than 90 counties) and large (active in more than 90 counties).
Columns present the results of the linear regression for different groups of counties based on
median Census Tract income (2010). Every specification includes a set of control variables
defined in Section 4.5.
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Table 4.10: Effects of FinTech on the incumbents’ number of loan applications (mi-
nority borrowers), by size and type of lender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Low Income Middle Income Higher Income
Panel A. Local Lenders
Number FinTech (t) -0.0290** -0.0610** -0.00421 -0.0265
(0.0121) (0.0241) (0.0211) (0.0206)
Number FinTech (t− 1) 0.0256* 0.0233 0.0165 0.0464*
(0.0132) (0.0259) (0.0221) (0.0249)
Panel B. Small Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.0278** 0.0285* -0.00950 0.0597***
(0.0119) (0.0165) (0.0191) (0.0206)
Number FinTech (t− 1) 0.0455*** 0.0200 0.0428** 0.0727***
(0.0121) (0.0201) (0.0207) (0.0211)
Panel C. Medium-sized Lenders
Number FinTech (t) -0.00229 0.00545 -0.00367 0.00183
(0.0113) (0.0236) (0.0186) (0.0186)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.0253** 0.00457 -0.0327* -0.0533***
(0.0116) (0.0231) (0.0192) (0.0200)
Panel D. Large Lenders
Number FinTech (t) -0.0194*** -0.0266** -0.0192** -0.0106
(0.00491) (0.0104) (0.00798) (0.00769)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.0169*** -0.0214* -0.0156* -0.0160*
(0.00501) (0.0118) (0.00795) (0.00837)
Observations 15,125 4,255 6,265 4,605
Number of panel id 3,025 1,125 1,757 1,188
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average number of applications of
African-American and Hispanic borrowers received by non-FinTech incumbent lenders, per
type of lender and county. Lenders are classified as local (active in less than 10 counties in
the same state), small (present in less than 30 counties), medium-sized (active in less than
90 counties) and large (active in more than 90 counties). Columns present the results of the
regression for different groups of counties based on median Census Tract income (2010).Every
specification includes a set of control variables defined in Section 4.5.
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Table 4.11: Effects of FinTech on the incumbents’ number of loan applications (mi-
nority borrowers), by size and type of lender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Low Income Middle Income Higher Income
Panel A. Local Lenders
Number FinTech (t) -0.0127 -0.0376 0.00478 -0.00437
(0.0122) (0.0244) (0.0212) (0.0206)
Number FinTech (t− 1) 0.0142 0.0220 0.00572 0.0159
(0.0130) (0.0260) (0.0223) (0.0243)
Panel B. Small Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.0115 0.0313 -0.0331* 0.0582***
(0.0122) (0.0260) (0.0187) (0.0214)
Number FinTech (t− 1) 0.0101 -0.0282 0.0154 0.0346
(0.0124) (0.0252) (0.0222) (0.0213)
Panel C. Medium-sized Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.00355 0.00449 0.00352 0.00703
(0.0110) (0.0220) (0.0190) (0.0179)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.0205* 0.0279 -0.0445** -0.0286
(0.0119) (0.0262) (0.0204) (0.0185)
Panel D. Large Lenders
Number FinTech (t) 0.00375 -0.0204 0.00111 0.0273**
(0.00850) (0.0179) (0.0190) (0.0138)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.00767 0.0185 -0.0457** -0.0251*
(0.00843) (0.0188) (0.0204) (0.0139)
Observations 15,125 4,255 6,265 4,605
Number of panel id 3,025 1,125 1,757 1,188
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average number of loan originations
of African-American and Hispanic borrowers by non-FinTech incumbent lenders, per type
of lender and county. Lenders are classified as local (active in less than 10 counties in the
same state), small (present in less than 30 counties), medium-sized (active in less than 90
counties) and large (active in more than 90 counties). Columns present the results of the
regression for different groups of counties based on median Census Tract income (2010).
Every specification includes a set of control variables defined in Section 4.5.
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Table 4.12: Effect of FinTech on the denial rate of incumbent traditional lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local Small Medium Large
Panel A. Total denial rate - all borrowers
Number FinTech (t) -0.00267 -0.00276 0.00320** -0.00291***
(0.00302) (0.00205) (0.00163) (0.000679)
Number FinTech (t− 1) -0.00233 0.000107 0.00213 -0.000225
(0.00318) (0.00212) (0.00162) (0.000672)
Panel B. Total denial rate - minorities
Number FinTech (t) -0.00287 0.00181 -0.00842 -0.00200**
(0.00762) (0.00690) (0.00549) (0.000989)
Number FinTech (t− 1) 0.0165** 0.0170** 0.00334 -0.000187
(0.00786) (0.00698) (0.00561) (0.000905)
Observations 10,820 10,820 10,820 10,820
R-squared 0.131 0.125 0.263 0.102
Number of counties 2,309 2,309 2,309 2,309
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of applications that were denied
by non-FinTech incumbent lenders, per type of lender and county. Lenders are
classified as local (active in less than 10 counties in the same state), small (present
in less than 30 counties), medium-sized (active in less than 90 counties) and large
(active in more than 90 counties). Columns present the results of the linear
regression for different groups of counties based on median Census Tract income
(2010). Every specification includes a set of control variables defined in Section
4.5.
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4.7 Final Remarks
In this paper, I explore the response of incumbent lenders to the increased availability
of online mortgage lending in the United States. Several studies have focused on
understanding the business model of FinTech institutions and their direct role in
improving the mortgage market’s efficiency and accessibility. In this paper, I offer a
complementary analysis by describing the response of incumbent loan providers to the
increased competition created by these lenders and exploring the differences across
counties with varying levels of income.
I find that large financial institutions are the ones that exhibit the most consider-
able reduction in their volume of applications and originations after entry of FinTech
competitors. In contrast, local and small lenders tend to experience an increase in
their number of loan operations, particularly in higher-income counties after the ar-
rival of FinTech competitors. The reduction in the volume of loans provided by large
lenders is largely explained by the behavior of refinancing loan operations, where Fin-
Tech lenders seem to have a greater relative advantage. By contrast, large lenders
seem to be highly resilient to the advent of the new FinTech competitors in the seg-
ment of home-purchase mortgages. This resilience is consistent with the argument
that these institutions have a greater capability at financing unconventional mortgages
that have more difficulties for securitization in the secondary market.
When examining the behavior of the volume of loan originations of minority bor-
rowers in response to the increased availability of FinTech, I find that small lenders
seem to experience an increase in their volume of loan applications and originations
after an additional FinTech lender becomes available in the state. This results high-
light the importance of small lenders in the provision of credit for minority borrowers
across regions with different income levels and contrast previous studies that have
indicated that small and local lenders are more vulnerable to the arrival of platform-
based competitors. The mechanisms behind the positive effect on credit growth in
this segment will be explored in further detail in future extensions of this work.
The results highlight the differences in the financial services offered by incumbent
loan providers. Although the analysis presented here does not take into account
important differences in incumbent lenders’ regulatory requirements, this insight could
help us understand the effects of the development of online mortgage lending on credit
access across geographic markets.
When examining the overall effect of an increased availability of Fintech on the
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volume of loans at the county level, I find that their arrival was followed by a decrease
in the number of applications and loan originations by incumbent loan providers that
might not have been entirely compensated by online mortgage lending. Nevertheless,
this result could change if traditional lenders start to exploit the benefits of tech-
nological innovation developed by FinTech by transforming their own processes of
application and loan underwriting. Recently, policymakers and industry experts have
highlighted the benefits of partnerships between FinTech institutions and local lenders
to expand the portfolio of services available for consumers, exploiting the competitive
advantages of two different business models. While the effects of these alliances were
still incipient during the period of analysis that I consider here, their role in shaping
the competitive environment in the mortgage market industry should be considered
in more detail in future research.
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4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 HDMA data set: List of variables
For each application or loan:
• Application date and the date an action was taken on the application
• Action taken on the application
– Approved and originated
– Approved but not accepted by the applicant
– Denied (with the reasons for denial—voluntary for some lenders)
– Withdrawn by the applicant
– Closed for incompleteness
• Preapproval program status (for home-purchase loans only)
– Preapproval request denied by financial institution




– Insured by the Federal Housing Administration
– Guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs
















– Commercial bank, savings bank, or savings association
– Life insurance company, credit union, mortgage bank, or finance company
– Affiliate institution
– Other type of purchase




• Income relied on in credit decision
For each property:
• Location, by state, county, metropolitan statistical area, and census tract
• Type of structure
• Occupancy status (owner occupied, non-owner occupied, or not applicable)
For loans subject to price reporting:
• Spread above comparable Treasury security for applications taken prior to Oc-
tober 1, 2010
• Spread above average prime offer rate for applications taken on or after October
1, 2010
• Indicator of whether loan is subject to the Home Ownership and Equity Pro-
tection Act
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4.8.2 Additional descriptive statistics





























Notes: This Figure shows the evolution of the total number of loan originations of those institutions














Table 4.13: Summary Statistics: minority counties and rural areas
Minority counties Rural areas
2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017
Minority population (%) 47.96 47.94 47.96 15.20 15.19 14.87
Population 4, 804.78 4, 803.09 4, 864.62 3, 167.91 3, 153.73 3, 116.27
Number of disaster areas 9.89 7.53 8.10 0.13 0.13 0.19
Number of rural and underserved areas 0.18 0.18 0.18 2.30 2.30 2.32
Median income (2000) 55, 608.27 56, 189.47 56, 564.84 56, 765.72 57, 959.23 58, 360.55
MSA median income 103.26 103.40 102.36 96.51 96.47 97.66
Number of distressed areas 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.54 0.52 0.49
Number of Fintech lenders 2.44 4.38 4.63 1.55 2.86 2.76
Number of non Fintech lenders 166.75 174.30 175.68 51.17 54.08 54.33
Total applications 7, 962.15 9, 111.28 7, 861.34 264.81 292.09 271.21
Total loan originations 4, 080.19 4, 634.50 3, 990.70 134.74 145.92 138.18
FHA insured loans 722.38 768.30 657.41 13.80 15.31 14.93
Denial rate 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.21
Denial rate no Fintech 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.50
Denial rate Fintech 0.64 0.36 0.56 0.62 0.37 0.53
Market share FinTech (applications) 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.10
Market share FinTech (originations) 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11
HHI applications 726.05 662.91 631.89 939.63 866.26 858.23
HHI originations 935.05 868.69 817.62 1, 412.16 1, 294.51 1, 315.64
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